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ABSTRACT
Applications of ontologies/knowledge bases (KBs) in many domains (healthcare, national
security, intelligence) have become increasingly important. In this dissertation, we focus on
developing techniques for answering queries posed to KBs under the open world assumption
(OWA) 1.
In the first part of this dissertation, we study the problem of query answering in KBs that
contain epistemic information, i.e., knowledge of different experts. We study ALCKm, which
extends the description logic ALC by adding modal operators of the basic multi-modal logic
Km. We develop a sound and complete tableau algorithm ΛK for answering ALCKm queries
w.r.t. an ALCKm knowledge base with an acyclic TBox. We then consider answering ALCKm
queries w.r.t. an ALCKm knowledge base in which the epistemic operators correspond to those
of classical multi-modal logic S4m and provide a sound and complete tableau algorithm ΛS4.
Both algorithms can be implemented in PSpace.
In the second part, we study problems that allow autonomous entities or organizations (col-
lectively called querying agents) to be able to selectively share information. In this scenario,
the KB must make sure its answers are informative but do not disclose sensitive informa-
tion. Most of the work in this area has focused on access control mechanisms that prohibit
access to sensitive information (secrets). However, such an approach can be too restrictive in
that it prohibits the use of sensitive information in answering queries against knowledge bases
even when it is possible to do so without compromising secrets. We investigate techniques for
secrecy-preserving query answering (SPQA) against KBs under the OWA. We consider two
scenarios of increasing difficulty: (a) a KB queried by a single agent; and (b) a KB queried by
multiple agents where the secrecy policies can differ across the different agents and the agents
1The closed world assumption is the presumption that a statement that cannot be inferred from the KB, is
false. The open world assumption on the other hand is the presumption that a statement that cannot be inferred
from the KB is not necessarily false.
xcan selectively communicate the answers that they receive from the KB with each other sub-
ject to the applicable answer sharing policies. We consider classes of KBs that are of interest
from the standpoint of practical applications (e.g., description logics and Horn KBs). Given a
KB and secrets that need to be protected against the querying agent(s), the SPQA problem
aims at designing a secrecy-preserving reasoner that answers queries without compromising
secrecy under OWA. Whenever truthfully answering a query risks compromising secrets, the
reasoner is allowed to hide the answer to the query by feigning ignorance, i.e., answering the
query as “Unknown”. Under the OWA, the querying agent is not able to infer whether an
“Unknown” answer to a query is obtained because of the incomplete information in the KB or
because secrecy protection mechanism is being applied. In each scenario, we provide a general
framework for the problem. In the single-agent case, we apply the general framework to the
description logic EL and provide algorithms for answering queries as informatively as possible
without compromising secrecy. In the multiagent case, we extend the general framework for
the single-agent case. To model the communication between querying agents, we use a com-
munication graph, a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with self-loops, where each node represents
an agent and each edge represents the possibility of information sharing in the direction of the
edge. We discuss the relationship between secrecy-preserving reasoners and envelopes (used to
protect secrets) and present a special case of the communication graph that helps construct
tight envelopes in the sense that removing any information from them will leave some secrets
vulnerable. To illustrate our general idea of constructing envelopes, Horn KBs are considered.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of the World Wide Web (WWW) and the widespread use of distributed
databases and networked information systems offer unprecedented opportunities for productive
interaction and collaboration among individuals and organizations in virtually every area of
human endeavor. In many domains such as healthcare, with the increasing electronic data,
applications that store domain information and manipulate stored information in an automated
way have become more and more important. Knowledge representation and reasoning is an area
of artificial intelligence research that is concerned with representing knowledge symbolically
and manipulating the knowledge representation, by inference and otherwise, to create new
knowledge. This dissertation focuses on two topics in this area.
1.1 Query Answering in Epistemic Knowledge Bases
In many applications, due to the specific domain knowledge from different experts, the
ability to represent experts knowledge such as ‘Dr. Vos knows that swine flu is a life threat-
ening disease’ rather than just the facts as ‘swine flu is a life threatening disease’ is desirable.
Motivated by such applications, we study Description Logics (DLs) [1] which offer a power-
ful formalism for representing and reasoning with knowledge in a broad range of applications.
Many DLs have been investigated with respect to their expressivity and complexity [2, 3, 4, 5].
Some DLs provide the foundation for powerful practical languages to represent knowledge on
the web, e.g., DAML+OIL [6], OWL DL, OWL Lite [7], and reasoners (typically based on the
analytic tableau method [4]) can be used to draw inferences from these DL knowledge bases [7].
Because of its inferential feasibility and practical utility, the terminological knowledge repre-
sentation language ALC [2] is of particular interest. Representing knowledge in such a system
2amounts to introducing the terminology of the application domain through definitions of the
relevant concepts, and assertions that hold with respect to specific individuals in the domain.
However, terminological knowledge representation languages such as ALC lack the expressivity
needed to represent modal or epistemic aspects of knowledge.
Epistemic DLs allow us to address this limitation by providing a means to model as well
as reason about the knowledge of different experts using epistemic operators. The resulting
logic finds applications in settings where it is useful to be able to attribute specific pieces of
knowledge to individual experts.
In Chapter 2, we augment ALC with an acyclic TBox with modal operators that can ap-
pear in front of any concept expressions, yielding a language which we refer to as ALCKm.
We provide two sound and complete algorithms that can be implemented in PSpace for the
satisfiability of an ALCKm query with respect to an ALCKm knowledge base and the satisfi-
ability of an ALCS4m query with respect to an ALCS4m knowledge base where ALCS4m is
an epistemically motivated language whose syntax is identical to that of ALCKm, but whose
semantics is based on the modal logic S4m.
1.2 Secrecy-preserving Query Answering Problem
With the increasing reliance on networked knowledge bases in virtually all areas of hu-
man endeavor that involve interactions among organizations, those that provide healthcare
(hospitals, pharmacies, insurance providers), governmental agencies (e.g., intelligence, law en-
forcement, public policy), or independent nations acting on matters of global concern (e.g.,
counter-terrorism, international finance) call for information sharing between organizations.
However, the need to share information often has to be balanced against the need to protect
sensitive information or secrets from unintended disclosure, e.g., due to copyright, privacy, se-
curity, or commercial considerations. Barring few examples (see below), most approaches to
information protection, e.g., access control methods in databases [8, 9, 10, 11] and on policy
languages (see [12] for a survey), including those that focus on selective access to information
on the web [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] simply forbid the use of secret information in answering queries.
As Weitzner et al. [18] have recently noted, “excessive reliance on secrecy and up-front
3control over information has yielded policies that fail to meet social needs, as well as technologies
that stifle information flow”. The controlled query evaluation (CQE) framework [19] offers a
way to answer database queries without revealing secrets [20, 21, 22]. This work has focused
on protecting secrets in (typically relational) databases under the closed world assumption
(CWA), using techniques that may rely on lying (i.e., responding to queries with answers that
are inconsistent with the knowledge base) in addition to refusing to answer. However, KBs that
contain knowledge about the real world, e.g., scientific or medical knowledge are necessarily
incomplete. Hence semantics based on OWA is better suited than that based on CWA in such
settings. To the best of our knowledge, Bao et al. (2007) were the first to consider the SPQA
problem under OWA, albeit in the restricted setting of a hierarchical KB with a single querying
agent. In this case, query answering reduces to checking reachability in a directed acyclic graph,
and protecting a secret is tantamount to hiding the reachability of a given target node from a
given source node. More recently, Tao et al. (2010) provided a solution to the SPQA problem
for instance checking in the description logic EL, with a single querying agent.
In this part of this dissertation, techniques for secrecy-preserving query answering against
KBs under OWA are investigated in two scenarios of increasing difficulty: (a) a KB queried by
a single agent; and (b) a KB queried by multiple agents where the secrecy policies can differ
across the different agents and the agents can selectively communicate the answers that they
receive from the KB with each other subject to the applicable answer sharing policies.
In Chapter 3, a simplified version of the SPQA problem which consists of a single querying
agent is presented. Given a KB Σ and a finite set S of secrets, called a secrecy set, the
secrecy-preserving query answering problem aims at designing a secrecy-preserving reasoner
that answers queries without revealing any secrets. A formal framework modeling most of
the aspects of the problem is provided. In general, the answer to a query q against a KB Σ
can be “Yes” (q can be inferred from Σ), “No” (¬q can be inferred from Σ) or “Unknown”
(e.g., because of the incompleteness of Σ). We assume a cooperative rather than adversarial
scenarios in which the KB does not lie. However, whenever truthfully answering a query risks
compromising secrets in S, the reasoner associated with the KB is allowed to hide the answer
to the query by feigning ignorance, i.e., answering the query as “Unknown”.
4One way to answer queries while preserving secrecy is to evaluate every query when it is
posed to the KB. If the truthful answer to the query together the query history compromises
some secret, an “Unknown” will be retrieved. Otherwise, the query will be faithfully answered.
This strategy is called a lazy evaluation. Since this approach checks the query history every
time a query is posed, when the history gets larger, the response time gets longer, and therefore,
the approach is getting less and less appealing.
Therefore, we propose an approach in which we precompute a secrecy envelope used to
protect secrets such that the querying agent who has no access to the contents of the envelope
will not be able to deduce any secrets. To compute such an envelope, we try to “disrupt” all
proofs of secrets that an envelope needs to protect. To illustrate the basic idea, consider a
formula α ∧ β in propositional logic. Suppose Γ  α and Γ  β. Obviously, Γ  α ∧ β. If we
need to protect α∧ β, we must protect at least one of α and β, i.e., if α∧ β is a secret, at least
one of α and β will be in the corresponding envelope. The formula, α or β, that is relegated to
the envelope is “disrupting” a proof of α ∧ β from {α, β}. Roughly, an envelope will be built
from all the disrupting formulas.
It is easy to see that a secrecy envelope always exists. For instance, Σ+\ {tautologies}
constitutes an envelope for any secrecy set S ⊆ Σ+. A key challenge is to develop strategies
that can be used by the KB to respond to queries as informatively as possible (i.e., using an
envelope that is as small as possible) without compromising secrets that the KB is obliged to
protect. Unfortunately, it turns out that given a language that is expressive enough, computing
a minimum envelope may be NP-hard (see Section 3.5.1). Therefore, we aim at computing
envelopes that are tight in the sense that removing any information from such an envelope will
leave the secrecy set vulnerable. In general, if an envelope is finite, for each element in the
envelope, we could test whether it is necessary to protect the secrets. If it is not, it can be
removed. After all the elements in the envelope are tested, a tight envelope is obtained. Since
computing tight envelopes is an optimization problem, depending on the underlying language,
algorithms may be designed to directly build an envelope that is tight.
We apply this approach to EL [25], which is one of the simpler Description Logics (DLs)
that is both computationally tractable [26, 27, 28] and practically useful [25, 29]. For example,
5the medical ontology Snomed ct [30] and large parts of the medical ontology Galen [31]
can be expressed in EL. We provide algorithms to computes envelopes and tight envelopes to
answer queries against an EL knowledge base that use, but do not reveal, the information that
is designated as secret.
In Chapter 4, we extend the single-agent framework to multiple querying agents where the
querying agents are allowed to communicate by sharing some of the query answers obtained
from the KB. Since secrecy sets for different agents may be different, instead of allowing free
communication, which essentially eliminates the distinction between different agents, we use
a communication graph, a directed acyclic graph (except for all the self-loops) to restrict how
the agents communicate. In a communication graph, each node represents a querying agent
and each edge denotes the permission of information sharing from a querying agent to its
successor. We consider a general situation where agents are only allowed to pass their own
query answers obtained from the KB rather than “gossip” about the information obtained
from their predecessors. This chapter aims at designing a secrecy-preserving reasoner that
answers queries so that none of the querying agents can infer any of the secrets which the
knowledge base is obliged to protect against them.
Similarly to the single-agent case, we utilize OWA and protect secrets by feigning ignorance.
If the truthful answer to q risks compromising any of the querying agents’ secrets, the answer
to q will be censored to be “Unknown” by the KB reasoner. Such a reasoner can be designed
using lazy evaluation, which, as we mentioned before, becomes less attractive over time. In
view of this, we provide a general approach of precomputing an envelope such that none of the
querying agents can deduce any secrets that need to be protected against itself from the queries
answers it obtains from both the KB and its predecessors. We provide a general framework for
SPQA problem in the multiple querying agents setting and discuss the relationship between a
secrecy-preserving reasoner and an envelope that protects secrets. We then use Horn KBs as
an example to present the idea of computing envelopes by “disrupting” proofs.
6CHAPTER 2. QUERY ANSWERING IN EPISTEMIC KNOWLEDGE
BASES
Based on a paper titled “PSpace Tableau Algorithms for Acyclic Modalized ALC”
published in Journal of Automated Reasoning 2011
Jia Tao, Giora Slutzki and Vasant Honavar
Abstract
We study ALCKm, which extends the description logic ALC by adding modal operators
of the basic multi-modal logic Km. We develop a sound and complete tableau algorithm
ΛK for answering ALCKm queries w.r.t. an ALCKm knowledge base with an acyclic TBox.
Defining tableau expansion rules in the presence of acyclic definitions by considering only
the concept names on the left-hand side of TBox definitions or their negations allows us to
give a PSpace implementation for ΛK. We next consider answering ALCKm queries w.r.t.
an ALCKm knowledge base in which the epistemic operators correspond to those of classical
multi-modal logic S4m. The expansion rules in the tableau algorithm ΛS4 are designed to
syntactically incorporate the epistemic properties. We also provide a PSpace implementation
for ΛS4. In light of the fact that the satisfiability problem for ALCKm with general TBox and
no epistemic properties (i.e., KALC) is NEXPTIME-complete, we conclude that ALCKm offers
computationally manageable and practically useful fragment of KALC .
2.1 Introduction
Description Logics (DLs) [1] offer a powerful formalism for representing and reasoning with
knowledge in a broad range of applications. Many DLs have been investigated with respect to
their expressivity and complexity [2, 3, 4, 5]. Some DLs provide the foundation for powerful
7practical languages to represent knowledge on the web, e.g., DAML+OIL [6], OWL DL, OWL
Lite [7], and reasoners (typically based on the analytic tableau method [4]) can be used to
draw inferences from these DL knowledge bases [7]. Because of its inferential feasibility and
practical utility, the terminological knowledge representation language ALC [2] is of particular
interest. Representing knowledge in such a system amounts to introducing the terminology of
the application domain through definitions of the relevant concepts, and assertions that hold
with respect to specific individuals in the domain. However, terminological knowledge repre-
sentation languages such as ALC lack the expressivity needed to represent modal or epistemic
aspects of knowledge. Thus, in a pure terminological system, we can say that ‘swine flu is a
life threatening disease’ but not that ‘Dr. Vos knows that swine flu is a life threatening dis-
ease’. Epistemic DLs allow us to address this limitation by providing a means to model as well
as reason about the knowledge of different experts using epistemic operators. The resulting
logic finds applications in settings where it is useful to be able to attribute specific pieces of
knowledge to individual experts.
Motivated by such applications, there is growing interest in incorporating some features of
epistemic modal logics [32, 33, 34] into DLs [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. In general, in DLs augmented
with modal operators the interaction between modalities and DL constructs can substantially
increase the complexity of reasoning and in some cases, even lead to undecidability [41, 42, 43].
In a series of papers, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [44, 45, 46, 47] showed various decidability
results for the satisfiability problem for logics that augment DLs by modal operators. These
papers delineate some syntactical and semantical limits within which DLs augmented with
modal operators remain decidable; this line of research was summarized in [40].
There are also papers that provide decision procedures for languages that augment ALC
with modal operators. For example, Donini et al. [37, 38] investigated the addition of an
epistemic operator to an ALC-based query language and showed that this allows treatment of
several features of standard databases such as closed-world reasoning and integrity constraints.
The language is further extended by adding the autoepistemic operator A [48] such that the
resulting language combines the non-first-order features of frame-based systems with default
reasoning. Baader and Laux [39] extended ALC by adding multi-modal operators which can
8be used both inside concept expressions and in front of assertional (ABox) and terminological
(TBox) axioms but not in front of roles. The modal operators in the resulting language (later
named KALC in [40]), are interpreted in the classic multi-modal logic Km. By extending
the tableau expansion rules for ALC to incorporate accessibility relation between worlds, they
showed that the satisfiability of finite sets of formulae in KALC is decidable under the increasing
domain assumption (i.e., if a world w′ is accessible from a world w, then the domain of w is
a subset of the domain of w′). They further showed that their tableau algorithm for KALC is
not adequate under the constant domain assumption (a.k.a. common domain assumption in
[32]) where all worlds share the same interpretation domain. It has been shown in [44] that
the satisfiability problem w.r.t. models with increasing domains can be reduced to that w.r.t.
models with constant domains. Hence, the treatment in this chapter is based on the constant
domain assumption.
Lutz et al. [40] assumed a constant domain and a global interpretation for all individuals
(i.e., all individuals are interpreted identically in all worlds) and provided a tableau decision
algorithm for the KALC satisfiability problem. They observed that although infinitely many
individuals may be needed to construct a model for a satisfiable KALC formula, only finitely
many concepts are involved. Based on this observation, they designed a tableau algorithm
that constructs a quasimodel wherein each object represents a type of individuals (i.e., a set
of concepts they belong to) rather than the individuals themselves. The complexity of the
resulting tableau algorithm is NEXPTIME which is consistent with the known result that the
satisfiability problem for KALC is NEXPTIME-complete [42]. In contrast, the satisfiability
problem for ALC is known to be PSpace-complete [2, 49]. Hence, it is of interest to explore
computationally manageable, yet practically useful fragments of KALC . We investigate a subset
of KALC obtained by augmenting ALC with an acyclic TBox with modal operators that can
appear in front of any concept expressions, yielding a language which we refer to as ALCKm.
As in the case of KALC , ALCKm conforms to the constant domain assumption. We provide a
sound and complete tableau algorithm for ALCKm with an acyclic TBox.
As in the case of DL knowledge bases (see [50]), given an ALCKm knowledge base (KB) Σ,
the following problems are of interest: (1) KB-satisfiability : Σ is satisfiable if it has a model;
9(2) Concept satisfiability : a concept C is satisfiable w.r.t. Σ if there exist a model of Σ in which
the interpretation of C is not empty; (3) Subsumption: a concept C is subsumed by a concept
D w.r.t. Σ if for every model of Σ the interpretation of C is a subset of the interpretation of
D; (4) Instance checking : a is an instance of C if the assertion C(a) is satisfied in every model
of Σ. Instance checking problem can be viewed as a query answering problem. It is well-known
that problems (2)-(4) can be reduced to KB-satisfiability in linear time [50]. We solve the query
answering problem (whether the KB entails the query) by reducing it to the KB-satisfiability
problem.
The main contribution of this chapter is two PSpace implementations for the satisfiabil-
ity of an ALCKm query with respect to an ALCKm knowledge base and the satisfiability of
an ALCS4m query with respect to an ALCS4m knowledge base. This extends the result of
Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka [2] that checking satisfiability and subsumption of ALC concepts
can be decided in linear space. Hladik and Pen˜aloza [51] used automata-theoretic approach
to reprove the result that the ALC concept satisfiability w.r.t. acyclic TBoxes is decidable in
PSpace. Our solution takes advantage of:
1. Tableau expansion rules that can cope with acyclic definitions by considering only the
left-hand sides of TBox definitions or their negations. This approach allows us to detect
potential clashes and facilitates PSpace implementation by eliminating the need for
backtracking.
2. An extension of the idea of canonical interpretation [52, 50] that incorporates the TBox
definitions into the interpretation of concept names.
3. A blocking technique that facilitates the termination of the algorithm in the case of
ALCS4m.
In what follows, we introduce the syntax and semantics of ALCKm as well as the frame-
work of query answering problem in Section 2.2. We proceed to develop a sound and complete
algorithm for ALCKm KB-satisfiability with an acyclic TBox in Section 2.3, and then pro-
vide the solution to the query answering problem in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 shows a PSpace
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implementation for ALCKm KB-satisfiability. Section 2.6 develops a sound and complete al-
gorithm for ALCS4m KB-satisfiability w.r.t. the class of S4-models and provides a PSpace
implementation for the algorithm. Section 2.7 summarize the chapter.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 The Syntax and Semantics
The non-logical signature of the ALCKm language includes four mutually disjoint sets: a
set of concept names NC , a set of role names NR, a set of individual names NO, all of which
are countably infinite and a finite set of experts NE = {1, . . . ,m}. When we write i or ♦i, the
subscript i refers to an expert i ∈ NE . The syntax of ALCKm is defined by specifying ALCKm
expressions E and ALCKm formulae F. E contains the set of roles names NR and a set of
concepts C which is recursively defined as follows:
C,D −→ A | > | ⊥ | ¬C | C uD | C unionsqD | ∀R.C | ∃R.C | ♦iC | iC
where A ∈ NC , > is the top symbol, ⊥ is the bottom symbol, C,D ∈ C, R ∈ NR, i ∈ NE and
♦iC is an abbreviation of ¬i¬C.
In this paper we will consider restricted ALCKm formulae F of two kinds: the assertional
formulae of the form C(a) or R(a, b) and the definitional formulae of the form A
.
= C, where
a, b ∈ NO, C ∈ C, R ∈ NR and A ∈ NC .
A concept is said to be in negation normal form (NNF) if negation occurs only in front of
concept names. It is well-known that any concept can be rewritten into an equivalent negation
normal form in linear time [2].
The semantics of ALCKm language is defined by using Kripke structures [32]. A relational
Kripke structure for m experts is a tuple M = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 where S is a set of states,
Ei ⊆ S × S are the accessibility relations, and pi interprets the syntax of ALCKm, both the
expressions in E and the formulae in F for each state s ∈ S. A (Kripke) world is a pair
w = (M, s) where M is a Kripke structure and s is a state in S. The intuitive interpretation of
(s, t) ∈ Ei is that in world (M, s) expert i considers world (M, t) as a possible world. We may
further use Ei(s) to denote the set {t | (s, t) ∈ Ei} of the i-successors of the state s.
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For a finite set of symbols N ⊂ NC ∪ NR ∪ NO, we define a Kripke structure M =
〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 restricted to N to be M|N = 〈S, pi|N , E1, ..., Em〉 where pi|N denotes the re-
striction of the function pi to N .
All the concepts and roles will be interpreted in a common (i.e., state-independent) non-
empty domain which we denote by ∆. We do not make the Unique Name Assumption, i.e.,
distinct individual names can be interpreted identically. The interpretation of concept and role
expressions is defined recursively as follows: for all a ∈ NO, A ∈ NC , R ∈ NR, C ∈ C,
>pi(s) = ∆ (C unionsqD)pi(s) = Cpi(s) ∪Dpi(s)
⊥pi(s) = ∅ (C uD)pi(s) = Cpi(s) ∩Dpi(s)
api(s) ∈ ∆, (iC)pi(s) =
⋂
t∈Ei(s)C
pi(t)
Api(s) ⊆ ∆, (♦iC)pi(s) =
⋃
t∈Ei(s)C
pi(t)
Rpi(s) ⊆ ∆×∆, (¬C)pi(s) = ∆ \ Cpi(s)
(∀R.C)pi(s) = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀b : (a, b) ∈ Rpi(s) → b ∈ Cpi(s)}
(∃R.C)pi(s) = {a ∈ ∆ | ∃b : (a, b) ∈ Rpi(s) ∧ b ∈ Cpi(s)}
Definition 2.2.1 Let C be a concept, C(a) and R(a, b) assertional formulae, and A
.
= C a
definitional formula. We define the satisfiability relation as follows:
(M, s)  C ⇔ Cpi(s) 6= ∅ (M, s)  R(a, b) ⇔ (api(s), bpi(s)) ∈ Rpi(s)
(M, s)  C(a) ⇔ api(s) ∈ Cpi(s) (M, s)  A .= C ⇔ Api(s) = Cpi(s)
Let ϕ be a formula (assertional or definitional). Then (i) ϕ is satisfiable if there is a world
w = (M, s) such that w  ϕ; (ii) ϕ is valid in a Kripke structure M = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉, written
as M  ϕ, if (M, s)  ϕ for all s ∈ S; (iii) ϕ is valid, written as  ϕ, if M  ϕ for all M.
2.2.2 Knowledge Bases and Query Answering
A finite non-empty set of assertional formulae whose concepts and roles belong to the
language ALCKm is called an ABox. A finite set T of definitional formulae is called a TBox. A
concept name A directly refers to a concept name B w.r.t. T if there is a definition A .= C ∈ T
and B occurs in C. Let refers be the transitive closure of directly refers. Then T is said to be
12
acyclic if no concept name refers to itself. In this paper, a TBox is assumed to be acyclic such
that no defined concept (l.h.s. of a definitional formula) has more than one definition (r.h.s.
of a definitional formula). An ABox A and a TBox T together form an ALCKm-knowledge
base Σ = 〈A, T 〉. Note that all the KBs in this paper will be ALCKm-knowledge bases unless
specified otherwise. A knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉 is called acyclic if T is acyclic. Our query
language is the set of all assertional formulae over the alphabet of the given knowledge base.
Definition 2.2.2 A world w = (M, s) satisfies a knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉, written as w  Σ,
if w satisfies all the assertions in A and all the definitions in T . A knowledge base Σ entails
an assertion C(a), written as Σ  C(a), if for all worlds w, w  Σ⇒ w  C(a).
In this paper, our motivation is to answer queries of the form C(a) or R(a, b), i.e., whether a
is a member of the concept C, or whether (a, b) is a member of the role R. Given a KB Σ, a
concept C ∈ C, and an individual a ∈ NO, the answer to the query C(a) posed to Σ, is based
on the open world assumption (OWA) and it is defined as
• YES, if Σ  C(a),
• NO, if Σ  ¬C(a),
• UNKNOWN, otherwise.
Clearly, given Σ = 〈A, T 〉, answering the query C(a) is equivalent to checking the non-
satisfiability of 〈A ∪ {¬C(a)}, T 〉 in the following sense. If 〈A ∪ {¬C(a)}, T 〉 is not satisfiable,
the answer to the query is YES. Otherwise, if 〈A∪{C(a)}, T 〉 is not satisfiable, then the answer
to the query is NO; and if both are satisfiable, the answer to the query will be UNKNOWN.
The query answering framework contains the following components:
• A knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉.
• Σ includes epistemic statements that contain knowledge of the experts expressed using
modal operators.
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• A reasoner that knows every assertion and definition in Σ. In response to a query, it
computes answers such as “YES”, “NO”, or “UNKNOWN” from the information present
in Σ and returns the answer to the querying agent.
• A querying agent that poses queries of the form C(a) or R(a, b) to Σ. We assume that
the querying agent does know the language, NC , NR, NO, NE as well as the syntax of
the language. In particular, the querying agent can ask queries that involve knowledge
operators.
In the following example we consider a knowledge base with an ABox and an acyclic TBox
with exactly one operator on the right-hand side of each definition.
Example 2.2.3 Consider the following knowledge base Σ1 = 〈A, T 〉 where
A = { ADVISE(john, mary), TEACHES(susan, cs525), ♦1Advisor(susan),
♦2Grad(mary), 2Lecturer(susan), Advisor(john), ¬BasicCourse(cs525)}
T = { Lecturer .= ∀TEACHES.BasicCourse, Advisor .= Professor u A,
A
.
= ∃ADVISE.Grad }.
Consider the following queries:
Q1: Is john a professor?
Query: Professor(john); Answer: YES.
Q2: Is susan a lecturer?
Query: Lecturer(susan); Answer: NO.
Q3: Is there an Expert 1’s successor world where peter is a graduate student?
Query: ♦1Grad(peter); Answer: UNKNOWN.
Q4: In all Expert 2’s successor worlds, is it true that all courses that susan teaches are basic
courses?
Query: 2(∀TEACHES.BasicCourse)(susan); Answer: YES.
The answer to Q1 is explained by the assertion Advisor(john) and the definition Advisor
.
= Professor u A. The answer to Q2 comes from the assertions TEACHES(susan, cs525),
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¬BasicCourse(cs525) and the definition Lecturer .= ∀TEACHES.BasicCourse. To answer Q3,
observe that there is an Expert 1’s world where Advisor(susan) is true. However, under the
OWA, whether there is an Expert 1’s world where peter is a graduate student is UNKNOWN. In
answering Q4, for any Expert 2’s successor world (and there is one in view of ♦2Grad(mary)),
Lecturer(susan) is true. Since the definition Lecturer
.
= ∀TEACHES.BasicCourse is satisfied
in any such world, The answer to 2(∀TEACHES.BasicCourse)(susan) is YES.
2.3 Tableau Algorithm for ALCKm
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, answering queries against a knowledge base can be reduced
to the problem of checking existence of models. Tableau algorithms are generally used to
construct models. Such a model, usually built by using a data structure called a constraint
system [37, 39, 38, 40], contains a set of constraints and it is constructed by recursively applying
expansion rules.
In the presence of modal operators, we need to construct a model which eventually is
equivalent to a Kripke structure. Intuitively, one world corresponds to one constraint system,
and the accessibility relations connect one constraint system to another. Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be
a knowledge base. We define the concept of a constraint graph by generalizing the idea of a
completion tree in [53], and build it starting from a single node representing the constraint
system obtained from A and an input query and repeatedly applying expansion rules. The
constraints in constraint systems are of the form a : C or (a, b) : R, where a, b ∈ NO, C ∈ C
and R ∈ NR. Each assertion D(a) in A is rewritten into a constraint a : D′ where D′ is the
NNF of D; each R(a, b) in A is rewritten into a constraint (a, b) : R.
Formally, a constraint graph 1 is a directed graph G = 〈V,E,L〉 where V is a set of nodes,
E is a set of directed edges and L is a function that labels each node n with a constraint
system and each edge (n, n′) in E with a nonempty subset of NE . If i ∈ L(n, n′), then n′ is
an i-successor of n, i.e., it is directly accessible from node n by expert i. We denote by OG
(a subset of NO) the set of all individual names that occur in G. A node n ∈ V is said to be
1We use constraint graphs, rather than trees, with an eye towards an application to the case of S4-structures
in which the accessibility relations are reflexive and transitive.
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closed if L(n) contains a clash, i.e., {a : C, a : ¬C} ⊆ L(n) or {a : ⊥} ⊆ L(n). G is said to be
closed if at least one of its nodes is closed. A constraint graph that is not closed is open, and
it is complete if no expansion rule applies.
There are three types of expansion rules: local expansion rules which generate new con-
straints within one constraint system, global expansion rules which can add new assertions to
constraint systems associated with nodes that are directly accessible from the current node
and terminological expansion rules which take into consideration both the constraints in the
constraint systems and the given set of terminological definitions T . Note that the syntactic
construct ∃R.C encodes incomplete information. For example, ∃ADVISE.Grad(susan) says
that the individual susan advises a graduate student. However, who is this graduate student is
left unspecified. Under the OWA and without the Unique Name Assumption, to find a model
for the knowledge base containing this kind of assertions, it is sufficient to use a new individual
name that has not yet appeared in the constraint graph to denote this unknown person. If
using a new individual name causes a clash, then, a fortiori, using any existing individual name
will also cause a clash.
We denote by NΣ (OΣ) the set of all the symbols (individual names) appearing in the
knowledge base Σ. Initially, the constraint graph G contains only the individual names occur-
ring in Σ, i.e., OG = OΣ. With the application of expansion rules, new individual names may
be added to OG. An individual name is called fresh (at any particular time) if it belongs to
NO \ OG (at that time). The local and global expansion rules are listed in Figure 2.1.
We assume that the TBox T is in simple form where the right-hand side of each definition
contains exactly one operator, i.e., the right-hand side of each definition is of the form ¬C,C u
D,C unionsqD,∃R.C,∀R.C,♦iC or iC where C,D ∈ NC and R ∈ NR; moreover, if the right-hand
side is of the form ¬A, then A does not appear on the left-hand side of any definition in T (see
[54], Definition 6). It can be shown that transforming a given TBox to an equivalent simple
form can be done in linear time. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 in [54].
Nebel has shown that the straightforward unfolding of an ABox w.r.t. a TBox may lead
to an exponential blowup [55]. To give a PSpace complexity result for reasoning ALC with
acyclic TBoxes, instead of unfolding iteratively as in [55], the approach in [54] ensures that if an
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Local Expansion Rules:
u-rule: If there is a node n with a : C1 u C2 ∈ L(n),
and {a : C1, a : C2} * L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : C1, a : C2};
unionsq-rule: If there is a node n with a : C1 unionsq C2 ∈ L(n)
and {a : C1, a : C2} ∩ L(n) = ∅,
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : Ci} for some i ∈ {1, 2};
∃-rule: If there is a node n with a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n),
and there is no b ∈ OG s.t. {(a, b) : R, b : C} ⊆ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {(a, c) : R, c : C} where c is fresh;
∀-rule: If there is a node n with {a : ∀R.C, (a, b) : R} ⊆ L(n),
and b : C /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {b : C};
Global Expansion Rules:
♦-rule: If there is a node n with a : ♦iC ∈ L(n),
and n has no i-successor l with a : C ∈ L(l),
then add a new i-successor n′ of n with L(n′) := {a : C};
-rule: If there is a node n with a : iC ∈ L(n),
and n has an i-successor n′ with a : C /∈ L(n′),
then L(n′) := L(n′) ∪ {a : C}.
Figure 2.1 The local and global expansion rules for ALCKm
assertion a : C is in the ABox and a definition C
.
= D is in the TBox, then the assertion a : D
is added to the ABox. However, in the case when C
.
= D1uD2 ∈ T and {a : D1, a : D2, a : ¬C}
is a subset of a constraint system, such an approach may not detect the implicit clash. The
terminological expansion rules given in Figure 2.2 deal with this issue.
We denote by ΛK the K-tableau algorithm which nondeterministically applies the local,
global and terminological expansion rules until no further applications are possible. We note
again, following up on footnote 1, that the graph-structure constructed by ΛK is actually a
tree, referred to as a constraint tree. It is also easily seen that in a constraint tree the edge
labels are singletons. The following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma 2.3.1 All executions of ΛK on an input consisting of a knowledge base and a query
terminate.
The next definition provides a formal interpretation of a constraint graph.
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Terminological Expansion Rules:
T-rule: If there is a node n with a : A ∈ L(n), A .= D ∈ T , and a : D /∈ L(n)
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : D}.
N-rule: If there is a node n with {a : ¬A, a : B} ∩ L(n) 6= ∅, A .= ¬B ∈ T ,
and {a : ¬A, a : B} * L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : ¬A, a : B};
N u -rule: If there is a node n with a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= B1 uB2 ∈ T ,
and a : ¬B1 unionsq ¬B2 /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : ¬B1 unionsq ¬B2};
N unionsq -rule: If there is a node n with a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= B1 unionsqB2 ∈ T ,
and a : ¬B1 u ¬B2 /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : ¬B1 u ¬B2};
N∃-rule: If there is a node n with a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= ∃P.B ∈ T ,
and a : ∀P.(¬B) /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : ∀P.(¬B)};
N∀-rule: If there is a node n such that a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= ∀P.B ∈ T ,
and a : ∃P.(¬B) /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : ∃P.(¬B)};
N♦-rule: If there is a node n with a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= ♦iB ∈ T ,
and a : i¬B /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : i¬B}.
N-rule: If there is a node n with a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= iB ∈ T ,
and a : ♦i¬B /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : ♦i¬B}.
Figure 2.2 The terminological expansion rules for ALCKm
Definition 2.3.2 Let G = 〈V,E,L〉 be a constraint graph, M = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 a Kripke
structure, and σ a mapping from V to S. Then M satisfies G via σ if, for all n, n′ ∈ V,
• i ∈ L(n, n′) =⇒ Ei(σ(n), σ(n′))
• a : C ∈ L(n) =⇒ (M, σ(n))  C(a)
• (a, b) : R ∈ L(n) =⇒ (M, σ(n))  R(a, b)
We say that M satisfies G, denoted as M  G, if there is a mapping σ such that M satisfies G
via σ. In this case, we also say that M is a model of G. Note that M  G implies that G is
open.
The idea behind Definition 2.3.2 is that each constraint system is mapped to a state of
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M in which all its constraints are satisfied. Moreover, labeled edges in G are mapped to the
corresponding accessibility relations.
LetM = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 andM′ = 〈S, pi′, E1, ..., Em〉 be two Kripke structures, and N2 ⊆ N1
be finite subsets of NC ∪NR ∪NO such that N1 \N2 ⊆ NO. Then M′|N1 = 〈S, pi′|N1 , E1, ..., Em〉
is a semantic extension of M|N2 = 〈S, pi|N2 , E1, ..., Em〉 if (M′|N1)|N2 = M|N2 . The following
theorem shows that if a constraint graph has a model, then the constraint graph resulting from
the application of any expansion rule also has a model which is a semantic extension of the
original model.
Theorem 2.3.3 (Soundness of the expansion rules) Given a Kripke structure M = 〈S, pi,
E1, ..., Em〉 and an acyclic TBox T where M  T , let G be a constraint graph, α a local, global
or terminological expansion rule and Gα a constraint graph obtained by applying α to G. If
M  G via σ, then there exists a semantic extension Mα of M|NΣ∪OG s.t. Mα  Gα via σ′
(which extends σ) and Mα  T . Furthermore, Mα  G.
Theorem 2.3.3 (proof is given in Appendix A.1.1) ensures that applications of expansion
rules preserve the existence of models. Unfortunately, it does not specify how to construct such
models in the first place. The canonical interpretation of a constraint system has been defined
in [52, 50]. In [52], no TBox is involved, and the canonical interpretation is defined to be a
model for a constraint system that originates from an ABox of an ALCN knowledge base. The
approach in [50] incorporates the subsumptions in the TBox (not necessarily acyclic) into the
initial constraint system and then applies expansion rules. A subsumption, C v D, is converted
into a constraint ∀x.x : ¬C unionsq D in which, during the process of expansion, the variable x is
substituted by all possible individual names in the constraint system. The resulting algorithm
for ALCNR is in NEXPTIME. In contrast, our tableau algorithm for ALCKm incorporates
the TBox (in our case, acyclic) into the terminological expansion rules. This is reflected in
the following definition of a canonical Kripke structure for a constraint graph which takes the
TBox into account. It thereby ensures that the TBox is valid in the canonical Kripke structure
for an open constraint graph that is complete w.r.t. local, global and terminological expansion
rules.
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Definition 2.3.4 Let G = 〈V,E,L〉 be a constraint graph and T a simple acyclic TBox. Let
Θ be the set of all the concept names in either G or T that do not occur on the left-hand side
of any definition in T . The canonical Kripke structure MG = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 for G w.r.t. T
is defined as follows.
• S := V,
• Ei := {e ∈ E | i ∈ L(e)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
• ∆ := OG,
• api(n) := a for all a ∈ OG,
• Rpi(n) := {(a, b) | (a, b) : R ∈ L(n)},
• Api(n) := {a | a : A ∈ L(n)}, if A ∈ Θ,
• Api(n) := {a | a : A ∈ L(n)} ∪Dpi(n), if A /∈ Θ and A .= D ∈ T .
Let T be a given TBox and let G be a constraint graph that is complete w.r.t. local, global
and terminological expansion rules. We next prove that G is open if and only if it has a model.
This shows the soundness and completeness of the K-tableau algorithm. Before proving it,
we state an auxiliary lemma that specifically deals with negation (proof is given in Appendix
A.1.2).
Lemma 2.3.5 Let T be an acyclic TBox and let G be an open complete constraint graph w.r.t.
local, global and terminological expansion rules. Then for every A ∈ NC and every a ∈ ∆,
a : ¬A ∈ L(n)⇒ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
Theorem 2.3.6 (Soundness and Completeness of the K-Tableau Algorithm) Let T be a simple
acyclic TBox, and G be a constraint graph, complete w.r.t. local, global and terminological
expansion rules. Then G is open if and only if MG  G and MG  T .
Proof It suffices to prove the following:
• Claim 1. If G is open, then MG  G and MG  T .
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• Claim 2. If G is closed, then there does not exist a Kripke structure M such that M  G.
Proof of Claim 1. For Claim 1, suppose that the complete constraint graph G is open. We
first prove MG  G.
By the construction of MG, for every n, n′ ∈ V, i ∈ L(n, n′) ⇒ Ei(n, n′) and (a, b) : R ∈
L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  R(a, b) where R ∈ NR. The implication a : C ∈ L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  C(a)
where C ∈ C, is proved by induction on the structure of C. The base case is when C ∈ NC .
If C ∈ Θ, by the definition of Cpi(n), (MG, n)  C(a). If C /∈ Θ, then there is a definition
C
.
= D ∈ T , and again by Definition 2.3.4, Cpi(n) = {b | b : C ∈ L(n)} ∪ Dpi(n). Hence,
(MG, n)  C(a).
With respect to the induction step, the most involved case is that of the negation, which
was dealt with in Lemma 2.3.5. The remaining cases, namely, u,unionsq, ∃, ∀,♦, and , are proved
below.
1. C is of the form B1 u B2. Since G is complete, {a : B1, a : B2} ⊆ L(n). By IH,
a : B1 ∈ L(n) and a : B2 ∈ L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  B1(a) and (MG, n)  B2(a) ⇔ (MG, n) 
B1 uB2(a)⇔ (MG, n)  C(a).
2. C is of the form B1 unionsq B2. Since G is complete, {a : B1, a : B2} ∩ L(n) 6= ∅. By IH,
a : B1 ∈ L(n) or a : B2 ∈ L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  B1(a) or (MG, n)  B2(a) ⇔ (MG, n) 
B1 unionsqB2(a)⇔ (MG, n)  C(a).
3. C is of the form ∃R.B. Since G is complete, there exists b s.t. {(a, b) : R, b : B} ⊆ L(n).
Since (a, b) : R ∈ L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  R(a, b) and by IH, b : B ∈ L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  B(b),
(MG, n)  ∃R.B(a).
4. C is of the form ∀R.B. Since G is complete, for every b where (a, b) : R ∈ L(n), we have
b : B ∈ L(n). Since (a, b) : R ∈ L(n) ⇒ (MG, n)  R(a, b) and by IH, b : B ∈ L(n) ⇒
(MG, n)  B(b), (MG, n)  ∀R.B(a).
5. C is of the form ♦iB. Since G is complete, there exists n′ ∈ V s.t. i ∈ L(n, n′) and
a : B ∈ L(n′). Since i ∈ L(n, n′)⇒ Ei(n, n′) and by IH, a : B ∈ L(n′)⇒ (MG, n′)  B(a),
we have (MG, n)  ♦iB(a).
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6. C is of the form iB. Since G is complete, then for every n′ ∈ V where i ∈ L(n, n′), we
have a : B ∈ L(n′). Since i ∈ L(n, n′)⇒ Ei(n, n′) and by IH, a : B ∈ L(n′)⇒ (MG, n′) 
B(a), we have (MG, n)  iB(a).
We next show that T is valid in MG. Suppose that there is a node n and a definition
A
.
= D ∈ T such that (MG, n) 2 A .= D. Since A /∈ Θ, Api(n) := {a | a : A ∈ L(n)}∪Dpi(n), and
hence, Dpi(n) ⊆ Api(n). Suppose that Dpi(n) 6= Api(n). Then there is b ∈ OG such that b ∈ Api(n)
and b /∈ Dpi(n). This implies that b ∈ {a | a : A ∈ L(n)}. G being complete and b : A ∈ L(n)
imply that b : D ∈ L(n). We already proved that MG  G. So (MG, n)  D(b) ⇔ b ∈ Dpi(n),
which is a contradiction. It follows that for every definition A
.
= D ∈ T and for every n ∈ V,
(MG, n)  A .= D.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume that the complete constraint tree G is closed. Then there is a
node n in G such that {a : C, a : ¬C} ⊆ L(n) or {a : ⊥} ⊆ L(n). Suppose there is a Kripke
structure M and a mapping σ that satisfy G. Then api(σ(n)) ∈ Cpi(σ(n)) and api(σ(n)) ∈ ¬Cpi(σ(n)),
or api(σ(n)) ∈ ⊥pi(σ(n)). Either case leads to a contradiction.
Remark Firstly, note that Theorem 2.3.6 applies to general directed graphs (rather than just
trees as, e.g., in [53]). Secondly, it is crucial that G is complete w.r.t. all the local, global and
terminological expansion rules as given in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
Corollary 2.3.7 Given a simple acyclic TBox T , let G be a constraint graph that is com-
plete w.r.t. local, global and terminological expansion rules, and let M be an arbitrary Kripke
structure. Then, M  G =⇒ (MG  G ∧MG  T ).
Discussion. Designing a set of terminological expansion rules that provide a sound and com-
plete tableau algorithm, and also lead to a PSpace implementation is rather challenging. Recall
the example presented just before Lemma 1: Given a definition C
.
= D1 uD2 and a constraint
system L(n) = {a : D1, a : D2, a : ¬C}, to generate a “quick” clash, one may expand L(n) by
adding a constraint a : C. This would suggest a terminological expansion rule for the construct
u : “If there is a node n with {a : B1, a : B2} ⊆ L(n), A .= B1 u B2 ∈ T , and a : A /∈ L(n),
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {a : A}”. Similar terminological expansion rules could be defined for
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other constructs. However, treating ♦ and  analogously would require one to backtrack to
the parent node, which would vastly complicate the algorithm. To avoid backtracking, our
terminological expansion rules always examine the left-hand side of a definition and expand
the right-hand side whenever necessary. As we will see in Section 2.5, this idea facilitates the
PSpace implementation of the K-tableau algorithm ΛK 2.
2.4 Query Answering
In this section we show how to use the tableau algorithm to answer queries.
Theorem 2.4.1 Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a knowledge base, C a concept, and a ∈ NO. Let L(n0)
be the constraint system obtained from A ∪ {¬C(a)}. Then Σ  C(a) if and only if all the
complete constraint graphs generated by the tableau algorithm ΛK from n0 are closed.
Proof Assume the hypotheses. The proof can be split into two claims:
• Claim 1. If Σ  C(a), then all the constraint graphs generated by ΛK from n0 are closed.
• Claim 2. If Σ 2 C(a), then there is an open and complete constraint graph generated
by ΛK from n0.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume that Σ  C(a). By Definition 2.2.2, this means that for all
(M, s), (M, s)  Σ⇒ (M, s)  C(a). Suppose that G is an open and complete constraint graph
generated by ΛK starting from n0. By Theorem 2.3.6, MG  G and MG  T . By Theorem
2.3.3, (MG, n0)  L(n0). Because the set of constraints obtained from A∪ {¬C(a)} is a subset
of L(n0), we have (MG, n0)  A and (MG, n0)  ¬C(a). It follows that (MG, n0)  Σ and
(MG, n0)  ¬C(a). This contradicts that Σ  C(a).
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that Σ 2 C(a). By Definition 2.2.2, this means that for some
(M0, s0), (M0, s0)  Σ and (M0, s0) 2 C(a); this implies that (M0, s0)  T and (M0, s0) 
A ∪ {¬C(a)}. We construct an initial constraint graph G0 consisting of a single node n0 with
2If the terminological expansion rules go from left to right for definitions involving modalities (to avoid
backtracking) and go from right to left for definitions that do not involve modalities, then the resulting tableau
algorithm is incomplete. See an example in Appendix A.1.3.
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label L(n0) obtained from A∪{¬C(a)} and set the mapping σ0(n0) = s0. Obviously, M0  G0
via σ0. By Lemma 1 and repeated application of Theorem 2.3.3, there is an execution of ΛK
resulting a complete constraint graph G, a corresponding Kripke structure M and a mapping σ
such that M is a semantic extension of M0|NΣ where M  G (via σ) and M  T . Thus, M  G.
By Corollary 2.3.7, MG  G and MG  T where MG is the canonical Kripke structure of G. It
follows from Theorem 2.3.6 that G is open.
We revisit Example 2.2.3 to illustrate the use of tableau algorithm to answer queries against
an ALCKm knowledge base.
Example 2.4.2 (Example 2.2.3 continued.) Consider the knowledge base Σ1 = 〈A, T 〉 where
A = { ADVISE(john, mary), TEACHES(susan, cs525), ♦1Advisor(susan),
♦2Grad(mary), 2Lecturer(susan), Advisor(john), ¬BasicCourse(cs525)}
T = { Lecturer .= ∀TEACHES.BasicCourse, Advisor .= Professor u A,
A
.
= ∃ADVISE.Grad }.
Each query will be answered by constructing a constraint graph.
Q1: Is john a professor? Query: Professor(john).
In this example, since there are no concepts involving the construct unionsq or possibility of
generating a concept involving unionsq, there is only one complete constraint graph that can be
constructed from A ∪ {¬Professor(john)}. The constraint system L(n0) at the root node
n0 is listed below:
L(n0) ={ (john, mary) : ADVISE, (susan, cs525) : TEACHES, susan : ♦1Advisor,
mary : ♦2Grad, susan : 2Lecturer, john : Advisor, john : Professor,
john : A, john : ∃ADVISE.Grad, (john, x) : ADVISE, x : Grad,
john : ¬Professor, cs525 : ¬BasicCourse }
Because of the constraints “john : Professor” and “john : ¬Professor”, L(n0) has a clash
and the constraint graph is closed. Hence, Σ1  Professor(john) and the answer to the
query is YES.
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Q2: Is susan a lecturer? Query: Lecturer(susan).
We start by constructing a constraint system from A ∪ {¬Lecturer(susan)} and end up
with an open complete constraint graph G1 as follows.
L(n0) ={ (john, mary) : ADVISE, (susan, cs525) : TEACHES, susan : ♦1Advisor,
mary : ♦2Grad, susan : 2Lecturer, john : Advisor, john : Professor,
john : A, john : ∃ADVISE.Grad, (john, x) : ADVISE, x : Grad,
cs525 : ¬BasicCourse, susan : ¬Lecturer, susan : ∃TEACHES.¬BasicCourse }
L(n1) ={ susan : Advisor, susan : Professor, susan : A,
susan : ∃ADVISE.Grad, (susan, y) : ADVISE, y : Grad }
L(n2) ={ mary : Grad, susan : Lecturer, susan : ∀TEACHES.BasicCourse }
L(n0, n1) = {1}, L(n0, n2) = {2}.
The above G1 provides a model of 〈A ∪ {¬Lecturer(susan)}, T 〉. Therefore, we cannot
conclude “YES” to the original query. We then go on to construct a constraint graph
from A ∪ {Lecturer(susan)} and similarly to Q1, there is a clash in L(n0).
L(n0) ={ (john, mary) : ADVISE, (susan, cs525) : TEACHES, susan : ♦1Advisor,
mary : ♦2Grad, susan : 2Lecturer, john : Advisor, john : Professor, john : A,
john : ∃ADVISE.Grad, (john, x) : ADVISE, x : Grad, cs525 : ¬BasicCourse,
susan : Lecturer, susan : ∀TEACHES.BasicCourse, cs525 : BasicCourse }
Since there is only one constraint graph that can be constructed from A∪{ Lecturer(susan)
} and it has a clash, we conclude that Σ1  ¬Lecturer(susan) and therefore the answer
to the query is NO.
The queries Q3 and Q4 in Example 2.2.3 will be answered in the same way.
2.5 PSpace implementation of the Tableau Algorithm ΛK
The model constructed by the K-tableau algorithm ΛK may be exponential in the size of
input as illustrated by the following set of constraints a : Ci where Ci = ♦1Ai1u♦1Ai2u1Ci+1
(1 ≤ i < n− 1), and Cn = ♦1An1 u ♦1An2.
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We now describe the algorithm ALCKm-Sat (Algorithm 1), a PSpace implementation for
the tableau algorithm ΛK. Given an ALCKm KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and an ALCKm query C(a),
the algorithm ALCKm-Sat decides whether C(a) is satisfiable with respect to Σ. The algo-
rithm ALCKm-Sat(Σ, C(a)) makes use of the recursive subroutine Sat(n, L(n)) that imposes
restrictions on the order in which expansion rules are applied so as to maintain only a single
path of the constraint tree at all times during its execution.
The algorithm ALCKm-Sat expands constraint systems in a depth-first manner (see Figure
2.3). The expansion procedure creates two kinds of successors: successors of individuals w.r.t.
roles that are created due to the ∃-rule, and successors of the current constraint system that
are created due to the ♦-rule.
Within each constraint system, before applying the ∃-rule or the ♦-rule, the algorithm
ensures that all the other local and terminological rules are applied exhaustively. Once this
process is completed, the resulting constraint system, say L(n), remains fixed until the time
when L(n) is removed. The algorithm then expands L(n), by applying the ∃-rule to a constraint
of the form b : ∃R.D ∈ L(n), and creates an R-successor, say x, of the individual b, and
constraints (b, x) : R, x : D that are put in a “temporary” set Lx(n). In the presence of (b, x) : R
and x : D, other expansion rules may become applicable to constraints in L(n) ∪ Lx(n). So
the algorithm then exhaustively applies local and terminological rules, except the ∃-rule. All
these newly created constraints, except for (b, x) : R, are only about the fresh individual x
and they are put into the set Lx(n). Since constraints about x cannot clash with constraints
about other individuals, we consider Lx(n) as an auxiliary constraint system specifically for
individual x. The algorithm checks in a depth first manner whether Lx(n) contains any clash
(Line 14-16). During the recursive call (Line 14), new auxiliary constraint systems, e.g., Ly(n),
may be created. Once Ly(n) was found to be satisfiable, the control returns to Lx(n) and Ly(n)
is removed. If still E(n) 6= ∅, another auxiliary constraint system will be created, and the space
previously used by Ly(n) will be reused. Once E(n) = ∅, D(n) is checked. If D(n) 6= ∅, the
♦-rule will be applied and a new constraint system Lx(n′) will be created (see Figure 2.3).
Expansion rules are applied in Lx(n′) the same manner as in L(n). If Lx(n′) has been fully
examined without any clash, the ♦-rule will be applied to another possible constraint and
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Algorithm 1 ALCKm-Sat(Σ, C(a))
ALCKm-Sat(Σ, C(a)) := Sat(n0,L(n0)), where Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and L(n0) is a constraint system
obtained from A ∪ {C(a)}.
Sat(n,L(n)):
1: while a local or terminological rule, except for the ∃-rule, is applicable to L(n) do
2: apply the rule (if it is a unionsq-rule, non-deterministically pick one choice),
add the new constraints to L(n)
3: end while
4: if L(n) contains a clash then
5: return “not satisfiable”
6: end if
7: E(n) := {a : ∃R.C | a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n) and there is no b s.t. (a, b) : R, b : C ∈ L(n)}
8: D(n) := {a : ♦iC | a : ♦iC ∈ L(n)}
9: while E(n) 6= ∅ do
10: pick one a : ∃R.C ∈ E(n) and let Lx(n) := {(a, x) : R, x : C} where x is fresh
11: while a local or terminological rule, except for the ∃-rule, is applicable to L(n) ∪ Lx(n)
do
12: apply the rule (if it is a unionsq-rule, non-deterministically pick one choice),
add the new constraint to Lx(n)
13: end while
14: if Sat(n,Lx(n)) = “not satisfiable” then
15: return “not satisfiable”
16: end if
17: discard Lx(n)
18: E(n) := E(n) \ {a : ∃R.C}
19: end while
20: while D(n) 6= ∅ do
21: pick one a : ♦iC ∈ D(n), create a new constraint system L(n′)
let L(n′) := {a : C} and L(n, n′) := {i}
22: while the -rule is applicable to L(n) do
23: apply the rule in L(n), add corresponding constraints to L(n′)
24: end while
25: if Sat(n′,L(n′)) = “not satisfiable” then
26: return “not satisfiable”
27: end if
28: discard L(n′)
29: D(n) := D(n) \ {a : ♦iC}
30: end while
31: return “satisfiable”
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another constraint system will be created using the same space of Lx(n′). When D(n) = ∅,
if no clash has been detected, Lx(n) is satisfiable. The control returns to L(n) and Lx(n) is
removed so that the same space can be reused for another “fresh” individual.
Figure 2.3 An Illustration of the Execution of Algorithm 1
The following example illustrates the operation of Algorithm 1.
Example 2.5.1 Suppose that we have an initial constraint system L(n) = {a : ∃R.♦1C, a :
∀R.∃R.♦2D, b : ♦1D}. The constraint systems and the auxiliary constraint systems are created
or removed in the following order:
1. Lx(n) = {(a, x) : R, x : ♦1C, x : ∃R.♦2D} is created;
2. Ly(n) = {(x, y) : R, y : ♦2D} is created;
3. Ly(n′) = {y : D} is created where (n, n′) = {2};
4. Ly(n′) is removed;
5. Ly(n) is removed;
6. Lx(n′) = {x : C} is created where (n, n′) = {1};
7. Lx(n′) is removed;
8. Lx(n) is removed;
9. L(n′) = {b : D} is created where (n, n′) = {1};
10. L(n′) is removed.
Eventually, the algorithm returns “satisfiable”.
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In reference to Figure 2.3, we note that at any one time only one path through the “tree”
is maintained. For example, when this path consists of · · · ,L(n),Lx(n),Lx(n′), · · · , the tem-
porary “nodes” Ly(n),Ly(n′), · · · would have already been processed and the space they used
can therefore be reused. At that point of time, the node L(n′), in Figure 2.3, has not yet been
created.
We now proceed to show that the ALCKm satisfiability problem can be solved in PSpace.
It suffices to show that ALCKm-Sat, the implementation of the tableau algorithm ΛK, runs in
PSpace.
Theorem 2.5.2 The tableau algorithm ΛK can be implemented in PSpace.
Proof Referring to the execution of ALCKm-Sat, within each (possibly auxiliary) constraint
system, the algorithm ALCKm-Sat takes one existential constraint a : ∃R.C at a time and
the auxiliary constraint system is reset for the newly created constraints that are all about the
witness individual of a : ∃R.C. The algorithm reuses the same space for new constraint systems
that are successors of the current system. The constraint system L(n′) is reset whenever such
a successor of the current constraint system is created.
Since the TBox is acyclic, the depth of the auxiliary constraint systems created due to
the ∃-rule or ♦-rule is linearly bounded by the length of the constraints in the original con-
straint system. Within each constraint system, the total number of constraints is polynomially
bounded by the number of constraints in the initial constraint system. Furthermore, in algo-
rithm ALCKm-Sat, once the ∃-rule is applied to a constraint b : ∃R.D ∈ L(n), it will not be
applicable to the same constraint again (Line 18). Similarly, for constraints of the form b : ♦iD,
after the ♦-rule is applied to it, the same rule will not be applicable to this constraint any more
(Line 29). It follows that the algorithm terminates and runs in PSpace.
2.6 Tableau Algorithm for ALCS4m
In this section we study ALCS4m, an epistemically motivated language whose syntax is
identical to that of ALCKm, but whose semantics is based on the modal logic S4m. The modal
logic S4m is well-suited to express epistemic knowledge in multiagent environments. This point
29
was argued eloquently in [56]. Given a knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a query C(a), we would
like to know whether Σ  C(a) w.r.t. all S4-structures defined as follows.
A Kripke structure M = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 is reflexive (transitive) if for every i ∈ NE , the
relation Ei is reflexive (transitive). M is an S4-structure if it is reflexive and transitive. It
can be easily shown that S4-structures satisfy the following two properties (see the analogous
axioms (A3) and (A4) in [33]):
(e1) (Truth) The facts known by experts are true; formally, for any world w, every i ∈ NE , if
w  iC(a), then w  C(a).
(e2) (Positive Introspection) If an expert knows something, then he/she knows that he/she
knows it; formally, for any world w, every i ∈ NE , if w  iC(a), then w  iiC(a).
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, checking whether Σ  C(a) can be reduced to the problem of
checking the existence of models. Given a knowledge base Σ and a query C(a), we would like to
build an open and complete constraint graph which can be used to construct an S4-structure
as per Definition 2.3.4. However, the K-tableau algorithm which utilizes only local, global
and terminological expansion rules is not sufficient for this purpose. For example, consider
a set of constraints A = {a : 1C, a : ¬C} with an empty TBox. Clearly, the constraint
graph G consisting of a single node labeled with A is open and complete w.r.t. local, global
and terminological expansion rules. By Theorem 2.3.6, there is a canonical Kripke structure
MG = 〈{s}, pi, ∅〉 such that MG  G. But MG is not an S4-structure for G since it is not
reflexive. In fact, due to reflexivity, G is not satisfiable in any S4-structure.
Accessibility Expansion Rules:
AT -rule: If there is a node n with a : iC ∈ L(n), and a : C /∈ L(n),
then L(n) = L(n) ∪ {a : C}.
A4-rule: If there is a node n with a : iC ∈ L(n),
and n has an i-successor n′ with a : iC /∈ L(n′),
then L(n′) := L(n′) ∪ {a : iC}.
Figure 2.4 The accessibility expansion rules
To address this problem, we adapt the K-tableau algorithm by adding two accessibility
expansion rules that implement the two properties (e1) and (e2) stated above and which will
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facilitate the construction of S4-models. They are shown in Figure 2.4. However, it turns
out that the tableau algorithm with the accessibility rules and the current local, global and
terminological rules may not terminate. Consider an initial constraint system L(n0) = {a :
1♦1C}. After an application of the AT -rule, a constraint a : ♦1C is added to L(n0) and
leads to the application of ♦-rule which creates a new constraint system L(n1) = {a : C} with
L(n0, n1) = {1}. After an application of the A4-rule followed by another application of the
AT -rule, L(n1) = {a : C, a : 1♦1C, a : ♦1C}. With the current tableau algorithm ΛK, a new
constraint system, say L(n2), will be created and contain the same constraints as L(n1); this
process will not terminate. Since S4-structures are reflexive, any world in the structure is an
i-successor of itself (i ∈ NE) and this suggests that we modify the condition of the ♦-rule such
that the ♦-rule is not applicable to a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) whenever a : C ∈ L(n). Unfortunately, this
modification by itself is not sufficient to ensure termination as is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 2.6.1 Consider an initial constraint system L(n0) = {a : 1♦1D, a : ♦1D, a :
1♦1∃R.1♦1C, a : ♦1∃R.1♦1C}. Applications of several expansion rules may lead to the
following constraint systems: L(n1) = {a : ∃R.1♦1C, (a, x) : R, x : 1♦1C, x : ♦1C}∪L(n0),
L(n2) = {x : C, x : 1♦1C, x : ♦1C} ∪ L(n0), and L(n3) = {a : ∃R.1♦1C, (a, y) : R, y :
1♦1C, y : ♦1C}∪{x : 1♦1C, x : ♦1C}∪L(n0) where L(n0, n1) = L(n1, n2) = L(n2, n3) = {1}
and individuals x, y were freshly chosen. Both L(n1) and L(n3) were created because of the
constraint a : ♦1∃R.1♦1C. The constraint system L(n2) was created because of the constraint
x : ♦1C. Since the ∃-rule always picks a fresh individual, the box-assertions for the previously
picked individuals will be carried along to the newly created constraint system. So there may be
larger and larger sets of constraints with the creation of new constraint systems.
To address this problem, we use a blocking technique. We define Bni = {a : iC ∈ L(n) | a ∈
NO, C ∈ C} for i ∈ NE . In a constraint tree, we say that n1 is an i-ancestor of nk and that nk
is an i-descendant of n1 if i ∈
⋂k−1
j=1 L(nj , nj+1) where k > 1. Among all the tableau expansion
rules that we use, there are two expansion rules that create new entities - the ♦-rule and the
∃-rule. To enforce termination, we must limit the applicability of these rules. Figure 2.5 lists
31
the “blocking” versions of these rules: the ♦b-rule and the ∃b-rule.
Definition 2.6.2 An assertion a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) is blocked by a node n′ if (i) n′ is an i-
ancestor of n, (ii) Bni = Bn
′
i , and (iii) a : C ∈ L(n′). An assertion a : ∃r.C ∈ L(n) is blocked
by an individual x ∈ OG \ OΣ if there is an ancestor n′ of n such that {a : ∃r.C, (a, x) : r,
x : C} ⊆ L(n′).
♦b-rule: If there is a node n such that none of the expansion rules except the ♦b-rule
is applicable to L(n), and
1. a : ♦iC ∈ L(n), a : C /∈ L(n),
2. a : ♦iC is not blocked,
3. n has no i-successor l with a : C ∈ L(l),
then add a new i-successor n′ of n with L(n′) := {a : C} and L(n, n′) = {i}.
∃b-rule: If there is a node n with a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n) and there is no b ∈ OG such that
{(a, b) : R, b : C} ⊆ L(n), then
(i) if there is an individual x ∈ OG \ OΣ such that a : ∃R.C is blocked by x,
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {(a, x) : R, x : C}; or
(ii) if a : ∃R.C is not blocked by any individual in OG \ OΣ,
then L(n) := L(n) ∪ {(a, c) : R, c : C} where c is fresh.
Figure 2.5 The ♦b-rule and the ∃b-rule
The u-, unionsq-, ∃b- and ∀-rules (respectively, the ♦b- and -rules/the AT - and A4-rules) are
jointly referred to as S4-local rules (respectively, S4-global rules/S4-accessibility rules). The
S4-local, S4-global, terminological and S4-accessibility expansion rules together are called S4-
rules. We denote by ΛS4 the S4-tableau algorithm which nondeterministically applies an S4-rule
until no rule is applicable. As was the case with ΛK, the graph-structure produced by ΛS4 will
be a tree. The next theorem establishes the soundness of the expansion rules used in ΛS4.
Theorem 2.6.3 (Soundness of expansion rules) Given an S4-structure M = 〈S, pi, E1, ...,
Em〉 and an acyclic TBox T with M  T , let G be a constraint graph, α an S4-rule and Gα
a constraint graph obtained by applying α to G. If M  G via σ, then there exists a semantic
extension Mα (also an S4-structure) of M|NΣ∪OG s.t. Mα  Gα via σ′ (which extends σ) and
Mα  T . Furthermore, Mα  G.
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Proof Assume the hypotheses. It suffices to prove that the ∃b-rule, the ♦b-rule and S4-
accessibility expansion rules preserve the existence of S4-models. In the other cases, Mα is a
semantic extension of M (see proof of Theorem 2.3.3) and hence, if M is an S4-structure, so is
Mα.
• If α is an AT -rule, then there is a node n with a : iC ∈ L(n) and a : C /∈ L(n). After
applying α, a : C ∈ L(n). Since M is reflexive, Gα obtained from G is satisfied by M via
σ.
• If α is an A4-rule, then there are two nodes n and n′ in G such that i ∈ L(n, n′),
a : iC ∈ L(n) and a : iC /∈ L(n′). After applying α, a : iC is added to L(n′).
Let n′′ be an arbitrary i-successor of n′. Because M  G and a : iC ∈ L(n), we have
(M, σ(n))  iC(a). Since M being transitive implies that n′′ is also an i-successor of
n, we have (M, σ(n′′))  C(a). Because n′′ is an arbitrary i-successor of n′, (M, σ(n′)) 
iC(a). Therefore, Gα obtained from G is satisfied by M via σ.
• If α is a ♦b-rule, then there is a node n such that none of the expansion rules except the
♦b-rule is applicable, a : ♦iC ∈ L(n), a : ♦iC is not blocked, and n does not have an
i-successor l with a : C ∈ L(l). By Definition 2.3.2, a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) implies (M, σ(n)) 
♦iC(a) which means that there is a world s with (σ(n), s) ∈ Ei and api(s) ∈ Cpi(s). There
are two cases. (i) If a : C /∈ L(n), then after applying the ♦b-rule, a new node n′ is added
to G with L(n′) = {a : C}, L(n, n′) = {i} and L(n, n′) = a : ♦iC. Extend σ to σ′ such
that σ′(n′) = s. M satisfies the resulting Gα via σ′. (ii) When a : C ∈ L(n), since M is
reflexive, (σ(n), σ(n)) ∈ Ei, then s = σ(n) and api(s) ∈ Cpi(s).
• If α is an ∃b-rule, then there is a node n with a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n) and there is no b ∈ OG such
that {(a, b) : R, b : C} ⊆ L(n). There are two cases. (i) If a : ∃R.C is blocked by x, then
x ∈ OG \ OΣ and there is an i-ancestor n′ of n such that x is a witness for the assertion
a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n′). Since a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n), we have (M, σ(n))  ∃R.C(a). So there exists
an element d ∈ ∆ such that (api(σ(n)), d) ∈ Rpi(σ(n)) and d ∈ Cpi(σ(n)). Let xpi(σ(n)) = d.
Then we have xpi(σ(n)) ∈ Cpi(σ(n)) and (api(σ(n)), xpi(σ(n))) ∈ Rpi(σ(n)). Therefore, the newly
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added constraints (a, x) : R and x : C are satisfied. (ii) If a : ∃R.C is not blocked, the
proof is same as that in Theorem 2.3.3).
In the case of ALCKm, since the KB is finite and the TBox is acyclic, there are finitely many
assertions in each constraint system and so the outdegree of each constraint system is finite.
Moreover, since no A4-rule is involved (and the TBox is acyclic), whenever a new constraint
system is created, the length of an assertion in the new constraint system is shorter than the
assertion that creates it. It follows that the length of a path is also finite and therefore, the
tableau algorithm ΛK terminates. However, in the ALCS4m case, because of the A4-rule, the
same assertion may be passed from one constraint system to its successor and so it is not
immediately obvious why the tableau algorithm ΛS4 terminates. The following lemma deals
with this issue.
Lemma 2.6.4 Given a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a query C(a), the S4-tableau algorithm ΛS4 that
takes 〈A ∪ {¬C(a)}, T 〉 as input terminates.
Proof It suffices to show that the constraint tree that ΛS4 creates is a finite tree and that each
constraint system contains finitely many constraints.
Let l be the total number of sub-expressions of all the concepts and roles that appear in Σ
or C(a). Within each constraint system, for each individual x ∈ OG, the number of assertions
involving individual x is bounded by l. Since the TBox is acyclic, at most one fresh individual
is chosen for each ∃-assertion and so the total number of individuals in each constraint system
is also bounded by l. Therefore, the size of each constraint system is O(l2). It follows that the
number of ♦-assertions in each constraint system and hence the outdegree of each node in a
constraint tree are O(l2).
Note that starting from the root, each path actually contains a sequence of i-edges followed
by a sequence of j-edges (j 6= i), and so on. Let i-sequence denote the sequence of nodes as well
as the constraint systems associated with them where nodes (except the starting node) are i-
descendants of the starting node. Also note that due to the ∃b-rule, for each ∃-assertion within
an i-sequence, at most one fresh individual will be chosen as witness and so there are O(l)
individuals within each i-sequence. It follows that the total number of distinct -assertions
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and ♦-assertions along each i-sequence of a constraint tree is O(l2). To show that the length
of each path of a constraint tree is finite, it suffices to show that (1) each i-sequence has finite
length, and (2) on each path, there are finitely many such sequences:
(1) Since there are O(l2) -assertions in one i-sequence of a constraint tree, there are O(l2)
i-assertions in each i-sequence. Due to the A4-rule, every i-assertion is passed to its i-
descendants. So there will be one constraint system L(n∗) in an i-sequence which contains all
the i-assertions that appear in this i-sequence. Starting from node n∗, each ♦i-assertion will
be expanded once and then will remain blocked so that the ♦b-rule is not applicable to this
assertion any more. Since there are O(l2) ♦i-assertions in an i-sequence, each i-sequence is
finite.
(2) If a j-sequence starts from the last node of an i-sequence (j 6= i), then no k-assertions
(k 6= j) can be passed to the constraint systems in the j-sequence (see A4-rule). There may
be two or more different i-sequences in one path. However, since the TBox is acyclic, the
constraint systems associated with two different i-sequences will be different and none of such
sequences can be repeated in one path. Specifically, every -concept appearing in the latter
i-sequence is a proper sub-concept of some -concept appearing in the former i-sequence (with
a shorter length). Therefore, the number of distinct such sequences in one path of a constraint
tree is finite.
Since each constraint system has finitely many constraints with a finite outdegree and each
path is finite, ΛS4 terminates.
Let G be an open and complete constraint tree resulting from ΛS4. To obtain an S4-model
for G, we need to construct a graph from G such that whenever a : ♦iC ∈ L(n), there is an
i-successor n′ of n such that a : C ∈ L(n′). Moreover, for each i ∈ NE , the set of edges labeled
by {i} should represent a reflexive and transitive relation. Formally, this is defined as follows.
Definition 2.6.5 Let G = 〈V,E,L〉 be an arbitrary constraint tree resulting from ΛS4. An S4
constraint graph GS4 = 〈V,E∗,L∗〉 is obtained from G as follows:
1. For every i ∈ NE ,
Ei := {(n, n′) | n, n′ ∈ V, either i ∈ L(n, n′) or a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) is blocked by n′},
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E∗i is the reflexive and transitive closure of Ei,
E∗ :=
⋃
i E∗i ;
2. For every n ∈ V and every e ∈ E∗,
L∗(n) := L(n),
L∗(e) := NE , if e is a self-loop edge,
L∗(e) := {i}, if e ∈ E∗i and e is not a self-loop edge.
Note that when i 6= j, Ei ∩Ej = ∅. Moreover, since G is a tree, E∗i ∩E∗j = {(n, n) | n ∈ V}.
The following lemma shows the relationship between G and GS4.
Lemma 2.6.6 If a constraint tree G = 〈V,E,L〉 is open and complete w.r.t. S4-rules, then
GS4 = 〈V,E∗,L∗〉 is also open and complete w.r.t. S4-rules. Moreover, GS4 is open and
complete w.r.t. local, global and terminological expansion rules.
Proof Suppose that G is open and complete w.r.t. S4-rules. Let us analyze the applicability
of the expansion rules in GS4.
• A4-rule: If an A4-rule is applicable in GS4, then there is a node n with a : iC ∈ L∗(n) =
L(n) and n has an i-successor n′ with a : iC /∈ L∗(n′). Since a : iC ∈ L(n) and G
is complete (specifically, the A4-rule is not applicable), n′ cannot be an i-descendant of
n in G. In view of the construction of E∗i (see Definition 2.6.5), there is an assertion
b : ♦iD ∈ L(n) that is blocked by a node n′′ (an i-ancestor of n in G) which is either n′
itself or an i-ancestor of n′. It follows from Definition 2.6.2 that Bni = Bn
′′
i . Moreover, if
n′′ is an i-ancestor of n′ in G, by the the A4-rule, we have Bn′′i ⊆ Bn
′
i . Hence, a : iC ∈
L(n′) = L∗(n′), which is a contradiction. Therefore, no A4-rule is applicable in GS4.
• -rule: Since no A4-rule is applicable in GS4 by the previous case, for any two nodes n,
n′ such that i ∈ L∗(n, n′), a : iC ∈ L∗(n) ⇒ a : iC ∈ L∗(n′). Furthermore, since no
AT -rule is applicable in G, a : iC ∈ L∗(n′) = L(n′) implies a : C ∈ L(n′) = L∗(n′).
Therefore, no -rule is applicable in GS4.
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• ♦b-rule: Since G is a subgraph of GS4, if an assertion a : ♦iC ∈ L∗(n) is not blocked by
any i-ancestor, a : C /∈ L∗(n) and there is no i-successor n′ of n such that a : C ∈ L∗(n′)
in GS4, same happens in G. However, this contradicts that G is complete w.r.t. ♦b-rule.
Therefore, no ♦b-rule is not applicable in GS4.
Since none of the A4-, - and ♦b-rules are applicable and all the constraint systems in GS4
remain the same as those in G, if no S4-local, terminological expansion rule, or AT -rule is
applicable in G, it is not applicable in GS4 either. Next we analyze the applicability of the ♦-
and ∃-rules.
• ♦-rule: If a ♦-rule is applicable in GS4, then there is a node n with a : ♦iC ∈ L∗(n) =
L(n), a : C /∈ L∗(n) = L(n) and n does not have an i-successor n′ in GS4 such that
a : C ∈ L∗(n′) = L(n′). This implies that in G the assertion a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) was blocked
by an i-ancestor n1 of n. It follows that a : C ∈ L(n1) and Bn1i = Bni . By Definition
2.6.5, there is an edge (n, n1) ∈ E∗i in GS4 and so n1 is an i-successor of n such that
a : C ∈ L∗(n1) = L(n1), which is a contradiction. Therefore, no ♦-rule is applicable in
GS4.
• ∃-rule: All constraint systems in GS4 are same as those in G. Moreover, G is complete
w.r.t. ∃b-rule, i.e., for every n ∈ V, if a : ∃R.C ∈ L∗(n), there is a witness x ∈ OG such
that {(a, x) : R, x : C} ⊆ L∗(n). Therefore, no ∃-rule is applicable in GS4.
It follows that GS4 is complete w.r.t. local, S4-local, global, S4-global, terminological and
S4-accessibility expansion rules. Furthermore, the constraint systems in GS4 are exactly the
same as the corresponding ones in G and since G is open, so is GS4.
Note that the converse implication of Lemma 2.6.6 does not hold. That is, GS4 = 〈V,E∗,L∗〉
being open and complete (w.r.t. S4-rules) does not imply that G = 〈V,E,L〉 is open and
complete (w.r.t. S4-rules). For example, suppose that we have L(n0) = {a : ♦1C, a : ♦1♦1C} =
L∗(n0), L(n1) = {a : ♦1C} = L∗(n1) and L(n2) = {a : C} = L∗(n2) where L(n0, n1) =
L(n1, n2) = {1}. G is not complete since n0 does not have a 1-successor l such that a : C ∈ L(l).
However, the corresponding GS4 is complete because (n0, n2) ∈ E∗1.
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The canonical Kripke structure MGS4 is obtained from GS4 using Definition 2.3.4. By
Definition 2.6.5, MGS4 is actually an S4-structure. To show the soundness and completeness
of the tableau algorithm ΛS4, we need to show that any complete constraint graph G (w.r.t
S4-rules) is open if and only if there is an S4-structure that satisfies G. The next lemma shows
that the canonical Kripke structure MGS4 is such an S4-structure for G.
Lemma 2.6.7 Let G = 〈V,E,L〉 be a constraint tree and GS4 = 〈V,E∗,L∗〉 the constraint
graph obtained from G by Definition 2.6.5. Let MGS4 = 〈S, pi, E1, ..., Em〉 be the canonical
Kripke structure of GS4. Then MGS4  GS4 ⇒MGS4  G.
Proof Suppose MGS4  GS4 via σ where σ is an identity function (see Definitions 2.3.2 and
2.3.4). Since for every n ∈ V, L(n) = L∗(n), E ⊆ E∗ and for every e ∈ E, L(e) = L∗(e), it is
clear that MGS4  G via σ. Hence, MGS4  GS4 ⇒MGS4  G.
Theorem 2.6.8 (Soundness and completeness of ΛS4) Let G = 〈V,E,L〉 be a complete con-
straint tree resulting from ΛS4 applied to a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 where T be a simple acyclic TBox.
Then G is open if and only if MGS4  G and MGS4  T .
Proof (⇒) Suppose that G is open and complete w.r.t. S4-rules. Let GS4 be the constraint
graph constructed from G by Definition 2.6.5. By Lemma 2.6.6, GS4 is open and complete w.r.t.
local, global and terminological expansion rules, and hence, by Theorem 2.3.6, MGS4  GS4
and MGS4  T . By Lemma 2.6.7, MGS4  G.
(⇐) The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Claim 2 in Theorem 2.3.6.
By Lemma 2.6.4, the S4-tableau algorithm ΛS4 terminates. Based on ΛS4, a PSpace im-
plementation ALCS4m-Sat for ALCS4m-satisfiability can be obtained following the approach
of ALCKm-Sat. The basic idea is to maintain a single path of the constraint tree during the
execution by imposing restrictions on the order of application of the expansion rules. The
algorithm ALCS4m-Sat(Σ, C(a)) (see Algorithm 2) calls the subroutine S4-Sat by providing
the input arguments n0 and L(n0), where Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and L(n0) is a constraint system ob-
tained from A∪{C(a)}. The subroutine S4-Sat differs from the subroutine Sat in Algorithm
1 mainly at the following points:
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Algorithm 2 ALCS4m-Sat
ALCS4m-Sat(Σ, C(a)) := S4-Sat(n0,L(n0)), where Σ = 〈A, T 〉, T is a simple acyclic TBox,
and L(n0) is a constraint system obtained from A ∪ {C(a)}.
S4-Sat(n,L(n)):
1: while an S4-local, terminological or AT -rule, except for the ∃b-rule, is applicable to L(n)
do
2: apply the rule (if it is a unionsq-rule, non-deterministically pick one choice),
add the resulting constraints to L(n)
3: end while
4: if L(n) contains a clash then
5: return “not satisfiable”
6: end if
7: E(n) := {a : ∃R.C | a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n) and there is no b ∈ OG s.t. (a, b) : R, b : C ∈ L(n)}
8: D(n) := {a : ♦iC | a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) is not blocked and a : C /∈ L(n)}
9: while E(n) 6= ∅ do
10: pick one a : ∃R.C ∈ E(n)
11: if a : ∃R.C is blocked by an individual x then
12: Lx(n) := {(a, x) : R, x : C} ∪ {x : D | x : D ∈ L(n)} and
L(n) := L(n) \ Lx(n)
13: else
14: Let Lx(n) := {(a, x) : R, x : C} where x is fresh
15: end if
16: while an S4-local, terminological or AT -rule, except for the ∃b-rule,
is applicable to L(n) ∪ Lx(n) do
17: apply the rule (if it is a unionsq-rule, non-deterministically pick one choice),
add the resulting constraint to Lx(n)
18: end while
19: if S4-Sat(n,Lx(n)) = “not satisfiable” then
20: return “not satisfiable”
21: end if
22: discard Lx(n)
23: E(n) := E(n) \ {a : ∃R.C}
24: end while
25: while D(n) 6= ∅ do
26: pick one a : ♦iC ∈ D(n), create a new constraint system L(n′)
let L(n′) := {a : C} and L(n, n′) := {i}
27: while the - or A4-rule is applicable to L(n) do
28: apply the rule to L(n), add corresponding constraints to L(n′)
29: end while
30: if S4-Sat(n′,L(n′)) = “not satisfiable” then
31: return “not satisfiable”
32: end if
33: discard L(n′)
34: D(n) := D(n) \ {a : ♦iC}
35: end while
36: return “satisfiable”
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• Lines 10-15 in S4-Sat implements the ∃b-rule which corresponds to Line 10 in Sat (see
Algorithm 1).
• In Lines 1 and 16, S4-Sat tests for the applicability of the S4-local, terminological and
AT rules except for the ∃b-rule instead of local and terminological rules except for the
∃-rule in Sat (Lines 1 and 11).
• In Line 8, S4-Sat chooses constraints of the form a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) only under the condition
that a : ♦iC is not blocked and a : C /∈ L(n) whereas Sat chooses constraints of the form
a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) without any restriction.
• In Line 27, S4-Sat tests for the applicability of the A4-rule in addition to the -rule in
Sat (Line 22).
It is clear that these changes do not affect the space requirements of ALCS4m-Sat. It follows
that the tableau algorithm ΛS4 can be implemented in PSpace.
2.7 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter we studied ALCKm and ALCS4m, knowledge representation languages ob-
tained by augmenting ALC with modal operators of the basic multi-modal logics Km and S4m.
The resulting logics allow us to represent and reason about the knowledge of multiple experts.
We developed sound and complete tableau algorithms ΛK and ΛS4 for answering queries w.r.t.
corresponding knowledge bases with acyclic TBoxes.
Instead of general concept inclusions allowed in KALC [40] which lead to a NEXPTIME
algorithm for satisfiability, the acyclicity restriction on the TBoxes is critical to achieving the
PSpace implementations for both algorithms. In particular, the tableau algorithm ΛK does
not need any blocking technique to ensure termination. Furthermore, we have introduced
expansion rules that have the following features:
• The expansion rules are quite efficient at detecting clashes in the tableau by avoiding
addition of concept memberships that are guaranteed not to lead to a clash during tableau
expansion. For example, when L(n) = {a : C, a : D} and A .= C u D ∈ T , we do
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not add a : A into L(n). The design of the terminological expansion rules aims at
detecting clashes only when necessary instead of fully expanding the constraint systems.
A consequence of this approach is that not all individuals are categorized as being in
or out (of the interpretation) of concept names. In this setting, it turns out that a
canonical interpretation, defined analogously to [50], is not sufficient to ensure that the
TBox definitions are valid in the model. Therefore, we had to introduce a new definition
of a canonical Kripke structure for a constraint graph to address this issue (see Definition
2.3.4).
• In the case of ΛS4, we not only have accessibility expansion rules that are designed to
syntactically incorporate the properties of S4-structures, but also use a blocking technique
that guarantees the termination of the algorithm and facilitates the construction of S4-
models. In KALC [40], since there is no acyclicity restriction on the formulas, in order to
prevent creating infinitely many individuals and ensure the termination of the algorithm,
each object is used to represent a type, i.e., a set of concepts that an individual belongs
to, rather than the individual itself. Thus, two “individuals” that have the same type
are deemed the same. This identification can be viewed as a “blocking” of sorts. In ΛS4,
the repetition of the same constraint in different constraint systems is caused because
of the epistemic property (e2) that is implemented as the A4-rule. To prevent creating
infinitely many individuals and ensure termination, we limit the generation of new entities
as follows. The ∃b-rule limits the creation of a new individual by reusing an existing one
created in some previous constraint system and the ♦b-rule limits the creation of a new
constraint system if there is an existing constraint system that can be used as a successor
of the current one. With this blocking technique, when ΛS4 terminates, the resulting
constraint tree is sufficient to detect clashes (see Definition 2.6.5 and Lemma 2.6.6).
If the resulting constraint tree is open and complete, the corresponding canonical S4-
structure can be constructed by adding edges to the constraint tree without the need to
change any constraint system.
The implementations of the tableau algorithms ΛK and ΛS4 trace a constraint tree one
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path at a time, and within each (possibly auxiliary) constraint system the algorithms deal with
constraints about the same “freshly” chosen individual one at a time, thus lending themselves
to PSpace implementations.
Our PSpace results for the satisfiability of ALCKm and ALCS4m extend the result of
Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka [2] for the satisfiability and subsumption of ALC concepts. Baader
et al. [57] have recently extended the PSpace result of [2] to ALC with transitive and inverse
roles. In light of this result, we conjecture that query answering against SIK, obtained by
replacing ALC with SI (ALC augmented with transitive and inverse roles), can also be imple-
mented in PSpace.
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CHAPTER 3. SECRECY-PRESERVING QUERY ANSWERING
FOR KNOWLEGDE BASES
Abstract
In this chapter, we investigate the secrecy-preserving query answering (SPQA) problem.
Given a knowledge base (KB) and a set of secrets that need to be protected against the querying
agent, the SPQA problem aims at designing a secrecy-preserving reasoner that answers queries
without compromising secrecy under the OWA. Whenever truthfully answering a query risks
compromising secrets, the reasoner is allowed to hide the answer to the query by feigning
ignorance, i.e., answering the query as “Unknown”. Under the OWA, the querying agent is not
able to infer whether an “Unknown” answer to a query is obtained because of the incomplete
information in the KB or because secrecy protection is being applied.
A simple solution to this problem is to evaluate every query when it is posed to the KB.
Since this approach checks the query history each time a query is posed, when the query
history gets longer, the response time to a query gets longer as well and hence the approach
becomes less and less attractive over time. In our approach, we maintain a secrecy system that
is initialized before any query is posed. This system contains a set of assertions that can be
inferred from the KB and a secrecy envelope that is used to protect the secrets, both restricted
to a finite set of expressions. When a query that was not evaluated during the prequery stage
is posed, the secrecy system will be expanded accordingly. The secrecy envelope contains a
set of assertions that “disrupt” all proofs of secrets so that none of the secrets can be deduced
by the information outside the envelope. To answer queries as informatively as possible, the
envelope should be as small as possible. Unfortunately, computing a minimum envelope may
be NP-complete. However, we could compute a tight envelope which is irredundant in the sense
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that removing any information from it will leave the secrecy set vulnerable.
We provide a general framework for answering queries while preserving secrecy and then
study query answering against EL knowledge bases. Given an EL knowledge base Σ and a set
S of secrets, we compute an envelope Ef ⊇ S by inverting the EL-tableau expansion rules. We
then provide two algorithms for computing tight envelopes, a naive approach and an optimized
one. We compare the complexity of the two approaches, including experimental results. With
the precomputed tight envelope, the answer to a query q posed to Σ will be censored if q can
be deduced from Σ and q ∈ Ef . Our approach allows more flexible information sharing than is
possible with traditional access control mechanisms.
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3.1 Introduction
The rapid expansion of the WWW and the widespread use of distributed databases and
networked information systems offer unprecedented opportunities for productive interaction and
collaboration among individuals and organizations in virtually every area of human endeavor.
However, the need to share information has to be balanced against the need to protect private,
confidential and otherwise sensitive information. The following example illustrates one such
scenario.
Example 3.1.1 (Healthcare) (a simplified version adapted from [58]): Suppose that Jane’s
mother Jill had breast cancer. Dr. James, Jane’s physician, who is aware of Jane’s family
history, concludes that Jane has a significant risk of developing breast cancer. He asks her to
undergo genetic screening for BRCA1 mutation (which is linked to an increased risk of breast
cancer) to determine the extent to which Jane is at risk of developing breast cancer. Suppose
Jane tests positive for BRCA1 mutation. Dr. James proceeds to prescribe her a certain drug
that he knows is effective at reducing the breast cancer risk for patients with BRCA1 mutation.
Jane purchases the medications from her pharmacy and wants to get reimbursed for the cost
of her prescription by her insurance company. If her insurance company finds out that she has
tested positive for BRCA1 mutation or that she has been prescribed certain drug(s) for breast
cancer, Jane risks losing her health insurance. In this setting, the knowledge base (KB) needs
to be able to certify to the insurance company that Jane qualifies for reimbursement for a drug
that is covered by her insurance policy without revealing the fact that she is on such drugs.
The preceding example illustrates the need for algorithms that can, given a knowledge base
Σ and a set S of secrets (perhaps specified using some secrecy policy1), answer queries against Σ,
using secrets in the deduction process and providing informative answers, whenever it is possible
to do so without compromising confidentiality. In this chapter, we investigate a simplified
version of the SPQA problem which consists only one single querying agent. Note that multiple
querying agents can be treated as a single querying agent whenever communication between
1Upon choosing an underlying language to express the information in the KB, a mechanism is needed to
transform the secrecy policies into secrets expressed by the chosen language. Such transformations are beyond
the scope of this paper.
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the agents is unrestricted. Given a KB Σ and a finite set S of secrets, called a secrecy set,
that need to be protected against the querying agent, the secrecy-preserving query answering
problem aims at designing a secrecy-preserving reasoner that answers queries without revealing
any secrets. We provide a general framework of how to answer queries without compromising
S. In general, the answer to a query q against a KB Σ can be “Yes” (q can be inferred from
Σ), “No” (¬q can be inferred from Σ) or “Unknown” (e.g., because of the incompleteness of
Σ). We assume a cooperative rather than adversarial scenarios in which the KB does not lie.
However, whenever truthfully answering a query risks compromising secrets in S, the reasoner
associated with the KB is allowed to hide the answer to the query by feigning ignorance, i.e.,
answering the query as “Unknown”.
One way to answer queries while preserving secrecy is to evaluate every query when it is
posed to the KB. If the truthful answer to the query together the query history compromises
some secret, an “Unknown” will be retrieved. Otherwise, the query will be faithfully answered.
This strategy is called a lazy evaluation. Since this approach checks the query history every
time a query is posed, when the history gets larger, the response time gets longer, and therefore,
the approach is getting less and less appealing.
Let Σ+ denote the set of all assertions that can be inferred from Σ. Given a finite secrecy
set S ⊆ Σ+, it is clear that answers to queries in S will be “Unknown”. However, since truthful
answers to certain queries that are not in S may reveal information in S, protecting just S is
not sufficient. It follows that we must protect a superset E of S (S ⊆ E ⊆ Σ+), which we
call a secrecy envelope for S, such that the querying agent who has no access to the envelope
will not be able to deduce any information in S. It is easy to see that a secrecy envelope
always exists. For instance, Σ+\ {tautologies} constitutes an envelope for any secrecy set
S ⊆ Σ+. A key challenge is to develop strategies that can be used by the KB to respond to
queries as informatively as possible (i.e., using an envelope that is as small as possible) without
compromising secrets that the KB is obliged to protect. Unfortunately, it turns out that given a
language, computing a minimum envelope may be NP-hard (see Section 3.5.1). Therefore, we
aim at computing an envelope that is tight in the sense that removing any information from it
will leave the secrecy set S vulnerable. In general, if an envelope is finite, after it is obtained,
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for each element in the envelope, we could test whether it is necessary to protect the secrets. If
it is not, it will be removed. After all the elements in the envelope are tested, a tight envelope
is obtained. Since computing tight envelopes is an optimization problem, depending on the
underlying language, algorithms may be designed to directly build an envelope that is tight.
We apply this approach to EL [25], which is one of the simpler Description Logics (DLs)
that is both computationally tractable [26, 27, 28] and practically useful [25, 29]. For example,
the medical ontology Snomed ct [30] and large parts of the medical ontology Galen [31] can
be expressed in EL. We provide algorithms to answer queries against an EL knowledge base
that use, but do not reveal, the information that is designated as secret.
In the case of EL, a KB contains an ABox A, a finite set of assertions and a TBox T , a
finite set of subsumptions. Given an EL-KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a secrecy set S, let SubE be
a finite set of expressions, initialized as the set of expressions occurring in Σ or S and some
of their subexpressions (see Section 3.4.1). We shall maintain a secrecy maintenance system
which we will initialize before any query is posed. It consists of SubE, Af , T f and Ef where
Af is a set of assertions deducible from Σ, T f is the set of subsumptions deducible from Σ,
and Ef ⊆ Af is an envelope for S, all restricted to SubE. Envelopes restricted in this fashion
will be termed partial envelopes. The answer to a query q ∈ Af is censored whenever q ∈ Ef .
When a query q whose expression is not in SubE is posed, the secrecy maintenance system
needs to be expanded before q can be answered. This includes updating SubE, Af , T f and
Ef .
We assume that T f is precomputed (see [59] for more details). The ABox Af is computed
using the EL tableau expansion rules. To compute Ef , we introduce the following idea. From
each original expansion rule, we construct a corresponding inverse expansion rule. We show
that the inverted system of expansion rules generates an envelope for S. To the best of our
knowledge, the idea of constructing a secrecy envelope by inverting the tableau expansion rules
is novel.
Since computing a minimum envelope in EL is NP-hard (see Section 3.5.1), instead of com-
puting a minimum envelope, we provide two polynomial time algorithms (one called the naive
and the other optimized) for computing tight envelopes. The naive algorithm first computes an
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envelope, then tests every assertion in the envelope whether or not it is redundant, and removes
those that are. The optimized algorithm guides the process as it builds up a tight envelope. It
avoids much unnecessary work of first putting an assertion in the envelope and then removing
it because of redundancy. Even though both approaches run in polynomial time, we show that
the optimized algorithm indeed is more efficient for applications whenever the sizes of the TBox
and the secrecy set are much smaller than that of the ABox.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the general framework
for the SPQA problem. From Section 3.3 to Section 3.6, we study the SPQA problem against EL
knowledge bases. In more detail, Section 3.3 introduces the EL secrecy-preserving framework.
Section 3.4 initializes the EL secrecy maintenance system. We provide a tableau algorithm
for computing Af and a tableau algorithm for computing Ef . In Section 3.5, we show that
computing a minimum envelope in EL is NP-complete and give an optimized algorithm for
computing tight envelopes. Section 3.6 discusses how to retrieve answers to queries for an EL
KB. Specifically, when a query is not in the current secrecy maintenance system, Af and Ef
need to be expanded. We show that such expansion will still lead to a tight envelope provided
we start with a tight envelope. Section 3.7 contains description of related work and we conclude
in Section 3.8.
3.2 General Framework of Secrecy-preserving Query Answering
3.2.1 Preliminaries
Let L be some appropriate (logic-based) description language which, for simplicity of nota-
tion, we also view as a set of sentences (viz., all sentences expressible in the language L). Let
L (or, just ) be a Tarski-style semantic entailment for L and suppose that `L (or, just `) is
an inference system for the language L that is sound and complete with respect to .
For Γ ⊆ L, we write Γ+ = {α | Γ `L α} for the inferential closure of a set of formulas Γ
and we say that Γ ⊆ L is inferentially closed if Γ+ = Γ. We also write ¬Γ = {¬α | α ∈ Γ}.
A formula α ∈ L is a tautology if  α. The set of all tautologies will be denoted by Taut.
Definition 3.2.1 A knowledge base (abbreviated, KB) over L is a triple K , 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉 where
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• Σ is a consistent finite subset Σ ⊆f L. It represents the information that is explicitly
stored in K. Σ+ represents all the assertions that the KB can infer. In the sequel, we
shall refer to both K and Σ as a knowledge base (KB).
• Q, the query space of K, is a subset: Σ+ ⊆ Q ⊆ L representing the set of all queries that
can be “legally” posed against K. We do not insist that Q = L which allows us to account
for possible restrictions that may be imposed on the querying agents.
• Ω, is the answer space. In most cases Ω = {Y,N,U} (for “Yes”, “No” and “Unknown”,
respectively). The “classical” answer space is Ω = {Y,N}.
A secrecy set S ⊆ Σ+ is a finite set of non-tautological statements that the KB is supposed to
protect against the querying agent. Associated with the KB K, there is a reasoning algorithm,
called a K-reasoner R : Q → Ω, which for a query q ∈ Q provides an answer R(q) ∈ Ω. For
any B ∈ Ω = {Y,N,U}, let QB = {α ∈ Q | R(α) = B}, for the set of all queries to which the
K-reasoner returns the answer B 2.
Definition 3.2.2 Given a KB K = 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉 and a secrecy set S, a secrecy-preserving K-
reasoner is a K-reasoner R : Q → Ω satisfing the following axioms:
• [Yes-Axiom] QY ⊆ Σ+;
• [No-Axiom] QN = ¬QY , {¬α | α ∈ QY };
• [Closure Axiom] (QY )+ = QY ;
• [Secrecy Axiom] (QY )+ ∩ S = ∅.
The triple 〈K, S,R〉 is called a secrecy-preserving query answering system (SQ system).
The Yes-Axiom ensures that all Y -queries are provable from Σ. The No-Axiom enforces a
match between the Y -queries and the N -queries and implies that QU is closed under negation:
¬QU = QU . The Closure Axiom requires the set of Y -queries is closed under inference. Finally,
the Secrecy Axiom ensures that secrets are “inferentially unreachable” from QY . A trivial
2Observe that the set {QY ,QN ,QU} forms a 3-partition of the query space Q.
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example of a secrecy-preserving reasoner is one which for every non-tautological query α ∈ Q,
R(α) = U .
Given a KB K and a secrecy set S, the secrecy-preserving querying answering (SPQA)
problem is to design a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner. The secrecy-preserving query answering
framework is based on the OWA where what cannot be inferred is considered unknown rather
than false. To protect confidential information, we utilize OWA and answer queries that relate
to secrets as “Unknown” so that the querying agent is not able to distinguish between (a) the
answer to the query is truly unknown, and (b) the answer is being protected for reasons of
secrecy. We call the set of queries whose answers are adjusted so as to protect secrets a secrecy
envelope (or just envelope) for the secrecy set. To answer queries as informatively as possible,
we aim to have envelopes as small as possible. The idea of envelopes is formalized below in a
purely semantic way.
Definition 3.2.3 Let K = 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉 be a KB and S a secrecy set on K. A set E, where
S ⊆ E ⊆ Σ+ \ Taut, is called a secrecy envelope (or envelope) for S if for every α ∈ E,
Σ+ \E 2 α. A secrecy envelope E is said to be tight if it satisfies an extra condition: for every
α ∈ E, there exists β ∈ S such that (Σ+ \ E) ∪ {α}  β.
Note that for any secrecy envelope E, its complement is closed under entailment, i.e.,
Σ+ \ E  α implies α ∈ Σ+ \ E. A secrecy envelope ensures that its contents is “semantically
hidden” from the outside. A tight envelope requires, in addition, that the envelope cannot be
reduced by changing the answer of a single query in E without revealing the secret information
that needs to be protected against the querying agent. Also note that secrecy envelopes as well
as tight envelopes are not unique. For example, E = Σ+ \ Taut is a secrecy envelope.
The following two theorems present a useful relationship between secrecy envelopes and
secrecy-preserving K-reasoners.
Theorem 3.2.4 Let 〈K,S,R〉 be an SQ system. Then E = Σ+ \ QY is an envelope for S.
Proof We first show that for every α ∈ E, Σ+ \ E 2 α. Suppose that there exists α ∈ E such
that Σ+ \ E  α. Since the proof system ` is complete w.r.t. , we have QY = (Σ+ \ E) ` α.
By the Closure Axiom, α ∈ QY , i.e., α ∈ Σ+ \ E. This contradicts α ∈ E.
50
Next we show that S ⊆ E. If α ∈ S \ E, then α ∈ Σ+ \ E = QY , contradicting the Secrecy
Axiom.
Theorem 3.2.5 Let K = 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉 be a KB, S a secrecy set on K and E a secrecy envelope
for S. Define a function RE: Q → Ω by
RE(α) =

Y if α ∈ Σ+ \ E,
N if ¬α ∈ Σ+ \ E,
U otherwise.
Then RE is a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner.
Proof We need to show that RE satisfies the four axioms.
• Yes-Axiom: By definition of RE, QY = {α | α ∈ Σ+ \ E} = Σ+ \ E ⊆ Σ+.
• No-Axiom: By definition of RE, QN = {α | ¬α ∈ Σ+ \ E} = {¬α | α ∈ Σ+ \ E} = ¬QY .
• Closure Axiom: It suffices to show that (QY )+ ⊆ QY . By definition of RE, QY = Σ+ \E.
Suppose that QY ` α and α /∈ QY = Σ+ \ E. By the soundness of `, QY  α and α ∈ E.
This contradicts the assumption that E is an envelope.
• Secrecy Axiom: Suppose that (QY )+∩S 6= ∅. Let α ∈ S s.t. QY ` α. Then, (Σ+ \E) ` α,
and by the soundness of `, (Σ+ \ E)  α. This contradicts the assumption that E is an
envelope.
3.2.2 A Simple SQ Reasoner – Lazy Evaluation
Given a KB K and a secrecy set S, a simple approach of answering queries while preserving
secrecy is to evaluate each query when it is posed, check whether truthfully answering the query
will compromise the secrecy and adjust the answer if necessary. Suppose that queries are posed
in an arbitrary but fixed order (history) H = {αk}∞k=1. The history H is said to be full if for
all α ∈ Q, α belongs to H. When a query αk is posed, the algorithm checks whether answers
to previous queries combined with the truthful answer to αk reveal secret information or not.
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If they do, αk will be answered as “Unknown”. Otherwise, αk can be faithfully answered.
This approach is greedy in that it makes sure that the secrecy is not compromised each time
when answering a query without considering how the current response may constrain answers
to future queries. Algorithm 3 implements this lazy approach. For the sake of simplicity of
presentation, it omits the actual responses and, instead, concentrates on the construction of
the sets QY , QN , and QU . Note that when the history H is not full, Algorithm 3 does not
define a total function Q → Ω and as such it does not satisfy the definition of K-reasoner. The
next lemma shows that for full history, Algorithm 3 defines a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner.
Algorithm 3 Lazy Evaluation Algorithm
Input: K = 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉 and S
Initialization: Let QY = QN := ∅, QU := S.
1: while true do
2: input α ∈ Q
3: if α /∈ QY ∪QN ∪QU then
4: if Σ+ ∩ {α,¬α} = ∅ then
5: QU := QU ∪ {α,¬α}
6: else
7: let α¯ ∈ {α,¬α} such that Σ ` α¯
8: if (QY ∪ {α¯})+ ∩ S 6= ∅ then
9: QU := QU ∪ {α,¬α}
10: else
11: QY := QY ∪ {α¯}
12: QN := QN ∪ {¬α¯}
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: end while
Lemma 3.2.6 Given a knowledge system K = 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉, a secrecy set S and a full query
history H = {αk}∞k=1, the lazy evaluation algorithm (Algorithm 3) defines a secrecy-preserving
K-reasoner.
Proof It is easy to see that Algorithm 3 satisfies Yes-Axiom and No-Axiom in Definition 3.2.2.
To show that the Secrecy Axiom is satisfied, we argue by induction on history of queries. In
the pre-query stage, QY = ∅ and so, since Taut ∩ S = ∅, (QY )+ ∩ S = ∅. For the induction
step, suppose that the condition (QY )+ ∩ S = ∅ holds, and consider the next query α ∈ Q. If
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Σ+∩{α,¬α} = ∅, then QY does not change, and the above condition is maintained. The same
holds true if (QY ∪{α¯})+∩S 6= ∅. So suppose that (QY ∪{α¯})+∩S = ∅. Then QY := QY ∪{α¯}.
So with the new value of QY , the same condition holds. Note that whenever a query is assigned
to be in QY ∪QN ∪QU , it will not be re-evaluated. Therefore, the property (QY )+ ∩ S = ∅ is
an invariant of the algorithm. It follows that the Secrecy Axiom is satisfied.
To show that the Closure Axiom is also satisfied, we assume that there is a query q ∈ (QY )+
and q /∈ QY . From q ∈ (QY )+, we conclude Σ ` q. This means that when q was first queried
and evaluated (i.e., when q was not in QY ∪ QN ∪ QU ), Algorithm 3 executes Lines 7-13.
Moreover, since q /∈ QY , the condition in Line 8 was satisfied. Hence, (QY ∪ {α})+ ∩ S 6= ∅.
This contradicts the invariant of the algorithm. Therefore, (QY )+ ⊆ QY . Since, obviously,
QY ⊆ (QY )+, the Closure Axiom is satisfied.
By Theorem 3.2.4, E = Σ+ \QY = Σ+∩QU where QY and QU are computed by Algorithm
3 is an envelope. The next theorem shows that E is actually a tight envelope.
Theorem 3.2.7 Given an SQ system 〈K, S, R〉 where R is defined as in Algorithm 3, every
query that can be deduced from Σ and is in QU belongs to a tight envelope.
Proof By Lemma 3.2.6, for full history, the lazy evaluation algorithm is a secrecy-preserving
K-reasoner. It then follows from Theorem 3.2.4 that E = Σ+ \ QY = Σ+ ∩ QU is an envelope
where QY and QU are obtained by Algorithm 3. Suppose that E is not tight. Then there exists
α ∈ E ⊆ QU such that for every β ∈ S, (Σ+ \ E) ∪ {α} 2 β. By the soundness of `, we have
(Σ+ \E)∪ {α} 0 β, i.e., QY ∪ {α} 0 β. This means that (QY ∪ {α})+ ∩ S = ∅. So when α was
queried for the first time, since Σ ` α and the condition in Line 8 is satisfied, α should have
been added to QY . However, this contradicts that α ∈ QU .
The lazy evaluation approach is simple, but as the number of queries increases, the set QY
gets larger, checking conditions in Line 8 takes longer time and so answering queries tends to be
more time consuming as the system continues to operate. Therefore, the system becomes less
and less user-friendly. In the next section, we propose another approach that answers queries
by computing envelopes based on the intrinsic properties of secrets.
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3.2.3 Computing Envelope
Consider a formula α∧β in propositional logic. If Γ  α and Γ  β, then obviously Γ  α∧β,
and hence if we need to protect α∧β, it is clear that we must protect at least one of α and β; i.e.,
if α∧β is in a secrecy set, at least one of α and β should be in the corresponding envelope. We
use a syntactic version of a generalization of this observation. Roughly, the idea is to “disrupt”
all proofs of secret information in S. The disrupting formulas will form an envelope for S. Since
finding proofs is a syntactic process, to construct an envelope, we invert the inference rules to
obtain disrupting formulas (see an example in Section 3.4.3). When an envelope is present, a
reasoner can be defined to answer queries while preserving secrecy according to Theorem 3.2.5.
In what follows, we formalize these ideas.
Given a language L and α ∈ L, we say that a finite set Γ ⊆f L is α-minimal if Γ  α and
for every β ∈ Γ, Γ \ {β} 2 α. Let Fα = {Γ | Γ is α-minimal}. If α is to be protected, at least
one element in each set in Fα has to be protected so that α cannot be entailed. Let φΓ be an
arbitrary but fixed element of a given set Γ. Note that, in particular, for Γ ∈ Fα, Γ  α, but
Γ \ {φΓ} 2 α. Also note that for two different sets Γ and Γ′, φΓ and φΓ′ may be same.
Theorem 3.2.8 Given a secrecy set S, define a sequence of sets where E0 = S and Ei+1 =
{φΓ | there is α ∈ Ei and Γ ∈ Fα}. Let E =
⋃∞
i=0Ei. Then E is an envelope for S.
Proof Suppose that for some α ∈ E, Σ+ \ E  α. Then for some finite subset Γ ⊆ Σ+ \ E,
Γ  α and Γ is α-minimal; and therefore, Γ ∈ Fα. By the definition of E, suppose α ∈ Ei.
Then, φΓ ∈ Γ ∩ Ei+1 and so Γ ∩ E 6= ∅, contradicting Γ ⊆ Σ+ \ E.
Once an envelope is computed, queries can be answered according to Theorem 3.2.5 without
revealing any secret. Note that E is not unique and may contain redundant information. We
would like to have envelopes as small as possible so that we can answer truthfully as many
queries as possible. However, given a language, deciding a minimum secrecy envelope may
be NP-complete (see Section 3.5.1). Because of this, we strive to obtain tight envelopes. If
an envelope E is finite, a simple approach is to test for each α ∈ E, whether or not it could
be removed from E without compromising S. That is, if there does not exist β ∈ S such that
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(Σ+\E)∪{α}  β, then α is removed from E. After all the elements in the original envelope are
tested, one will get a tight envelope. Also note that depending on the order in which elements
of E are tested, different tight envelopes may result. Further optimization techniques may be
developed according to the properties of the underlying language L and its native inference
system.
We have presented a general framework for answering queries posed to a knowledge base
containing secret information that need to be protected against the querying agent. For the
rest of this paper, we take the description language EL to illustrate how our secrecy-preserving
query answering framework can be applied to a specific language.
3.3 EL Preliminaries
3.3.1 Syntax and Semantics
The non-logical signature of the EL description language includes three mutually disjoint
sets: a set of concept names NC , a set of role names NR and a set of individual names NO.
The syntax of EL is defined by specifying expressions and formulae. EL expressions consist of
the set of role names NR and the set of concepts C which is recursively defined as follows:
C,D −→ A | > | C uD | ∃r.C
where A ∈ NC , > is the top symbol, C,D ∈ C and r ∈ NR. In this paper we will consider three
kinds of EL formulae: assertions of the form C(a) or r(a, b), definitions of the form A .= D
and general concept inclusions (GCI) of the form C v D where a, b ∈ NO, C,D ∈ C, r ∈ NR
and A ∈ NC .
The semantics of EL is defined by using an interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉 where ∆ is a non-
empty domain and ·I is a function that maps each individual name to an element in ∆, >
to ∆, each concept name to a subset of ∆ and each role name to a subset of ∆ × ∆. The
interpretation of concept expressions is extended recursively as follows: for all r ∈ NR and
C,D ∈ C, (C uD)I = CI ∩DI and (∃r.C)I = {a ∈ ∆ | ∃ b ∈ ∆ : (a, b) ∈ rI ∧ b ∈ CI}. For
a finite set of symbols N ⊂ NC ∪ NR ∪ NO and an interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉, we define an
interpretation I restricted to N to be IN = 〈∆, ·I |N 〉 where ·I |N denotes the restriction of the
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function ·I to N .
Definition 3.3.1 An EL-knowledge base (abbreviated, EL-KB) is a triple K , 〈Σ,Q,Ω〉 such
that
• Σ = 〈A, T 〉 where A contains a finite non-empty set of assertions over EL, named an
ABox, and T contains a finite set of definitions and GCIs over EL, named a TBox. As
in the general case (see Definition 3.2.1), we shall refer to both K and Σ as a knowledge
base.
• Q, the query space of K is a set of assertions.
• Ω, is the answer space. Since EL does not have negation, Ω = {Y,U} (for “Yes” and
“Unknown”, respectively).
A TBox T is normalized [60] if T contains only GCIs each of which is of the following form:
A v B, A1 u ... u Ak v B, A v ∃r.B or ∃r.A v B where A,Ai, B ∈ NC ∪ {>} (i ∈ {1, ..., k}).
It was shown that transforming a TBox into such a normal form can be accomplished in
polynomial time [60]. Henceforth, we will assume that all the subsumptions are in normal
form. From now on, we shall denote by T + the extended transitive closure of the TBox T (as
computed in [59]). For example, if D v E ∈ T , then ∃r.(C u D) v ∃r.E ∈ T +. Similarly,
A+ will denote the inferential closure of Σ restricted to assertions and is referred to as the
assertional closure of Σ.
A concept C is said to be atomic if C ∈ NC or C = ∃r.D where D ∈ C. Note that the
concepts on the right-hand side of subsumptions (in normal form) are all atomic. An assertion
C(a) is atomic if C is atomic. We denote by NΣ ⊆ NC ∪ NR ∪ NO the set of all the names
appearing in Σ and by OΣ the set of individual names appearing in Σ. Thus, OΣ ⊂ NO ∩NΣ
and NΣ \ OΣ ⊂ NC ∪NR.
Definition 3.3.2 Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a knowledge base, I = 〈∆, ·I〉 an interpretation, C,D ∈ C,
r ∈ NR and a, b ∈ NO. We say that I satisfies C(a), r(a, b), or C v D if, respectively, aI ∈ CI ,
(aI , bI) ∈ rI , or CI ⊆ DI . I is a model of Σ if it satisfies all the assertions in A and all the
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GCIs in T . Let α be an assertion or a GCI. We say that Σ entails α, written as Σ  α, if all
models of Σ satisfy α.
3.3.2 The Secrecy-preserving Query Answering Problem in EL
The scenario described in Example 3.1.1 can be more formally specified as an EL-KB.
Example 3.3.3 (Example 3.1.1, cont.) Let Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉 be a KB that contains information
about the patients, their health history, the prescriptions that they get from the physicians and
their insurance information.
1. ∃is child.A v CancerRisk 7. A v HasCancer
2. HasMutBRCA1 v ∃has pres.CancerDrug 8. Woman uHasCancer v A
3. ∃has pres.CancerDrug v CancerRisk 9. Woman(Jill)
4. ∃has pres.CoveredDrug v Reimburse 10. HasCancer(Jill)
5. CancerDrug v CoveredDrug 11. is child(Jane, Jill)
6. A vWoman 12. HasMutBRCA1(Jane)
The GCIs 1-8 form a subset of T1 (in normal form) and the assertions 9-12 form a subset of
A1. The secrecy set is S1 = {CancerRisk(Jane)}. In order for Jane to get reimbursed, when
the query Reimburse(Jane) is posed to the KB, the answer should be “Yes”. To protect Jane’s
privacy, the query CancerRisk(Jane) should be answered “Unknown”.
Given an EL-KB and a finite secrecy set S, the basic goal is to answer queries as informa-
tively as possible while preserving secrecy. It is obvious that protecting just secrets in S is not
enough to preserve secrecy. For instance, in Example 3.3.3, in order to protect Jane’s privacy,
the query CancerRisk(Jane) should be answered “Unknown”. However, by keeping just Can-
cerRisk(Jane) secret, the fact that Jane has cancer risk can still be inferred from statements
12, 2 and 3.
Since the SPQA problem is to design a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner, it follows from the
discussion in Section 3.2 that we could either (a) use the lazy evaluation outlined in Section
3.2.2, or (b) be somewhat more proactive and precompute a (partial) envelope to answer queries
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as per Theorem 3.2.5. In what follows, we focus on providing algorithms to compute envelopes
for the given knowledge system and secrecy set.
In the following, we make explicit some assumptions about the EL-SPQA problem.
• The EL reasoner R has an underlying inference system `EL that is complete in the sense
that it can infer (prove) an assertion α whenever Σ  α (such inference systems exist, see
[2], and Section 3.4.2). Specifically, the inference system ` should be able to decide:
– whether a given subsumption follows from the TBox T . Since a sound and complete
proof system dealing with this issue is given in [59], we shall use it without any
further ado.
– whether any given assertion can be inferred from Σ.
• The querying agent has the same inference capacity as R. Since we assume that `EL
is complete, this is not a restriction. The querying agent may log the history of all the
answers to its queries and draw conclusions from it.
• The querying agent has full access to the TBox T . This implies that the querying agent,
given any subsumption, can decide whether or not it follows from T .
• Queries in the query space Q are of the form C(a) or r(a, b). We assume that the querying
agent has computational access only to the signature of the knowledge base, i.e., all its
queries are over NΣ.
• A secrecy set S is a finite set of assertions over NΣ.
The reason for the last two assumptions is that, if an assertion α contains symbols not in NΣ,
based on OWA, the answer to α is “Unknown” and asking such queries or protecting such
queries is of no interest. We stress that the secrecy set S is not assumed to be a subset of the
ABox A. However, the individual names that occur in S do belong to OΣ.
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3.4 Initializing EL SQ System
In this section, we discuss the initialization of the secrecy maintenance system in detail.
Since the set of formulas that can be deduced from a given KB as well as an envelope may
be infinite, we compute a finite set SubE of some subexpressions of all concepts and roles
appearing in Σ = 〈A, T 〉 or S. Then we restrict all the relevant sets to SubE. For example, the
assertional closure of Σ is denoted by A+, and its restriction to SubE will be denoted by Af .
Similarly, T f will denote the restriction of T + to SubE. The set Af is called the assertional
closure of Σ (restricted to SubE). Obviously, since S ⊆ Σ+ is finite and all the concepts and
roles in S are also in SubE, S ⊆ Af .
In [2], authors gave a sound and complete inference system for ALC. We have chosen
another inference system (see Section 3.4.2) which is fashioned explicitly for EL and is more
amenable to rule inversion, a technique we shall use to construct envelopes (see Section 3.4.3).
To compute envelopes, we apply the idea of “disrupting” proofs discussed in Section 3.2.3; the
inverted rules help us find formulas that will disrupt all the proofs of secrets in S.
3.4.1 Computing SubE
In the prequery stage, SubE is the set of certain subexpressions of all the concepts and
roles appearing in Σ or S, and it is defined formally as follows:
• if C(a) ∈ A ∪ S, then C ∈ SubE; if r(a, b) ∈ A ∪ S, then r ∈ SubE;
• if C v D ∈ T , then {C,D} ⊆ SubE;
• if C1 u · · · u Ck ∈ SubE (all Ci are atomic), then Ci ∈ SubE (1 ≤ i ≤ k);
• if ∃r.C ∈ SubE, then {r, C} ⊆ SubE;
Note that SubE does not contain all the subexpressions of concepts appearing in Σ or S.
For example, if C1 u C2 u C3(a) ∈ A, then {C1, C2, C3, C1 u C2 u C3} ⊆ SubE. However,
C1uC2 /∈ SubE unless it is added to SubE in another way, for example, if ∃r.(C1uC2) ∈ SubE
or C1 u C2 v D ∈ T .
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When a query C(a) comes along with C /∈ SubE, it (and, possibly, some of its subconcepts)
will be added into SubE. As such, following an initial, pre-query phase, the system is built up
gradually depending on the history of queries. Also note that the initial size of SubE is linear
in the size of the KB Σ plus the size of the secrecy set S.
Example 3.4.1 (Example 3.1.1-3.4.7, cont.) The set of subexpressions of Σ1 and S1 is:
SubE1 = {∃is child.A, CancerRisk, HasMutBRCA1, ∃has pres.CancerDrug,
∃has pres.CoveredDrug, Reimburse, CancerDrug, CoveredDrug, A,
WomanuHasCancer, Woman, HasCancer, is child, has pres}.
3.4.2 Computing Af
The ABox Af is initialized as A and expanded by recursively applying assertion expansion
rules listed in Figure 3.1. We say that Af is assertionally closed, or that it is an assertional
closure of Σ, w.r.t. SubE, if no assertion expansion rule is applicable. The set of all the
individual names appearing in Af is denoted by Of . It is initialized as OΣ. New individuals
are introduced with the application of the ∃A2 -rule. We stipulate that all individuals in OΣ are
introduced at the same time and before any individual in Of \ OΣ. An individual a is said to
be fresh (at a particular time during the expansion process) if a ∈ NO \Of (at that time). An
individual a ∈ Of \ OΣ is blocked by an individual b ∈ Of if b was introduced earlier than a
(during the expansion process), and {C | C(a) ∈ Af} ⊆ {C ′ | C ′(b) ∈ Af}.
vA -rule: if C v D ∈ T f , C(a) ∈ Af and D(a) /∈ Af ,
then Af := Af ∪ {D(a)};
uA -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck ∈ SubE, {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ Af
and C1 u · · · u Ck(a) /∈ Af , then Af := Af ∪ {C1 u · · · u Ck(a)};
∃A1 -rule: if ∃r.C ∈ SubE, {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ Af and ∃r.C(a) /∈ Af ,
then Af := Af ∪ {∃r.C(a)};
∃A2 -rule: if none of the vA-, uA- and ∃A1 -rules are applicable, and
1. ∃r.C(a) ∈ Af ,
2. a is not blocked, and
3. for all b ∈ Of , {r(a, b), C(b)} * Af ,
then Af := Af ∪ {r(a, c), C(c)} where c is fresh, and Of := Of ∪ {c}.
Figure 3.1 Assertion Expansion Rules
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We denote by Λ the tableau algorithm which nondeterministically applies assertion expan-
sion rules until no further applications are possible. Since each expansion rule can be applied
polynomially many times (in the size of SubE), the computation of Af can be completed in
polynomial time. When an execution of Λ terminates, we have an assertionally closed ABox
Af . The following are observations about the individuals occurring in Af .
f1. For any role assertion r(a, b) ∈ Af , b ∈ OΣ ⇒ a ∈ OΣ and r(a, b) ∈ A.
f2. Once an individual a is found to be blocked by an individual a
′ while attempting to apply
the ∃A2 -rule (item 2), the set {C | C(a) ∈ Af} will remain fixed and will not change for
the remainder of the tableau algorithm Λ. In particular, a will always remain blocked by
a′.
f3. For all a ∈ Of \OΣ, if a was introduced via an application of the ∃A2 -rule to an assertion
∃r.C(b), then for any D ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ Af}, C v D. The proof of this observation can
be found in Appedix A.2.1.
Remark. Without blocking, the ∃A2 -rule may introduce infinitely many individuals for the
same existential concept expression as in this example: A v ∃r.A ∈ T f and A(a) ∈ A.
With blocking and the condition that the ∃A2 -rule has to be considered only when no other
assertion expansion rule is applicable, for each existential concept assertion ∃s.B(d) ∈ Af with
d ∈ Of \ OΣ, the expansion process will generate at most one new individual (besides d). A
typical example is the following. Suppose that we have {A v B,B v C,C v ∃r.A} ⊆ T f
and B(a) ∈ A. From B(a) ∈ A, we conclude that C(a),∃r.A(a) ∈ Af . Since a ∈ OΣ, a
is not blocked and the ∃A2 -rule is applicable to ∃r.A(a). Suppose that a fresh individual b is
introduced and r(a, b), A(b) are added to Af . As a consequence, B(b), C(b), and ∃r.A(b) are
also added into Af . There are two cases: (1) If b is blocked by a, by observation (f2), the
∃A2 -rule will never be applicable to ∃r.A(b), or (2) If b is not blocked by a (e.g., if A(a) /∈ Af ),
the ∃A2 -rule is applicable to ∃r.A(b) and a new individual c is introduced which will be blocked
by b (since the set of concepts that c belongs to is a subset of concepts that b belongs to and b
was introduced earlier than c).
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Example 3.4.2 Continuing Examples 3.1.1-3.4.1 with the KB Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉 and secrecy set
S1, by applying Λ, we can obtain the assertional closure of Σ1, denoted by Af1 , as follows.
Af1 = A1 ∪ {WomanuHasCancer(Jill), A(Jill), ∃is child.A(Jane), CancerRisk(Jane),
∃has pres.CancerDrug(Jane), has pres(Jane, a), CancerDrug(a), CoveredDrug(a),
∃has pres.CoveredDrug(Jane), Reimburse(Jane) }.
Let I1 = 〈∆, ·I1〉, I2 = 〈∆, ·I2〉 be two interpretations, and N2 ⊆ N1 be two finite subsets
of NC ∪ NR ∪ NO such that N1 \ N2 ⊆ NO. Then, I1N1 = 〈∆, ·I
1 |N1〉 is a semantic extension
of I2N2 = 〈∆, ·I
2 |N2〉 if (·I
2 |N2) = (·I
1 |N2). The following theorem shows the soundness of the
assertion expansion rules. The proof is in Appendix A.2.2.
Theorem 3.4.3 (Soundness of the Assertion Expansion Rules) Let Af be an assertionally
closed ABox obtained from Σ by applying the tableau algorithm Λ. For any C ∈ C ∩ SubE and
any a ∈ Of , if C(a) ∈ Af , then for every model I = 〈∆, ·I〉 of Σ, there is a semantic extension
of INΣ that satisfies C(a). In particular, if a ∈ OΣ, then Σ  C(a).
The following Theorem shows the completeness of the tableau algorithm Λ and its proof is
in Appendix A.2.3.
Theorem 3.4.4 (Completeness) Let SubE be the set of subexpressions obtained from a KB
Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite set of assertions S (see Section 3.4.1). Let Af be an assertionally
closed ABox obtained from Σ by applying the tableau algorithm Λ. Then for every concept
C ∈ C ∩ SubE and for every individual a ∈ Of , Σ  C(a)⇒ C(a) ∈ Af .
Note that the ∃A2 -rule helps us to build a model for the assertional closure Af . The vA-rule,
as we will see in Theorem 3.4.6, leads to a nice feature regarding different assertional closures
of the same Σ. Example 3.4.5 below shows that two different executions of Λ may lead to two
different assertional closures Af .
Example 3.4.5 Consider a KB Σ = 〈A, ∅〉 where A = {∃r.C(a),∃r.D(a),∃r.(CuD)(a)}. One
computation of the assertional closure Af of Σ is obtained by:
1. applying the ∃A2 -rule to ∃r.(C uD)(a) and introducing r(a, b), C uD(b);
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2. applying the vA-rule to C uD(b) and introducing C(b), D(b);
resulting Af = A ∪ {r(a, b), C uD(b), C(b), D(b)}. Another computation of Af is:
1. applying the ∃A2 -rule to ∃r.C(a) and introducing r(a, d1), C(d1);
2. applying the ∃A2 -rule to ∃r.D(a) and introducing r(a, d2), D(d2);
3. applying the ∃A2 -rule to ∃r.(C uD)(a) and introducing r(a, e), C uD(e);
4. applying the vA-rule to C uD(e) and introducing C(e), D(e);
resulting Af = A ∪ {r(a, d1), C(d1), r(a, d2), D(d2), r(a, e), C uD(e), C(e), D(e)}.
As illustrated in Example 3.4.5, even though different assertional closures of Σ can be
obtained from different executions of Λ, they differ only in assertions about individual names
that have been freshly chosen during the executions. This observation is formulated more
precisely in the next theorem. Let AfΣ denote the assertional closures Af restricted to the
individuals in OΣ.
Theorem 3.4.6 Given a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a secrecy set S, let Af1 and Af2 be two assertional
closures of Σ w.r.t. SubE obtained by different executions of Λ. Then Af1Σ = Af2Σ where Af1Σ
(Af2Σ) denotes Af1 (Af2) restricted to the individuals in OΣ.
Proof By symmetry, it suffices to prove that Af1Σ ⊆ Af2Σ. If C(a) ∈ Af1Σ, then we have
a ∈ OΣ and C ∈ C ∩ SubE. It follows from Theorem 3.4.3 that Σ  C(a). By Theorem 3.4.4,
C(a) ∈ Af2 . Since a ∈ OΣ, C(a) ∈ Af2Σ.
3.4.3 Computing Envelopes in EL-KBs
In this section, we illustrate how we apply the general idea of computing envelopes presented
in Section 3.2.3. The basic idea is to start from secrets, protect at least one premise from each
proof of each secret, and answer “Unknown” to the protected information. As we shall see, this
can be achieved by inverting the normal inference rules. Because of OWA, a querying agent
cannot distinguish between an answer “Unknown” that results from the reasoner’s incomplete
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information and an “Unknown” resulting from the reasoner’s need to protect secret information.
Since we have assumed that the querying agent can only ask queries over the vocabulary NΣ, the
information the reasoner needs to protect against need not include assertions about individuals
that are not in OΣ.
Remark. Axiom pinpointing [61, 62] was introduced to find out proofs for a given consequence
by computing a boolean formula that encodes all the axioms used for obtaining the consequence.
Specifically, axiom pinpointing in EL [62] aims at finding all the possible subsumptions used to
deduce the subsumption relation between two concepts. It has been shown in [63] that axiom
pinpointing is hard. Different from axiom pinpointing that finds minimal subsets of the original
KB that have the given consequence, to protect a secret, we need to find all the sets (some
of them may not be a subset of the original KB since our secrets are assertions rather than
subsumptions) that the given secret can be deduced from, and disrupt every such set so that
the secret is not deducible.
Example 3.4.7 (Example 3.4.2, cont.) For the given knowledge base Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉, consider
the secrecy set S1 = {CancerRisk(Jane)}. Here, the querying agent is the insurance company
and the queries include CancerRisk(Jane) and Reimburse(Jane). Because CancerRisk(Jane)
can be inferred from statements 12, 2 and 3 in A1, at least one of these assertions, e.g.,
statement 12, should be put into the envelope. Thus, HasMutBRCA1(Jane)∈ E1 for S1.
The following definition specializes the general definition of envelopes and tight envelopes
to EL-KBs (see Definition 3.2.3).
Definition 3.4.8 Given an EL-KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S ⊆ A+Σ, a secrecy
envelope (or envelope) for S, denoted by E, is a superset of S and a subset of A+Σ \ Taut such
that for every α ∈ E, A+Σ \ E 2 α where A+ is the assertional closure of Σ and A+Σ is A+
restricted to the individuals in OΣ. An envelope E is tight if for every α ∈ E, there exists β ∈ S
such that (AfΣ \ E) ∪ {α}  β.
Remark. (1) The computational idea behind this definition is that if the reasoner R answers
every query in E with “Unknown” and every query in A+Σ \ E with “Yes”, the querying agent
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will not be able to deduce any assertions in S. Note that the computation of a secrecy envelope,
as described above, happens in the pre-query stage. (2) When constructing a knowledge base
that involves secret or private information, the designer is faced with the problem of resolving
the tradeoff between the two goals of a good design: secrecy and informativeness. In order
to be as informative as possible, we aim to make E as small as possible. A tight envelope
E is irredundant in the sense that removing any assertion α from E (i.e., answering it with
“Yes” instead of “Unknown”) would leave the secrecy set S vulnerable. Thus, the problem of
how to efficiently compute tight envelopes is of much interest. In what follows, we first focus
on the primary goal of preserving secrecy. Based on the techniques used to achieve this goal,
we go on to present some methods that can be used to achieve the second goal of improved
informativeness.
To compute an envelope, we introduce the technique of inverting assertion expansion rules.
The intuitive idea behind inverting rules is that: if the conclusion of an expansion rule is to
be secret, then some of its premises must be secret as well. There are four assertion expansion
rules in Figure 3.1. Among these four rules, even if ∃A2 -rule is applicable to (AfΣ \ E)+, due
to OWA, the querying agent can only conclude that there exists an individual d that is the
witness for ∃r.C(a) and that d /∈ OΣ. However, since the querying agent has no computational
access to individual names that are not in OΣ (except, of course, the names introduced for its
own use), inverting ∃A1 - and ∃A2 -rules can be restricted to OΣ (without considering any “fresh”
individuals). Therefore, we do not need to invert the ∃A2 -rule. Figure 3.2 lists a set of secrecy
closure rules that can be used to compute an envelope, which we name Secrecy Closure Rules.
Note that the SQ system only maintains a finite part of an envelope that is a subset of Af .
vS -rule: if C(a) ∈ Af \ Ef , C v D ∈ T f and D(a) ∈ Ef , then Ef := Ef ∪ {C(a)};
uS -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ Ef and {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ Ef = ∅,
then Ef := Ef ∪ {Ci(a)} where 1 ≤ i ≤ k and Ci is atomic;
∃S -rule: if ∃r.C(a) ∈ Ef and {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ Af \ Ef with b ∈ OΣ,
then Ef := Ef ∪ {r(a, b)} or Ef := Ef ∪ {C(b)}.
Figure 3.2 Secrecy Closure Rules
We denote by ΛS the tableau algorithm which repeatedly and nondeterministically applies
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the secrecy closure rules where Ef is initialized as the given set S. When no further rules are
applicable, we say that Ef is closed w.r.t. S. It is clear that all executions of ΛS , on an input
consisting of the assertional closure Af of a KB and a finite set of assertions S, terminate. It
is also easy to see that ΛS takes polynomial time in the size of its input.
Example 3.4.9 For the given KB Σ1 and the secrecy set S1, with the assertional closure Af1
of Σ1, by applying ΛS, an envelope can be obtained and is listed as follows:
E′1 = {CancerRisk(Jane), ∃has pres.CancerDrug(Jane), HasMutBRCA1(Jane),
∃is child.A(Jane), is child(Jane, Jill) }.
Theorem 3.4.10 Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a KB and S ⊆ AfΣ be a finite secrecy set. If Ef is closed
w.r.t. S, then Ef is an envelope for S restricted to SubE.
Proof Since Ef is initialized as S, we have S ⊆ Ef . To show that Ef is an envelope, we need
to show that for every α ∈ Ef , AfΣ \Ef 2 α. Since the tableau algorithm Λ is sound, it suffices
to show that for every α ∈ Ef , AfΣ \ Ef 0 α, or, equivalently, (AfΣ \ Ef )f ∩ Ef = ∅.
Let A = AfΣ \ Ef . We prove that Af ∩ Ef = ∅ by induction on the construction of Af . We
use A′ (A′′) and O′ (O′′) to denote the ABox before (after) the application of an expansion
rule and the set of individual names appearing in A′ (A′′), respectively. Since AfΣ \Ef ⊆ Af , it
follows from Theorem 3.4.6 that, AfΣ, the assertional closure of 〈AfΣ \ Ef , T 〉 restricted to OΣ,
is a subset of AfΣ. Therefore, for each assertion C(a): C(a) ∈ A′′, a ∈ OΣ ⇒ C(a) ∈ Af .
The base case is when none of the assertion expansion rules has been applied yet, A′ = A.
Clearly, A ∩ Ef = ∅. We assume that A′ ∩ Ef = ∅ and show that A′′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
• If the vA-rule is applicable, then C(a) ∈ A′, C v D ∈ T f and D(a) /∈ A′. After
the application of the vA-rule, D(a) ∈ A′′. Suppose D(a) ∈ Ef . Because individuals
appearing in Ef are in OΣ, we have a ∈ OΣ, and so by Theorem 3.4.6, C(a), D(a) ∈ Af .
However, since Ef is closed, by the vS-rule, C(a) ∈ Ef , which contradicts A′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
Therefore, A′′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
• If the uA-rule is applicable, then {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A′, C1 u · · · u Ck(a) /∈ A′ and
C1 u · · · u Ck ∈ SubE. A′ ∩ Ef = ∅ implies that {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ Ef = ∅. After the
66
application of the uA-rule, C1u· · ·uCk(a) ∈ A′′. If A′′∩E 6= ∅, then C1u· · ·uCk(a) ∈ Ef .
Since Ef is closed, by uS-rule, there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) such that Ci(a) ∈ Ef , contradicting
A′ ∩ Ef = ∅. Therefore, A′′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
• If the ∃A1 -rule is applicable, then {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A′, ∃r.C ∈ SubE and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A′.
After the application of the rule, ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, A′ ∩ Ef = ∅, so in particular,
{r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A′ \ Ef . There are two cases:
– b ∈ OΣ. By (f1), a ∈ OΣ and r(a, b) ∈ A. It then follows from Theorem 3.4.6 that
r(a, b), C(b) ∈ AfΣ. Suppose ∃r.C(a) ∈ Ef . Since Ef is closed, by the ∃S-rule, either
r(a, b) ∈ Ef or C(b) ∈ Ef , contradicting A′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
– b /∈ OΣ. Suppose ∃r.C(a) ∈ Ef (and hence, a ∈ OΣ). Since b /∈ OΣ, b was
introduced earlier via an application of the ∃A2 -rule to some assertion in A′. In
view of r(a, b) ∈ A′, this assertion must be of the form ∃r.D(a). We have, by (f3),
D v C ∈ T f and so, ∃r.D v ∃r.C ∈ T f . Because a ∈ OΣ, it follows from Theorem
3.4.6 that ∃r.D(a) ∈ Af . Since Ef is closed, by the vS-rule, ∃r.D(a) ∈ Ef . However,
this contradicts A′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
Therefore, A′′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
• An application of the ∃A2 -rule introduces a fresh individual, say c /∈ OΣ, and adds two
assertions involving c to A′′. On the other hand, the tableau algorithm ΛS puts in Ef
only assertions involving individuals in OΣ. It follows that A′′ ∩ Ef = ∅.
Note that the whole initialization of the SQ system (including the computation of SubE,
Af and Ef ) is easily seen to be doable in polynomial time in the size of the KB Σ plus the size
of the given secrecy set S.
3.5 Tight Envelopes
Depending on the execution of ΛS , we may have different secrecy envelopes. Furthermore,
the construction of E resulting from ΛS may not result a tight envelope as shown in the following
example.
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Example 3.5.1 Suppose that the secrecy set S is {C uD(a), D uE(a)} and Σ = 〈A, ∅〉 where
A = {C(a), D(a), E(a)}. Depending on the choice made in the application of the uS-rule when
computing the secrecy envelope, we may have several envelopes:
• E1 = S ∪ {C(a), D(a)}, E2 = S ∪ {D(a), E(a)} — not tight;
• E3 = S ∪ {C(a), E(a)} — tight;
• E4 = S ∪ {D(a)} — minimum (and tight).
Since our goal is to answer queries as informatively as possible while preserving secrecy,
we would prefer to have a minimum envelope, i.e., an envelope of the smallest cardinality.
Unfortunately, to compute a minimum envelope is hard. Specifically, we will show that the
decision version of the problem of computing minimum envelopes is NP-complete.
3.5.1 Deciding a Minimum Secrecy Envelope is NP-complete
An instance of the Minimum Secrecy Envelope (MSE) problem contains a triple 〈Σ =
〈A, T 〉, S, k〉 where Σ is a knowledge base, A+ is the assertional closure of Σ restricted to
SubE, S ⊆ A+ is a secrecy set, and k ≤ |A+| is a nonnegative integer. The question is “Is
there a secrecy envelope E such that S ⊆ E ⊆ A+ and |E \ S| ≤ k?”
Given a set of assertions E′ ⊇ S, we can verify (a) whether E′ is an envelope by recalculating
(A+Σ \E′)+ and checking that it contains no assertions in S, and (b) whether |E′ \ S| ≤ k. Both
tasks are doable in polynomial time and therefore MSE belongs to NP.
To show that the MSE problem is NP-hard, we reduce the Hitting Set (HS) problem to the
MSE problem. An instance of HS consists of a collection M of subsets of a finite set S and a
positive integer k ≤ |S|. The question is “Is there a subset S′ ⊆ S with |S′| ≤ k such that S′
contains at least one element from each set in M?” W.l.o.g., we may assume that every set in
M has at least two elements.
Given an instance of HS, we construct an instance of MSE, using the same constant k, as
follows:
• NO = {a}, NR = ∅, NC = S
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• S = {A1 u · · · uAm(a) | {A1, ..., Am} ∈ M}
• A = {A(a) | A ∈ S} ∪ S
• Σ = 〈A, ∅〉
Claim. S has a subset S′ with |S′| ≤ k that hits every subset in M iff there is a secrecy
envelope E such that S ⊆ E ⊆ A+ and |E \ S| ≤ k.
Proof Suppose that S has a subset S′ with |S′| ≤ k that hits every set in M. Then for
each set {A1, ..., Am} ∈ M, there is an element Aj ∈ S′ (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Let E = S′ ∪ S. It
follows that for every A1 u · · · u Am(a) ∈ S, there is an assertion Aj(a) ∈ E (1 ≤ j ≤ m). By
construction, Σ does not involve any roles and SubE = {C | C(a) ∈ A}. Therefore A+Σ = A,
and so A+Σ \ E = A \ E. Note that A \ E contains only assertions of the form C(a) where
C ∈ NC and a ∈ OΣ. Consequently, none of the assertion expansion rules is applicable to
A \ E, implying that (A+Σ \ E)+ ∩ E = (A \ E) ∩ E = ∅. It follows that E is an envelope with
|E \ S| ≤ |S′| ≤ k.
Conversely, suppose that there is a secrecy envelope E such that S ⊆ E ⊆ A+ and |E\S| ≤ k.
Then, by Definition 3.4.8, for every A1 u · · · uAm(a) ∈ S, there is Aj(a) ∈ E where 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
E \ S contains only assertions of the form C(a) where C ∈ NC . This shows that S contains a
subset S′ = {C | C(a) ∈ E \ S} that hits every set in M and |S′| = |E \ S| ≤ k.
3.5.2 A Naive Algorithm for Computing Tight Envelope
Since computing a minimum envelope is NP-hard, in what follows, we consider polynomial
time algorithms for computing tight envelopes. Such a tight envelope is minimal in the sense
of being irredundant, but, as shown in Example 3.5.1, it need not be minimum.
By Definition 3.4.8, a naive algorithm for computing tight envelope can simply take an
envelope Ef obtained by applying ΛS to the secrecy set S, and check each assertion α in Ef
whether it is redundant: if the intersection ((AfΣ \Ef )∪{α})f ∩S is empty, α is redundant and
moved from Ef to AfΣ \ Ef . Otherwise, α remains in Ef .
Since Af and Ef can be computed in polynomial time and ((AfΣ \Ef )∪ {α})f ∩ S can also
be computed in polynomial time, it follows that the whole naive algorithm runs in polynomial
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time. The following example illustrates some of the computations in the execution of the naive
algorithm.
Example 3.5.2 Given a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a secrecy set S where
• A = {F (a), C(a), ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a), C uC1(a), C uC2(a), ..., C uCk(a), E1 uE2(a)},
• T = {E1 u E2 v C, ∃r.M v F , ∃s.D vM}, and
• S = {F (a), C u ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a)},
the set of subexpressions SubE and a corresponding assertional closure Af are listed as follows:
• SubE = {F,C, ∃r.∃s.(D u D′), r,∃s.(D u D′), s,D u D′, D,D′, C u C1, C u C2, ..., C u
Ck, C, C1, C2, ..., Ck, E1 u E2, E1, E2,∃r.M,M,∃s.D,C u ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)}.
• Af = A∪ S ∪ {r(a, x), ∃s.(D uD′)(x), s(x, y), D uD′(y), D(y), D′(y), ∃s.D(x), M(x),
∃r.M(a), C1(a), C2(a), ..., Ck(a), C(a), E1(a), E2(a)}, where x and y were freshly
chosen individuals during the computation of A+.
Suppose that an envelope Ef is obtained by
1. applying the uS-rule to C u ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a) and choosing C(a),
2. applying the vS-rule to C(a) and obtaining E1 u E2(a),
3. applying the uS-rule to E1 u E2(a) and choosing E1(a),
4. applying the vS-rule to F (a) and obtaining ∃r.M(a),
5. applying the vS-rule to ∃r.M(a) and obtaining ∃r.∃s.(DuD′)(a). Note that ∃s.(DuD′) v
∃s.D vM and so ∃r.∃s.(D uD′) v ∃r.M .
6. applying the vS-rule to C(a) repeatedly and obtaining C u C1(a), ..., C u Ck(a).
The resulting envelope is Ef = {F (a), Cu∃r.∃s.(DuD′)(a), C(a), E1uE2(a), E1(a), ∃r.M(a),
∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a), C uC1(a), ..., C uCk(a)}. The naive algorithm tests every assertion in Ef
and removes it if it is redundant. Note that in this case the presence of ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a) not
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only makes C(a) as well as all of C uC1(a), ..., C uCk(a) redundant, but also makes E1uE2(a)
and E1(a) redundant since they were obtained because of C(a). This suggests that further
optimization can be done to compute a tight envelope during the construction of an envelope by
using D-secrecy closure rules.
3.5.3 ∃Sd -Secrecy Closure Rule
Instead of repeatedly checking redundancy as done by the naive approach, we provide an
optimized approach that guides the application of secrecy closure rules as it builds up a tight
envelope.
Among the secrecy closure rules (Figure 3.2), the ∃S-rule is the only one that, when applied
to an assertion for one individual, may cause an assertion for (possibly) a different individual
to become redundant. Consider an example where {r(a, b), C(b), D(b)} ⊆ Af \ S and S =
{∃r.C(a), CuD(b)}. An application of the uS-rule may lead to Ef = {∃r.C(a), CuD(b), D(b)}.
Then, since {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ Af \ Ef and ∃r.C(a) ∈ Ef , the ∃S-rule is applicable and Ef may
be expanded to {∃r.C(a), C u D(b), D(b), C(b)}. At this point, D(b) becomes redundant. To
reduce such kinds of “interactions” between assertions for different individuals, we will use a
deterministic version of ∃S-rule. The rule, named ∃Sd -rule, is listed in Figure 3.3.
vS -rule: if C(a) ∈ Af \ Ef , C v D ∈ T f and D(a) ∈ Ef , then Ef := Ef ∪ {C(a)};
uS -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ Ef and {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ Ef = ∅,
then Ef := Ef ∪ {Ci(a)} where 1 ≤ i ≤ k and Ci is atomic;
∃Sd -rule: if ∃r.C(a) ∈ Ef and {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ Af \ Ef with b ∈ OΣ,
then Ef := Ef ∪ {r(a, b)}.
Figure 3.3 D-secrecy closure rules
The set of rules obtained from the deterministic secrecy closure rules by replacing the
∃S-rule with the ∃Sd -rule will be referred to as the D-secrecy closure rules.
In the following discussion, when we say that an assertion is redundant (irredundant), during
the construction of an envelope, we mean that this assertion is a candidate of being removed
(retained) in the resulting envelope. Here are some observations regarding the D-secrecy closure
rules:
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• uS-rule: Some of the non-deterministic choices in its applications may create redundant
assertions when computing an envelope (see Examples 3.5.1 and 3.5.2).
• ∃Sd -rule: It cannot trigger applications of the uS-rule (since its applications create role
assertions) and so if we can restrict its applications to irredundant assertions, the ∃Sd -rule
will not create any redundancy.
• vS-rule: An application of the vS-rule may possibly trigger applications of the uS-rule.
If it does, since the non-deterministic choice in the uS-rule may create redundancy, the
vS-rule may participate in creating redundancy. However, for any assertion C(a) ∈ E
obtained by applying the vS-rule, if there is an irredundant assertion E(a) ∈ E such that
C v E, then C(a) is also irredundant.
Taking these observations into account, the general idea of the optimized approach is to
(i) obtain a set of irredundant assertions that contains the given secrecy set and is closed
under the uS-rule, and
(ii) exhaustively apply the vS- and ∃Sd -rules (which, as we will show in Theorem 3.5.6, will
not create any redundancy).
In step (i), we need to consider not only applications of the uS-rule, but also applications
of the vS-rule because those applications, in turn, may trigger applications of the uS-rule (see
Step 2 and 3 in Example 3.5.2). In this step, the applications of the vS-rule will be restricted
to the set of subexpressions of S and T , denoted by SubE(S, T ) and computed in the same way
as SubE (see Section 3.4.1). This is important as the set S ∪ T may be substantially smaller
than A ∪ S ∪ T .
In a little more detail, the optimized approach first removes the redundancy from a set,
referred to as
⋃
a∈OΣ E
(1)
a in Section 3.5.4, that is closed under the uS-rule and the vS-rule
restricted to SubE(S, T ). The removal procedure ensures that the resulting set, referred to
as the basic set BS, is a superset of the given secrecy set S and is closed under the uS-rule.
The optimized approach then completes the envelope by repeated applications of the vS-rule,
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followed by repeated applications of the ∃Sd -rule. This procedure, named Tight, results a tight
envelope, as we shall see in Section 3.5.5.
Note that the uS-rule in fact deals with some implicit subsumptions that can be deduced
from an empty TBox. For example, DuD1 v D is such a subsumption even if it may not appear
in T . If an assertion D uD1(a) is to be protected, one of D(a) and D1(a) must be protected.
This differs from an subsumption such as C v D. In this case, if D(a) is to be protected, then
C(a) needs to be protected. However, if C(a) is to be protected, it’s not necessary to protect
D(a) because a “Yes” answer to D(a) does not directly lead to the “Yes” answer to C(a).
Therefore, we would like to distinguish these two kinds of subsumptions during the process of
building a tight envelope. We say that a concept D trivially subsumes (or covers) a concept
C, or C is trivially subsumed (or is covered) by D, denoted by C  D, if C = C1 u ... u Ck,
D = D1 u ... u Dm and {D1, · · · , Dm} ⊆ {C1, · · · , Ck}. We stipulate that every concept is
trivially subsumed by >. The following list two observations about the trivial subsumptions.
(s1) If (i) C ∈ SubE is non-atomic, (ii) C v D ∈ T f and C 6= D, and (iii) C does not
occur in the TBox, then there exists a concept E ∈ SubE such that E 6= C, C  E and
E v D ∈ T f .
(s2) If (i) ∃r.C ∈ SubE does not occur in the TBox, and (ii) ∃r.C v D ∈ T f where ∃r.C 6= D,
then there exists a concept ∃r.E ∈ SubE such that {∃r.C v ∃r.E, ∃r.E v D, C v E} ⊆
T f and C 6= E.
For observation (s1), it is obvious that when C  D, the claim is true (by letting E = D).
If C  D, then there must exist C ′ v D′ ∈ T (which cannot be deduced from an empty TBox)
where C ′  D′ such that C  C ′ and D′ v D ∈ T f . Because C ′ v D′ ∈ T , by the computation
of SubE, C ′ ∈ SubE. Letting E = C ′, the claim holds. For observation (s2), since ∃r.C is
atomic and does not occur in the TBox, for ∃r.C v D to be a subsumption that is not deduced
from an empty TBox, we can only have C v E where C  E to deduce ∃r.C v ∃r.E and
through ∃r.E v D to obtain ∃r.C v D.
We next provide an efficient algorithm for computing a basic set, denoted by BS, that will
play an important role in constructing a tight envelope for S.
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3.5.4 Computing the Basic Set BS
For each a ∈ OΣ, let Sa = {C(a) | C(a) ∈ S}. We apply the uS-rule and the vS1 -rule (the
vS-rule restricted to SubE(S, T ), see Figure 3.4) to Sa until none of them are applicable. The
resulting set is denoted by E(1)a .
vS1 -rule: if C ∈ SubE(S, T ), C(a) ∈ Af \ Ef , C v D ∈ T f and D(a) ∈ Ef ,
then Ef := Ef ∪ {C(a)}.
Figure 3.4 vS1 -Rule, the vS-Rule restricted to SubE(S, T )
It turns out that the set E(1)a may be too large for our purposes. We compute a subset
Ba ⊆ E(1)a termed the basic set for Sa w.r.t. E(1)a . Then we define BS :=
⋃
a∈OΣ Ba. To compute
Ba, we first construct a directed graph Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 where Va = E(1)a and ATa and Aua
consist of two types of edges constructed as follows:
(g1) If C(a), D(a) ∈ Va, C  D, C 6= D, and there does not exist E(a) ∈ Va such that
C 6= E 6= D and C  E  D, then Aua := Aua ∪ {(C(a), D(a))}.
(g2) If C(a), D(a) ∈ Va, C v D ∈ T f and C  D, then ATa := ATa ∪ {(D(a), C(a))} 3.
We call a node n ∈ Va atomic if n is an atomic assertion and non-atomic otherwise. For any
two nodes n1, n2 ∈ Va, if (n1, n2) ∈ Aua (ATa ), we say that n1 is a u-predecessor (v-predecessor)
of n2 and n2 is a u-successor (v-successor) of n1. A node n1 is a predecessor of a node n2
if n1 is either a u-predecessor or a v-predecessor of n2. The edges in Ga encode two kinds
of dependencies between assertions. For every C(a) ∈ Va, if C(a) needs to be protected, then
at least one of its u-successors and all of its v-successors need to be protected. Note that
Aua ∩ATa = ∅.
Some edges in Ga represent applications of rules used to compute E
(1)
a ; other edges represent
“accidental” subsumptions as illustrated in the following example. Let E(1)a = {C uD(a), D u
E(a), C(a), D(a)} where C(a) is obtained by an application of the uS-rule to C u D(a) and
D(a) is obtained by an application of the uS-rule to D u E(a). In the corresponding graph
3Note that the edges in Aua and A
T
a represent subsumptions in opposite directions.
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Ga, the edge (C uD(a), D(a)) does not correspond to an actual application of a rule used to
compute E(1)a .
The algorithm Basic-set checks for each node/assertion whether it is necessary in order
to protect Sa. If the tested node/assertion is not needed, it will be removed by the procedure
Remove (Line 4, Procedure 5). Some ancestors of the tested node/assertion will also be
removed (recursively) by the procedure Remove (Line 5-16, Procedure 5). Note that the
variable W is used to keep track of all the tested nodes so that none is tested more than once.
Moreover, it is easy to see that when the algorithm terminates, Va = W . There are three
criteria for removing predecessors:
c1. If (C(a), D(a)) ∈ ATa (e.g., C = ∃r.C1, D = ∃r.D1 and D1 v C1 ∈ T f ), removing D(a)
leads to the removal of C(a). This is because if D(a) is not protected, neither can be
C(a).
c2. If (C(a), D(a)) ∈ Aua and D(a) is the only u-successor of C(a) in Ga, removing D(a)
will directly lead to the removal of C(a) (e.g., C = D u D′ and D′(a) is not in Ga. In
this case, if none of D(a) and D′(a) is protected, D u D′(a) cannot be protected and
hence should be removed.); otherwise, when C(a) has an u-successor other than D(a),
removing D(a) will not lead to the removal of C(a).
c3. If (C(a), D(a)) ∈ Aua and C(a) is the only predecessor of D(a) in Ga, removing C(a)
will lead to the removal of D(a); otherwise, if D(a) has a predecessor other than C(a),
removing C(a) will not lead directly to the removal of D(a).
Regarding criterion (c3), note that we may have {(DuD′(a), D(a)), (DuD′(a), D′(a)} ⊆ Aua ,
and (E(a), D′(a)) ∈ ATa , in which case, removing D uD′(a) will lead to the removal of D(a),
but not D′(a). After computing Ba, if D′(a) ∈ Ba, then D uD′(a) will be brought back into
the tight envelope by applying the vS-rule (see Section 3.5.5).
The procedure Remove-Desc (Procedure 6) further optimizes the process by repeatedly
removing nodes that are only descendants of the removed node.
Example 3.5.3 In Example 3.5.2, we have given a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 with
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Algorithm 4 Basic-set(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, Sa)
1: W := Sa {The set W is used to maintain the tested irredundant nodes}
2: V := Va \W
3: while V is not empty do
4: pick a node v ∈ V
5: G′ = 〈V ′a, A
′T
a , A
′u
a 〉 := Remove(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, v)
6: if W ⊆ V ′a then {Removing v will not compromise Sa}
7: Ga := G
′
8: V := V ′a
9: else {v cannot be removed}
10: W := W ∪ {v}
11: end if
12: V := V \W
13: end while
14: return Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉
• A = {F (a), C(a), ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a), C uC1(a), C uC2(a), ..., C uCk(a), E1 uE2(a)},
• T = {E1 u E2 v C, ∃r.M v F , ∃s.D vM}, and
• S = {F (a), C u ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a)}.
The set of subexpressions of S and T is SubE(S, T ) = {F , Cu∃r.∃s.(DuD′), C, ∃r.∃s.(Du
D′), r, ∃s.(D uD′), s, D uD′, D, D′, E1 u E2, E1, E2, ∃r.M , M , ∃s.D}.
Suppose that applications of the uS- and vS1 -rules are exactly the same as those in Example
3.5.2. Then we have E(1)a = S ∪ {C(a), E1 u E2(a), E1(a), ∃r.M(a), ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a)}.
Figure 3.5 Ga in Example 3.5.3
Note that Step 6 in Example 3.5.2 is not applied since those concepts are not in SubE(S, T ).
Figure 3.5 is the graph Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 built from E(1)a . In Ga, there are single-head arrows
and two-head arrows which denote the edges in Aua and ATa , respectively. The nodes ∃r.M(a)
and ∃r.∃s.(D u D′)(a) cannot be removed because removing any of them leads to the removal
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Procedure 5 Remove(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, v)
1: V Tv := {u | (u, v) ∈ ATa }
2: V uv := {u | (u, v) ∈ Aua } {All the predecessors of v in Ga due to trivial subsumptions.}
3: sucuv := {u | (v, u) ∈ Aua } {All the successors of v in Ga due to trivial subsumptions.}
4: Ga := Ga \ {v} {Including all the incident edges. }
5: for all u ∈ V Tv do
6: Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 := Remove(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, u) {See criterion (c1).}
7: end for
8: for all u ∈ V uv do
9: if there is no vertex u′ s.t. (u, u′) ∈ Aua then
10: Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 := Remove(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, u) {See criterion (c2).}
11: end if
12: end for
13: for all u ∈ sucuv ∩ Va do
14: Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 := Remove-Desc(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, u)
15: end for
16: return Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉
Procedure 6 Remove-Desc(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, v)
1: if v has a predecessor in Ga then {v will not be removed. See criterion (c3).}
2: return Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉
3: end if
4: sucuv := {u | (v, u) ∈ Aua } {All the successors of v in Ga due to trivial subsumptions.}
5: Ga := Ga \ {v} {Including all the incident edges.}
6: for all u ∈ sucuv do
7: Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 := Remove-Desc(Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉, u)
8: end for
9: return Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉
of F (a) ∈ S. After the execution of the Algorithm Basic-set, the nodes C(a), E1 uE2(a) and
E1(a) will be removed. Eventually, the basic set Ba = S ∪ {∃r.M(a), ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a)}.
We denote by Ga = 〈Va,ATa ,Aua 〉 the graph obtained from Ga = 〈Va, ATa , Aua 〉 by executing
the algorithm Basic-set. Define Ba := Va. The following lists some observations about Ba:
b1. Sa ⊆ Ba.
The set W in Algorithm 4 is initialized as Sa and none of the elements in W was removed
once it is added to W . When the algorithm terminates, W = Va = Ba. Therefore,
Sa ⊆ Ba.
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b2. (a) For every assertion C(a) ∈ Ba \ Sa, there is a path to C(a) in Ga that starts from an
assertion in Sa.
If an assertion C(a) ∈ Ba \Sa is not reachable from Sa, then it is also not reachable from
nodes in W in Algorithm 4 (because all nodes in W are reachable from Sa), and so C(a)
would have been removed (Algorithm 4, Lines 5-11), contradicting the assumption.
(b) Moreover, given an assertion D(a) ∈ Ba \ Sa, there is a path p from Sa to D(a) such
that all non-atomic nodes on p have a unique u-successor in Ga (not necessarily on p).
Proof Let D(a) ∈ Ba \ Sa be an assertion for which the claim does not hold. Then
for every path p from Sa to D(a), there is a non-atomic node up with more than one
u-successor. W.l.o.g., we assume that up is the closest such node to D(a) (among all
the non-atomic nodes on p with more than one u-successor). Then, at the time when
D(a) was tested for removal (see Algorithm 4, Line 4), none of the nodes on p starting
from up’s u-successor and up to D(a) were tested yet because if they were, they would
have been removed (see criteria (c1) and (c2) as implemented by Algorithm 4, Lines 5,
and Procedure 5). It follows that none of these nodes were in W at that time and all of
them could be removed, including D(a) (when D(a) was tested for removal). This yields
a contradiction to D(a) ∈ Va = Ba. Therefore, the claim (b2) part(b) holds.
b3. Ba is closed under the uS-rule. This is equivalent to the claim that every non-atomic
node in Ba has a u-successor.
Proof Suppose that after the execution of the algorithm Basic-set, a non-atomic as-
sertion, say C uDuE(a) ∈ Ba, does not have any u-successor in Ga. Since E(1)a is closed
under the uS-rule, when the graph Ga was initially defined, at least one of C(a), D(a)
and E(a) was in Va. W.l.o.g., assume that all of them were in Va. Since C uD u E(a)
does not have any u-successor in Ga, then C(a), D(a) and E(a) were all removed dur-
ing the execution. Suppose that among C(a), D(a) and E(a), C(a) was removed after
the removal of D(a) and E(a). Right before the removal of C(a), C(a) was the only
u-successor of C uDuE(a). By criterion (c2) (Procedure 5, Line 12-16), removing C(a)
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will lead to the removal of CuDuE(a), contradicting that CuDuE(a) ∈ Ba. Therefore,
the claim (b3) holds.
3.5.5 The Procedure Tight
The whole procedure of computing a tight envelope is given in Figure 3.6. We will show
that by utilizing the basic set computed as in Section 3.5.4, the resulting set F(3) is a tight
envelope.
Tight:
(1) Compute the basic set BS for S according to Section 3.5.4. Let F(1) := S ∪ BS. Note
that F(1) \BS contains all and only the role assertions in S (see (b1) and the definition
of Sa).
(2) Apply the vS-rule exhaustively until no longer applicable a. The resulting set is
denoted by F(2).
(3) Apply ∃Sd -rule exhaustively to F(2) until no longer applicable. The resulting set is
denoted by F(3).
aNote that if C v D,D v E ∈ T f and E(a) ∈ F(1), then C(a) could have been added to F(2) either via
an application of the vS-rule to E(a) ∈ F(1) or via an application of the vS-rule to D(a) after D(a) is added
to F(2) via an application of the vS-rule to E(a). Furthermore, since F(1) is closed under the uS-rule, for
every C(a) ∈ F(2) \ F(1), there is an atomic assertion D(a) ∈ F(1) such that C v D ∈ T f .
Figure 3.6 Procedure Tight
Some observations regarding the procedure Tight are listed below:
t1. F(1) is closed under the uS-rule by (b3) and since BS :=
⋃
a∈OΣ Ba.
t2. F(2) is closed under the vS-rule. Furthermore, if C(a) ∈ F(2) is atomic and C ∈
SubE(S, T ), then C(a) ∈ F(1).
Proof Suppose that there is an atomic assertion C(a) ∈ F(2)\F(1) where C ∈ SubE(S, T ).
Then (by footnote (a)), there is an atomic assertion D(a) ∈ F(1) such that C v D ∈ T f .
Both C and D being atomic and distinct implies that C  D. Because C ∈ SubE(S, T ),
D(a) ∈ E(1)a and C v D ∈ T f , both C(a) andD(a) are in E(1)a . Moreover, since C  D, by
(g2), we have (D(a), C(a)) ∈ ATa in the initial graph Ga that we construct for computing
the basic set. However, C(a) /∈ F(1), so C(a) must have been removed by the algorithm
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Basic-set during its execution. By criterion (c1) (implemented by Procedure 5, Lines
1, 5-11), D(a) would also have been removed, contradicting D(a) ∈ F(1). Therefore,
C(a) ∈ F(1).
t3. F(3) is closed under ∃Sd -rule and F(3) \ F(2) contains only role assertions.
Lemma 3.5.4 For every non-atomic assertion C(a) ∈ F(2)\F(1) where C ∈ SubE\SubE(S, T ),
there is an assertion D(a) ∈ F(2), C 6= D, such that C  D.
Proof Since C(a) ∈ F(2) \ F(1), there is an assertion E(a) ∈ F(1) such that C v E ∈ T f .
Furthermore, because C ∈ SubE \ SubE(S, T ), C does not appear in the TBox. Since C(a)
is non-atomic, by (s1), there is a concept D ∈ SubE, D 6= C, such that C  D v E. It then
follows from (t2) that D(a) ∈ F(2).
Lemma 3.5.5 F(3) obtained from the procedure Tight is a secrecy envelope.
Proof We argue that F(3) is closed, i.e., none of the Secrecy Closure Rules rules is applicable
to F(3). By Theorem 3.4.10, F(3) is a secrecy envelope.
• vS-rule: By (t2) and (t3) above, F(3) is closed under the vS-rule.
• uS-rule: Since F(2) is obtained by exhaustively applying the vS-rule, for every C(a) ∈
F(2) \ F(1), there is an assertion D(a) ∈ F(1) such that C v D. If C(a) is atomic, then
the uS-rule is not applicable to C(a). If C is non-atomic, then either C ∈ SubE(S, T ) or
C ∈ SubE \ SubE(S, T ).
(a) C ∈ SubE(S, T ): If C  D, then since D(a) ∈ F(1) and F(1) is closed under the
uS-rule, the uS-rule is not applicable to C(a). Now suppose that C  D. Because
E(1)a is closed under the vS1 -rule (the vS-rule restricted to SubE(S, T )), and since
C v D and D(a) ∈ F(1) (in particular, D(a) ∈ Ba ⊆ E(1)a ), it follows that C(a)
must be in the initial graph Ga. Then by the construction of Ga, in particular (g2),
we have (D(a), C(a)) ∈ ATa . Since C(a) /∈ F(1), it was removed by the algorithm
Basic-set. However, in that case by criterion (c1) (implemented by Procedure 5,
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Lines 1, 5-11), D(a) would also have to be removed. This contradicts D(a) ∈ F(1).
Therefore, the uS-rule is not applicable to C(a).
(b) C ∈ SubE\SubE(S, T ): By Lemma 3.5.4, there is an assertion C1(a) ∈ F(2), C 6= C1,
such that C  C1.
∗ If C1 is atomic, then the uS-rule is not applicable to C(a).
∗ If C1 is non-atomic and C1 ∈ SubE(S, T ), it then follows from case (a) that the
uS-rule is not applicable to C1(a) and so it is also not applicable to C(a) in
view of C  C1.
∗ If C1 is non-atomic and C1 ∈ SubE \ SubE(S, T ), again by Lemma 3.5.4, there
is an assertion C2(a) ∈ F(2), C1 6= C2, such that C1  C2, and hence C  C2
and C 6= C2. Note that the length of C2 is smaller than that of C1. Applying
the same reasoning to C2, eventually, there is an atomic assertion Ck(a) ∈ F(2),
C 6= Ck, such that C  Ck. Therefore, the uS-rule is not applicable to C(a).
We have shown that F(2) \ F(1) is closed under the uS-rule. It then follows from (t1) and
(t3) that F(3) is closed under the uS-rule as well.
• ∃S-rule: Since F(3) is closed under the ∃Sd -rule by (t3), it is also closed under the ∃S-rule.
Theorem 3.5.6 F(3) obtained from the procedure Tight is a tight envelope.
Proof By Lemma 3.5.5, F(3) is an envelope. It suffices to show that for every α ∈ F(3),
((AfΣ \ F(3)) ∪ {α})f ∩ S 6= ∅. Note that F(3) = S ∪ (BS \ S) ∪ (F(2) \ F(1)) ∪ (F(3) \ F(2)).
1. If α ∈ S, then α ∈ ((AfΣ \ F(3)) ∪ {α})f ∩ S, and hence the intersection is not empty.
2. Let α = C(a) ∈ BS\S. By (b2), there is a path p in Ga from Sa to C(a) s.t. all non-atomic
nodes on p have a unique u-successor (not necessarily on p). Suppose that the path p
starts from D(a) ∈ Sa and that nodes on p are C1(a), ..., Ck(a) where C1(a) = D(a) and
Ck(a) = C(a). Then an edge (Ci(a), Ci+1(a))(1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) is in either ATa or Aua .
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(a) If (Ci(a), Ci+1(a)) ∈ ATa , then we have Ci+1 v Ci ∈ T f . With an application of the
vA-rule (see Figure 3.1), Ci(a) ∈ ((AfΣ \ F(3)) ∪ {Ci+1(a)})f .
(b) If (Ci(a), Ci+1(a)) ∈ Aua , then Ci(a) is non-atomic and Ci  Ci+1. Let H be the set of
atomic concepts that trivially subsumes Ci but not Ci+1. Since Ci+1(a) is the only u-
successor of Ci(a) in Ga, for every atomic E ∈ H, E(a) /∈ F(1). In view of Ci(a) ∈ BS,
we have Ci ∈ SubE(S, T ) and so H ⊆ SubE(S, T ). It follows from observations (t2)
and (t3) that for every E ∈ H, E(a) /∈ F(2) and E(a) /∈ F(3) \F(2). Therefore, E(a) ∈
AfΣ \ F(3). With an application of the uA-rule, Ci(a) ∈ ((AfΣ \ F(3)) ∪ {Ci+1(a)})f .
Iterating these two cases, we conclude that D(a) ∈ ((AfΣ \F(3))∪{C(a)})f ∩S. Therefore,
when α ∈ (BS \ S), ((AfΣ \ F(3)) ∪ {α})f ∩ S 6= ∅.
3. Let α = C(a) ∈ F(2) \F(1). Then there is an assertion D(a) ∈ F(1) such that C v D ∈ T f .
With an application of the vA-rule, D(a) ∈ ((AfΣ \F(3))∪{α})f . However, by cases 1 and
2, ((AfΣ \ F(3))∪ {D(a)})f ∩ S 6= ∅. Since ((AfΣ \ F(3))∪ {D(a)})f ⊆ ((AfΣ \ F(3))∪ {α})f ,
we obtain ((AfΣ \ F(3)) ∪ {α})f ∩ S 6= ∅.
4. If α ∈ F(3)\F(2), then α = r(a, b) (b ∈ OΣ) was obtained by an application of ∃Sd -rule to an
assertion ∃r.C(a) ∈ F(2) with {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ AfΣ. Hence, C(b) ∈ AfΣ \ F(3). By case 3,
∃r.C(a) ∈ F(2) implies that ((AfΣ\F(3))∪{∃r.C(a)})f∩S 6= ∅. An application of ∃A1 -rule to
α and C(b) (both in (AfΣ \F(3))∪{α}) would result ∃r.C(a) ∈ ((AfΣ \F(3))∪{α})f . Thus,
((AfΣ\F(3))∪{∃r.C(a)})f ⊆ ((AfΣ\F(3))∪{α})f , and therefore ((AfΣ\F(3))∪{α})f∩S 6= ∅.
3.5.6 Experimental Comparison Result
We have presented two algorithms for computing tight envelopes, a naive one and an op-
timized one, the Procedure Tight. It is easy to see that both algorithms run in polynomial
time. However, to compute a tight envelope, the naive approach uses the whole ABox, for each
assertion in an envelope, to check whether it is necessary to be protected whereas the optimized
algorithm depends much less on the ABox. Because of this, the optimized algorithm should
run faster when the sizes of the TBox and the secrecy set are much smaller than that of the
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ABox. We implemented ΛS for computing envelopes, and the two algorithms for computing
tight envelopes to see how they run in practice. Next we compare the experiment results for
the algorithms that build envelopes or tight envelopes during the pre-query stage.
Let NT be the number of subsumptions (in normal form) in T , NA be the number of
assertions in A, NI be the number of individuals in A and NS be the number of assertions
in S. Below we list experiment results showing the running time (in seconds) of computing
an envelope, computing a tight envelope using the naive approach and computing a tight
envelope using Procedure Tight. The experiments were run on a personal computer with
Intel R©CoreTM2 duo processor at 2.40GHz and 3GB of RAM.
Table 3.1 Experiments result
Line# NT NA NI NS tenvelope tnaive tTight
1 45 120 2 25 0.19 6.56 0.16
2 45 210 12 14 0.02 46.29 0.37
3 103 210 12 14 0.05 104.70 0.14
4 103 210 12 56 0.18 162.07 0.55
5 45 240 2 11 0.04 22.17 0.05
6 45 418 22 13 0.02 34.29 0.01
7 133 418 24 13 0.31 295.95 0.08
8 133 418 24 101 0.55 409.01 0.28
9 45 400 2 11 0.06 109.62 0.07
10 45 400 40 11 0.02 42.09 0.02
11 173 400 40 11 0.03 47.55 0.01
12 173 400 40 165 0.11 685.86 0.14
13 45 2340 40 11 0.06 31524.47 0.05
From the table above, we can see that the time for Procedure Tight for computing a
tight envelope is comparable with the time for computing an envelope (not necessarily tight).
However, computing a tight envelope using the naive approach is much more costly. In general,
when the size of S increases, the time of computation increases since the corresponding envelope
is larger (see lines 3 vs 4, 7 vs 8, 11 vs 12). When the size of the ABox A increases and the
size of the secrecy set S decreases, the time for computing an envelope or a tight envelope
using Procedure Tight decreases, but the time for computing a tight envelope using the naive
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approach increases because the naive approach depends more on the ABox A (see lines 1, 2, 5,
6). An extreme example is shown in Line 13.
3.6 Queries
Recall that we have assumed that given a KB Σ and a secrecy set S, the assertional closure
Af , the subsumption set T f and the initial secrecy envelope Ef for S are precomputed at the
pre-query stage (as described in detail in Section 3.4). Thus, when the concept C in a query
C(a) is in SubE, the answer of the query is “Yes” if C(a) ∈ AfΣ and C(a) /∈ Ef and it is
“Unknown” otherwise. It is obvious that such a query can be answered in linear time in the
size of AfΣ.
When C /∈ SubE, SubE will be expanded by adding the subexpressions of C, the assertional
closure Af and then the secrecy envelope Ef will be updated. The corresponding procedure
SPQA is listed in Algorithm 7. The input to SPQA includes the TBox T f in normal form, the
precomputed assertional closure Af , the query C(a) and the precomputed secrecy envelope Ef .
Algorithm 7 SPQA(T f ,Af , C(a),Ef )
1: if C /∈ SubE then
2: compute sub(C) (see Section 3.4.1)
3: SubE = SubE ∪ sub(C)
4: expand Af and T f to SubE
5: expand the secrecy envelope Ef to SubE by exhaustively applying the vS-rule
6: end if
7: if C(a) ∈ AfΣ and C(a) /∈ Ef then
8: return “Yes”
9: end if
10: return “Unknown”
Lines 1-6 of SPQA deal with the case when the concept expression of a query is not in
SubE. Line 2 computes the set of subexpressions of the concept C as defined in Section 3.4.1
and Line 3 expands SubE by adding expressions in sub(C) \ SubE. The expanded SubE is
then used to update Af by applying assertion expansion rules (Figure 3.1) until none of them
is applicable. T f is also updated accordingly, as indicated in Line 4. As a consequence, some
secrecy closure rules may become applicable, implying that the current Ef may no longer be a
84
secrecy envelope. Therefore, we apply the vS-rule exhaustively in Line 5. We next show that
once the execution of Line 5 is completed, we obtain a tight envelope. Let SubE′ be the newly
expanded set of subexpressions after the application of Line 3, A′ the assertional closure of Σ
after the application of Line 4 and E′ the expansion of Ef after the application of Line 5. We
first argue that E′ is an envelope.
• It is obvious that the vS-rule is not applicable.
• Suppose that the uS-rule is applicable to an assertion C(a) ∈ E′. Since Ef is closed under
the uS-rule, C(a) ∈ E′ \Ef . Therefore, C ∈ SubE′ \ SubE and C does not appear in the
TBox T . C(a) being non-atomic and not a role assertion implies that C(a) is obtained by
an application of the vS-rule. So there is an assertion D(a) ∈ Ef such that C v D ∈ T f .
It then follows from (s1) (see Section 3.5.3) that there is a concept E ∈ SubE′ such that
C 6= E and C  E v D. If E ∈ SubE, then E(a) ∈ Ef because Ef is closed under the
vS-rule w.r.t. SubE. Since Ef is also closed under the uS-rule w.r.t. SubE, there is an
atomic assertion E′(a) ∈ Ef such that E  E′, and hence, the uS-rule is not applicable to
C(a). If E ∈ SubE′\SubE, applying the same reasoning to E, we can eventually conclude
that the uS-rule is not applicable to (E(a) and) C(a). It follows that the uS-rule is not
applicable to E′.
• Suppose that the ∃Sd -rule is applicable to an assertion ∃r.C(a). By the previous case,
the uS-rule is not applicable to any assertion in E′. Hence, ∃r.C(a) was obtained by an
application of the vS-rule and there is an assertion D(a) ∈ Ef such that ∃r.C v D ∈ T f .
Since Ef is closed under the ∃Sd -rule, ∃r.C(a) ∈ E′ \Ef . Therefore, ∃r.C ∈ SubE′ \ SubE
and hence ∃r.C does not appear in the TBox T . It follows from (s2) (see Section 3.5.3)
that there is a concept ∃r.E ∈ SubE′ such that ∃r.C v ∃r.E v D, C v E and C 6= E. If
∃r.E ∈ SubE, then ∃r.E(a) ∈ Ef because Ef is closed under the vS-rule w.r.t. SubE and
D(a) ∈ Ef . Since the ∃Sd -rule is applicable to ∃r.C(a), there is an individual b ∈ OΣ such
that r(a, b), C(b) ∈ A′. By the observation (f1) in Section 3.4.2, r(a, b) ∈ A. Moreover,
C(b) ∈ A′ implies E(b) ∈ A′. Since E ∈ SubE, we have E(b) ∈ Af . Because Ef is
closed under the ∃Sd -rule, r(a, b) ∈ Ef . This contradicts the applicability of the ∃Sd -rule
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to ∃r.C(a). Therefore, the ∃Sd -rule is not applicable to ∃r.C(a). If ∃r.E ∈ SubE′ \ SubE,
applying the same reasoning to ∃r.E, we can eventually conclude that the ∃Sd -rule is not
applicable to ∃r.E(a) and so it is not applicable to ∃r.C(a). It follows that the ∃Sd -rule is
not applicable to E′.
Since no D-secrecy closure rules are applicable, E′ is closed and so it is an envelope. Further-
more, since all assertions in E′\Ef are obtained by applications of the vS-rule, for every C(a) ∈
E′\Ef , there is D(a) ∈ Ef such that C v D, and so ((A′\E′)∪{D(a)})f ⊆ ((A′\E′)∪{C(a)})f .
Since Ef is an envelope w.r.t. SubE and D(a) ∈ Ef , ((Af \Ef )∪ {D(a)})f ∩ S 6= ∅. Moreover,
because (E′ \ Ef ) ⊆ (A′ \ Af ), we have Af \ Ef ⊆ A′ \ E′ and so ((A′ \ E′) ∪ {C(a)})f ⊇
((A′ \ E′) ∪ {D(a)})f ⊇ ((Af \ Ef ) ∪ {D(a)})f . It follows that ((A′ \ E′) ∪ {C(a)})f ∩ S 6= ∅.
Hence, E′ is tight.
Example 3.6.1 Recall that we have a knowledge base Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉 and the secrecy set S1 =
{CancerRisk(Jane)} in our running Examples 3.1.1, 3.3.3, 3.4.7, 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.9. The
assertional closure Af1 of Σ1 is listed in Example 3.4.2. The envelope Ef1 of S1 in Example 3.4.9
is a tight envelope. If the querying agent asks the query Reimburse(Jane), Reimburse(Jane)∈
Af1Σ1 \ E
f
1 , the answer to the query is “Yes”. If the querying agent asks the query Cancer-
Risk(Jane), since CancerRisk(Jane)/∈ Af1Σ1 \ E
f
1 , the answer to the query is “Unknown”.
Example 3.6.2 Recall that in Examples 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, we have a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 with
• A = {F (a), C(a), ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a), C uC1(a), C uC2(a), ..., C uCk(a), E1 uE2(a)},
• T = {E1 u E2 v C, ∃r.M v F , ∃s.D vM}, and
• S = {F (a), C u ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a)}.
Starting with the basic set Ba computed in Example 3.5.3, we obtain a tight envelope Ef =
S ∪ {∃r.M(a), ∃r.∃s.(D uD′)(a)}. Suppose that the querying agent asks the query ∃r.∃s.D(a).
Note that ∃r.∃s.D /∈ SubE (see Example 3.5.2). We add ∃r.∃s.D into SubE and accordingly,
∃r.∃s.D(a) is added into Af in view of r(a, x),∃s.D(x) ∈ Af . Since ∃r.M(a) ∈ Ef and
∃r.∃s.D v ∃r.M , ∃r.∃s.D(a) is added into E′. The final answer to the query ∃r.∃s.D(a) is
“Unknown”.
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3.7 Related Work
In this section, we outline some related work in the area of privacy and security in infor-
mation systems, including web-based information systems.
Early work on information protection led to the creation of a multi-level security model for
mandatory access control (MAC) [8, 9] where each data object belongs to a security class and
each user is assigned a clearance for a security class. By posing restrictions on reads and writes
of all data objects, such models are built to ensure that no secret information flows between
different users. While MAC solves the problem of an unauthorized user tricking an authorized
user into disclosing sensitive data that a discretionary access control (DAC) model may have,
it restricts the security granularity at object level. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [64] is
an alternative approach to both DAC and MAC which provides authorization on operations
(rather than objects). The primary focus of these work has been on access control mechanisms
that prohibit access to sensitive information.
Chin [65] studied the problem of unintended disclosure of information about particular in-
dividuals that can be inferred from statistics made available about groups of individuals. Grau
and Horrocks [66] have recently introduced a framework that combines logic and probabilistic
approaches to privacy-preserving query answering from databases. A growing body of work on
data linkage [67, 68] addresses the problem of disclosure of personal data from aggregate infor-
mation or from separately released, non-confidential information about an individual. Work on
privacy preserving data mining [69, 70, 71] addresses the design of algorithms for constructing
predictive models that describe shared characteristics of groups of individuals, e.g., patients in
a clinical trial, without revealing information about specific individuals, e.g., clinical records
of individual participants in clinical trials. The primary focus of such work is on preventing
inference that is typically of a probabilistic nature about individual records from statistical
or aggregate information about a population. Our paper focuses on guaranteeing that secret
information is not compromised by queries answered using deductive inferences that are of a
purely logical nature. It remains to be seen (i.e., it is an open question) whether these two
approaches can be usefully combined in the context of knowledge bases with the open world
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assumption.
Research on encryption of sensitive information focuses on preventing unauthorized access
to such information using cryptographic protocols. Giereth [72] has studied techniques for hid-
ing a fragment of an RDF document by encrypting it while the rest of the document remains
publicly readable. Abel et al. [73] have proposed a policy-based control of access to RDF stores.
Baader et al. [74] have recently introduced an approach to reasoning with ontologies in the
presence of access restrictions on specific axioms. Access control policies and encryption tech-
niques can be used to prohibit access to sensitive information. More recent work on logic-based
authorization frameworks [64, 75, 76] focuses on policy languages that go beyond traditional
access control methods to address obligation, provision, and delegation of authorization as a
basis for protecting sensitive information in computer systems, databases and networked in-
formation systems (see [12] for a survey). Most of the work on policy languages for the web
[13, 14, 15, 77, 16, 78, 17, 79, 80] focuses on specifying syntax-based restrictions on access to
specific resources or operations on the web. Halpern and Weissman [81] have proposed a first
order logic based approach to reasoning about policies. The main focus of these models is
the control of direct access to sensitive information. Our paper focuses on logic-based mecha-
nisms for answering queries using secret information whenever it is possible to do so without
compromising their confidentiality.
Farkas et al. [58] have proposed a privacy information flow model to represent information
flow and privacy requirements that are enforced by a privacy mediator which guarantees that
users cannot logically infer information that violates the privacy requirements. They assume
a tree-like, semistructured data model, selection-projection queries and domain knowledge,
represented as Horn clause constraints, and a domain KB consisting of assertions in the form
of Horn clauses. Jain and Farkas [11] have proposed an elegant RDF authorization model that
can selectively control access to RDF triples using a pre-specified set of patterns that can be
used to assign a secrecy label to each (stored or inferred) RDF triple. Our approach can be
generalized to many KBs that are equipped with a sound and complete reasoning algorithm.
Several authors have explored the use of “cover stories” i.e., lies introduced into a multi-
level database in order to protect some secret information in the database [82, 83, 84]. The
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controlled query evaluation (CQE) framework first introduced by Sicherman et al. [19] offers
a mechanism for answering database queries without revealing secrets. This framework which
has been explored extensively by Biskup and colleagues in a series of papers [85, 86, 87, 88, 89,
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96] includes: (a) policies that specify secrets (queries for which all possible
answers must be protected), potential secrets (queries for which only some of the answers must
be protected); (b) policies for answering queries so as to protect secrets and potential secrets
including lying in response to a query, refusing to answer a query, and their combinations; and
(c) alternative assumptions regarding whether or not the querying agent is aware of the queries
whose answers the KB is trying to protect. Recent work within this framework has introduced
techniques using SAT-solvers and constraint solvers for preprocessing the databases so that
the resulting database can answer queries in a manner that is consistent with the specified
policies. However, with the exception of [94], this work has focused on protecting secrets in
(typically relational) databases under the closed world assumption. We focus on answering
queries against KBs under the open world assumption with emphasis on scenarios where lying
is either not desirable or prohibited (e.g., in the case of the physician, the pharmacy, and the
insurance company sharing information with each other in the scenario described in Example
1, or different government agencies sharing information with each other under the law).
3.8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we studied the problem of answering queries against a knowledge base that
contains secret information. Based on the OWA, we designed reasoners that hide truthful
answers to the queries that if faithfully answered, may compromise the secrecy. One such a
reasoner was designed using the lazy evaluation. This approach checks the query history each
time a query is posed, when the query history gets longer, the response time to a query gets
longer as well and hence the approach becomes less and less appealing over time. Because of
this, we proposed to maintain a secrecy system that precomputes an envelope used to protect
secret information so that the information outside the envelope cannot deduce any secret.
Once an envelope is present, a query will be truthfully answered if it is outside the envelope. A
general framework for the solution to the problem was provided. We discussed the relationship
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between a secrecy-preserving reasoner and an envelope. To answer queries as informatively
as possible, we aim at computing an envelope as small as possible. Unfortunately, given a
language, deciding the smallest envelope may be NP-complete. Depending on the underlying
language and its native inference system, optimization can be designed to compute a tight
envelope in the sense that removing any information from it will compromise secrecy.
We applied the general framework to the Description Logic EL. Given an EL knowledge
base Σ and a secrecy set S, in order to answer queries, we first construct a secrecy maintenance
system which contains a finite set of consequences Af of Σ and a secrecy envelope Ef which is
used to protect S. Both Af and Ef are restricted to SubE, a finite set of some subexpressions
in Σ or S. To answer queries as informatively as possible, we aimed to make Ef as small as
possible. Since computing the smallest envelope in EL is also NP-complete, we have presented
two algorithms for computing tight envelopes: a naive algorithm and an optimized version,
procedure Tight. We compared the complexities of these two algorithms, designed experiments
and concluded that the optimized algorithm indeed is more efficient for applications whenever
the sizes of the TBox and the secrecy set are much smaller than that of the ABox, which is
typical in many applications. When a query C(a) is posed to Σ, we first check whether the
concept C ∈ SubE. If it doesn’t, we expand the whole secrecy maintenance system by adding
the subexpressions of C. We showed that after the expansion of the maintenance system, the
resulting envelope is still tight. Then the answer of a query α is “Yes” if α ∈ Af \ Ef and
“Unknown” otherwise.
Instead of forbidding the use of the secret information in answering queries as is done in
access control methods, our approach uses secrets in the deduction process while providing
informative answers, whenever it is possible to do so without compromising secrecy.
In this chapter, we have focused on how to answer queries while preserving secrecy given
a secrecy set. A future extension of the current work can be developing strategies to specify
secrets (policy specifications) and generate secrecy sets in an automated way. For example, a
policy like “Whether or not a patient x is at risk of developing cancer must be kept secret”
specifies a requirement about a whole range of assertions which must be protected (rather than
a single assertion). This is rather different than most of the work on policy languages for the
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web which focuses on specifying syntax-based restrictions on access to specific resources or
operations on the web (see Section 3.7). We have also assumed that the secrecy set to be finite
in the current work. To develop strategies that can deal with infinite secrecy set is also a future
direction.
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CHAPTER 4. OPEN WORLD SECRECY-PRESERVING QUERY
ANSWERING: THE MULTIPLE QUERYING AGENTS SETTING
Abstract
Many applications require a knowledge base (KB) that contains secrets to answer queries
posed against it using secrets, whenever it is possible to do so, without revealing secrets. We
consider this problem under the OWA in a setting with multiple querying agents M1, ...,Mm
that can pose queries against the KB K and selectively share answers that they receive from
K with one or more other querying agents. We assume that for each Mi, the KB has a pre-
specified set of secrets Si that need to be protected from Mi. Communication between querying
agents is modeled by a communication graph, a DAG with self-loops. We introduce a general
framework and propose an approach to secrecy-preserving query answering. The idea is to
hide the truthful answer from a querying agent Mi, by feigning ignorance without lying, i.e.,
to provide the answer ‘Unknown’ to a query q if it needs to be protected. Under the OWA, a
querying agent cannot distinguish whether q is being protected or it cannot be inferred from K.
We precompute a set of envelopes E1, ..., Em (restricted to a finite set Φ of formulae that are
entailed by K) such that Si ⊆ Ei and a query α posed by agent Mi can be answered truthfully
only if α /∈ Ei. The envelope is updated as needed. We illustrate this approach in the case of
Propositional Horn KBs.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the SPQA problem under the OWA in a setting with multiple query-
ing agents. Given a KB K and a set of querying agents M = {M1, M2, ..., Mm}, we assume
that for each Mi, there is a pre-specified set of secrets Si that K needs to protect from Mi.
We further assume that each Mi can selectively share answers that it receives (in response to
queries posed by it) from K with one or more other querying agents. We model communication
(answer sharing) between querying agents using a communication graph (CG), a DAG with
self-loops, in which a node in the CG corresponds to a querying agent and a directed edge
from node Mi to Mj in CG denotes the ability of Mi to share with Mj the answers it receives
from K (but not answers shared with it by other querying agents, unless they happen to be
also received directly from K). We introduce a general framework and propose a solution to
the SPQA problem in this setting. Under OWA, the answer to a query q posed by an agent
Mi against K can be “Yes” (q can be deduced from K), “No” (¬q can be deduced from K), or
“Unknown” (Neither q nor ¬q can be deduced from K). The basic idea is to hide the truthful
answer from Mi, when it is necessary to do so by feigning ignorance without lying; i.e., to
provide the answer ‘Unknown’ to a query q whenever providing to Mi, the truthful answer to
q would compromise any secret that the KB K is obliged to protect from any of the querying
agents in M. Under the OWA, a querying agent cannot distinguish between the following two
scenarios: the answer to q (i) is being protected; and (ii) cannot be inferred from K.
A simple way of defining a secrecy-preserving reasoner is to maintain a history that, for
each agent, logs the sequence of queries and the corresponding answers. When a new query
q is posed by an agent Mi, the reasoner tests whether the truthful answer to q together with
answers to previous queries that Mi has obtained from directly by querying the KB K or
indirectly from other querying agents (its predecessors in the CG) compromises a secret that
K is obliged to protect against any of the querying agents in M. If it does, Mi receives the
answer “Unknown” in response to the query q. Otherwise, q will be truthfully answered. A
“Yes” or “No” answer can be shared by Mi with its successors in CG. We call this approach
lazy evaluation. Because lazy evaluation requires checking the answer to each query posed by
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each querying agent against a query history, it takes more and more time to answer a query as
the size of the history grows over time. Hence, we propose a different approach: we precompute
a secrecy envelope (or simply envelope) E = {E1, E2, ..., Em} (restricted to a finite set Φ of
formulae that are entailed by the KB) such that Si ⊆ Ei and a query α posed by agent Mi
can be answered truthfully only if α /∈ Ei. The envelope is updated as needed as queries are
answered. Our notion of an envelope is illustrated by the following example (in the simplified
setting of a single querying agent): Consider a formula α ∧ β in propositional logic that needs
to be protected from the querying agent. Suppose that both α and β are entailed by the KB.
Obviously, α∧β is entailed by the KB. If we need to protect α∧β from the querying agent, we
must disrupt every proof of α ∧ β, protect either α or β, i.e., if α ∧ β is a secret, either α or β
must be protected, and hence placed in the envelope. It is easy to show that an envelope always
exists. The challenge is to construct an envelope that is guaranteed to protect secrets (in the
sense described above, in the setting with multiple querying agents that can selectively share
answers with other querying agents) while allowing queries to be answered as informatively as
possible (feigning ignorance only when doing so is necessary to protect a secret). This requires
constructing an envelope that is as small as possible. Unfortunately, in general, computing the
smallest envelope is NP-hard or worse (see Section 4.5). Hence, we settle on computing and
maintaining a tight envelope, i.e., an envelope that is minimal in that no formula can be removed
from it without risk of a secret being compromised. When an envelope is finite, a general way
of obtaining a tight envelope is to evaluate every assertion in the envelope. If removing an
assertion still results an envelope, it will be removed from the envelope. This process ends with
a tight envelope. Since computing a tight envelope is an optimization problem, depending on
the language, and/or properties of the communication graph, some strategy may be designed
to guide the computation of an envelope so that when an envelope is constructed, it is tight.
we consider an example of a communication graph that is an inverted forest (with self-loops)
in which a strategy leads to a tight envelope.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 formally introduces a general
framework for SPQA with multiple querying agents under OWA. An algorithm for lazy evalu-
ation is provided in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 proves some properties of envelopes that are useful
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in computing and updating envelopes, and in using envelopes to answer queries and considers
an interesting special case of communication graphs (inverted forests). Section 4.5 illustrates
an application of the framework and results of preceding sections to solve the SPQA problem
in the simple yet practically useful case of Propositional Horn KBs.
4.2 Multiagent Secrecy-preserving Framework
Let L be some appropriate (logic-based) description language which, for simplicity of nota-
tion, we also view as a set of sentences (viz., all sentences expressible in the language L). Let
L (or, just ) be a Tarski-style semantic entailment for L and suppose that `L (or, just `) is
an inference system for the language L that is sound and complete, with respect to .
For Γ ⊆ L, we write Γ+ = {α | Γ `L α} for the inferential closure of a set of formulas Γ
and we say that Γ is inferentially closed if Γ+ = Γ. A formula α ∈ L is a tautology if  α. The
set of all tautologies will be denoted by Taut.
Definition 4.2.1 A knowledge base (abbreviated, KB) over L is a triple K , 〈K,Q,Ω〉 where
• K is a consistent finite subset K ⊆f L. It represents the information that is explicitly
stored in K. K+ represents all the information (“knowledge”) that the KB K can infer.
In the sequel, we shall refer to both K and K as a knowledge base (KB).
• Q, the query space of K, is a subset: K+ ⊆ Q ⊆ L representing the set of all queries
that can be “legally” posed against K. We do not insist that Q = L which allows us to
account for possible restrictions that may be imposed on the querying agents.
• Ω, is the answer space. In most cases Ω = {Y,N,U} (for “Yes”, “No” and “Unknown”,
respectively). The “classical” answer space is Ω = {Y,N}.
Let K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 be a KB and let M = {M1, M2, ..., Mm} be an m-set of querying
agents who may pose queries to the KB. For each querying agent Mi there is a corresponding
secrecy set consisting of non-tautological statements which the KB is supposed to protect
against agent Mi. The querying agents may share the answers they obtain from K with other
querying agents. The sharing is constrained by means of a communication graph (M,A) which
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is an acyclic directed graph (except for all the self-loops) such that the existence of an edge
(Mi,Mj) ∈ A means that querying agent Mi shares with agent Mj all the non-U answers he
receives from the KB 1. As a technicality, we stipulate that the communication graph includes
all the self-loops; that is, for every Mi ∈M, (Mi,Mi) ∈ A.
Definition 4.2.2 A secrecy structure on a KB K is a triple S , 〈M,S,G〉 where
• M = {M1,M2, ...,Mm} is an m-set of querying agents who may pose queries to K,
• S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} is a collection of secrecy sets, one for each querying agent, where for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Si ⊆ K+ \ Taut, and
• G = (M,A) is a directed communication graph which is acyclic except for all the self-
loops.
Protection of secrets is accomplished by means of K-reasoner R : Q×M→ Ω, a reasoning
algorithm “attached” to K, which for a query q ∈ Q and a querying agent Mi ∈ M provides
an answer R(q,Mi) ∈ Ω back to Mi. For any B ∈ Ω = {Y,N,U}, we write QiB = {α ∈
Q | R(α,Mi) = B}, for the set of all Mi-queries to which the K-reasoner returns the answer
B; similarly, for any B ∈ {Y,N}, we write P iB =
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AQ
j
B, for the set of all B-queries
that agent Mi obtains from its predecessors. Note that, as stated above, an agent Mi ∈M can
pass to its successors only answers to queries in QiY or QiN ; for a query α ∈ QiU ∩ (P iY ∪ P iN ),
even though agent Mi can infer the answer to α, it is not allowed to pass that answer to
its successors. The following definition attempts to capture and formalize the whole secrecy
framework as discussed above.
Definition 4.2.3 A multi-agent secrecy-preserving query answering (MSQ) system is a triple
〈K,S,R〉 where
• K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 is a KB,
• S = 〈M,S,G〉 is a secrecy structure on K, and
1The case when an agent is allowed to share query-answers obtained from other agents instead of only answers
obtained from the KB can be reduced to the current problem by using the transitive closure of the communication
graph rather than the original graph.
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• R is a K-reasoner satisfying the following axioms: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
– [Yes-Axiom] QiY ⊆ K+;
– [No-Axiom] QiN = {¬α | α ∈ QiY };
– [Closure Axiom] (QiY )+ = QiY ;
– [Secrecy Axiom] (P iY )+ ∩ Si = ∅.
A K-reasoner satisfying the above four axioms is termed a secrecy-preserving reasoner.
The Yes-Axiom ensures that every Y -query is provable from K. The No-Axiom enforces a
match between the Y -queries and the N -queries. Note that the No-Axiom implies that QiU is
closed under negation: ¬QiU = QiU . The Closure Axiom requires that any consequence of a set
of Y -queries that a querying agent obtains from the KB be a Y -query, i.e., QiY is inferentially
closed. Finally, the Secrecy Axiom ensures that any combination of Y -answers that agent Mi
obtains from its predecessors does not compromise any secrets that need to be protected against
it. A trivial example of a secrecy-preserving reasoner is one which for every Mi ∈M and every
non-tautological query α ∈ Q, R(α,Mi) = U . At the other extreme, a reasoner R who answers
truthfully all queries except for α ∈ Si may fail to satisfy the Closure and/or Secrecy Axioms
and hence is not a secrecy-preserving reasoner.
Definition 4.2.4 Let K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 be a KB and S = 〈M, S,G〉 a secrecy structure on K. A
collection E = {E1, E2, ..., Em}, where for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Si ⊆ Ei ⊆ K+ \Taut, is called a (secrecy)
envelope for S if the following two axioms are satisfied for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
• [E1] for every α ∈ Ei, K+ \ Ei 2 α;
• [E2] for every α ∈ Si,
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+ \ Ej) 2 α.
The collection E is called a weak envelope for S if it only satisfies Axiom E2. A secrecy envelope
E is said to be tight if it satisfies an extra minimality axiom:
• [TE] for every Mi ∈M and every α ∈ Ei, there exist an edge (Mi,Mj) ∈ A and β ∈ Sj
such that
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \ Ek) ∪ {α}  β.
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Note that every envelope is a weak envelope. Given an envelope E = {E1, E2, ..., Em}, we
say that Ei is an envelope for the secrecy set Si. Axiom E1 requires that no information in
the envelope Ei is entailed from K
+ \ Ei. Axiom E2 ensures that no combination of query
answers obtained from an agent’s predecessors entails any secrets protected against this agent.
Axiom TE requires that none of the queries in any of the envelopes in E can be removed
without compromising the overall secrecy (not necessarily of its own secrecy set). Specifically,
answering α ∈ Ei with Y (instead of U) would allow one of Mi’s successors to conclude some
of the secrets that need to be protected against it using the information passed to it from its
predecessors. It is easy to see that (1) for each Mi ∈M, the complement of Ei is closed under
entailment, i.e., K+ \ Ei  α implies α ∈ K+ \ Ei; and (2) for each (Mj ,Mi) ∈ A, Si ⊆ Ej .
Lemma 4.2.5 If a weak envelope E = {E1, E2, ..., Em} for S is tight, then E is a tight envelope
for S.
Proof We need to show that E satisfies Axiom E1. Suppose, by contradiction, that there
exists α ∈ Ei s.t. K+ \ Ei  α. Since E satisfies Axiom TE, there exist an edge (Mi,Mj) ∈ A
and β ∈ Sj s.t.
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \ Ek) ∪ {α}  β. However, since K+ \ Ei  α, we have⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \Ek)  α, and so
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \Ek)  β. This contradicts the fact that
E satisfies Axiom E2. Therefore, E satisfies Axiom E1. Since E satisfies Axioms E1, E2 and
TE, it is a tight envelope for S.
Secrecy envelopes (as well as tight envelopes) are not unique. For example, E = {K+ \
Taut, ...,K+ \ Taut} is always a secrecy envelope.
Let K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 be a KB. For a secrecy structure S = 〈M,S,G〉 on K define a set of in-
duced single-agent secrecy structures, one for eachMi ∈M: Si = 〈{Mi}, {Si}, 〈{Mi}, {(Mi,Mi)}〉〉,
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let E′i be a (weak) envelope for Si (as per Definition 4.2.4) and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
define E∗i =
⋃
j:(Mi,Mj)∈AE
′
j . Even though E′ = {E′1, ..., E′m} need not be a (weak) envelope
for S, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.2.6 E∗ = {E∗1 , ..., E∗m} is a (weak) envelope for S.
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Proof To show that E∗ is an envelope for S, we need to verify that E∗ satisfies Axioms E1
and E2.
• [E1]: Suppose that for α ∈ E∗i , K+\E∗i  α. Then α ∈ E′j for some j with (Mi,Mj) ∈ A.
SinceK+\E∗i ⊆ K+\E′j , every model ofK+\E′j is a model of K+\E∗i , and soK+\E′j  α.
This contradicts the definition of E′j .
• [E2]: Suppose that for some i and α ∈ Si, we have
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+ \ E∗j )  α. This
is equivalent to K+ \ (⋂j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AE∗j )  α. By the definition of E∗, we have E′i ⊆⋂
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AE
∗
j . It follows that K
+ \ (⋂j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AE∗j ) ⊆ K+ \ E′i, and so every model
of K+ \ E′i is a model of K+ \ (
⋂
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AE
∗
j ). This implies that K
+ \ E′i  α,
contradicting the definition of E′i.
Note that by performing only local changes, Theorem 4.2.6 can be used to integrate existing
MSQs into one. The next theorem shows that given a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner, there is
a natural way to define a corresponding envelope.
Theorem 4.2.7 Given an MSQ system 〈K,S,R〉, define a set E′ = {E′1, E′2, ..., E′m} where
E′i = K
+ \ QiY (1 ≤ i ≤ m). Then E′ is a secrecy envelope for S.
Proof We need to show that E′ satisfies Axioms E1 and E2.
• [E1]: Suppose that there exist Mi ∈ M and α ∈ E′i such that K+ \ E′i  α. Since the
proof system ` is complete w.r.t. , we have QiY = (K+ \ E′i) ` α. It follows from the
Closure Axiom that α ∈ QiY , i.e., α ∈ K+ \ E′i. This contradicts α ∈ E′i.
• [E2]: Suppose that there is α ∈ Si s.t.
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A (K
+ \ E′j)  α. It follows from the
definition of E′i that
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AQ
j
Y  α. Since the proof system ` is complete w.r.t. ,
we have
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈AQ
j
Y ` α, i.e., P iY ` α. This contradicts the Secrecy Axiom.
The following theorem gives the opposite direction: given a KB and an envelope E, a
corresponding secrecy-preserving K-reasoner can be defined and the answer of a query α can
be obtained by checking whether α can be deduced from the KB and its membership status
w.r.t. E.
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Theorem 4.2.8 Let K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 be a KB, S = 〈M, S,G〉 a secrecy structure on K and
E = {E1, E2, ..., Em} a secrecy envelope for S. Define a function RE: Q×M→ Ω by
RE(α,Mi) =

Y if α ∈ K+ \ Ei,
N if ¬α ∈ K+ \ Ei,
U otherwise.
Then RE is a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner.
Proof We need to show that RE satisfies the four axioms.
• Yes-Axiom: By definition of RE, QiY = {α | α ∈ K+ \ Ei} = K+ \ Ei ⊆ K+.
• No-Axiom: By definition of RE, QiN = {α | ¬α ∈ K+ \ Ei} = {¬α | α ∈ K+ \ Ei} =
¬QiY .
• Closure Axiom: It suffices to show that (QiY )+ ⊆ QiY . By definition of RE, QiY =
K+ \ Ei. Suppose that QiY ` α and α /∈ QiY = K+ \ Ei. By the soundness of `, QiY  α
and α ∈ Ei. This contradicts Axiom E1 in Definition 4.2.4.
• Secrecy Axiom: Suppose that (P iY )+ ∩ Si 6= ∅. Let α ∈ Si s.t. P iY ` α. Then we have⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+ \Ej) ` α. Because of the soundness of `, we obtain
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+ \
Ej)  α. This contradicts our assumption that E is an envelope.
4.3 A Simple MSQ Algorithm - Lazy Evaluation
Given a KB K and a secrecy structure S, a natural way of defining a secrecy preserving
reasoner is to assume that queries are posed in an arbitrary but fixed order (history) H =
{(αk,Mik)}∞k=1 where for all k, 1 ≤ ik ≤ m. The history H is said to be full if for all
(α,Mi) ∈ Q×M, (α,Mi) belongs to H, i.e., all the queries are asked by every agent Mi ∈M.
When agent Mik poses a query, the reasoner takes into account its answers to previous queries
and responds (to Mik) according to whether or not a true answer may reveal secret information
to Mik or to one of its successors (via communication as per the given communication graph).
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This greedy approach is implemented in Algorithm 8. For the sake of simplicity of presentation,
the algorithm omits the actual responses to the querying agents and, instead, concentrates on
the construction of the sets QiY , QiN , and QiU . Note that when the history H is not full,
Algorithm 8 does not define a total function Q ×M → Ω and as such it is not a “true” K-
reasoner according to our definition. The next lemma shows that for a full history, Algorithm
8 defines a secrecy-preserving K-reasoner.
Algorithm 8 Lazy Evaluation Algorithm
Input: K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 and S = 〈M, S,G〉
Initialization:
For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let QiY = P iY = QiN = P iN := ∅, QiU :=
⋃
j:(Mi,Mj)∈A Sj .
1: while true do
2: input α ∈ Q, Mi ∈M
3: if α /∈ QiY ∪QiN ∪QiU then
4: if K+ ∩ {α,¬α} = ∅ then
5: QiU := QiU ∪ {α,¬α}
6: else
7: let α¯ ∈ {α,¬α} such that K ` α¯
8: if there exists j where (Mi,Mj) ∈ A such that (PjY ∪ {α¯})+ ∩ Sj 6= ∅ then
9: QiU := QiU ∪ {α,¬α}
10: else
11: QiY := QiY ∪ {α¯}
12: QiN := QiN ∪ {¬α¯}
13: for all j where (Mi,Mj) ∈ A, PjY := PjY ∪ {α¯} and PjN := PjN ∪ {¬α¯}
14: end if
15: end if
16: end if
17: end while
Lemma 4.3.1 Given a knowledge base K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉, a secrecy structure S = 〈M,S, G〉
and a full query history H = {(αik ,Mik)}∞k=1, the lazy evaluation algorithm (Algorithm 8) is a
secrecy-preserving K-reasoner.
Proof We need to show that Algorithm 8 satisfies the four axioms in Definition 4.2.3. It is
easy to see that Yes-Axiom and No-Axiom are satisfied.
To show that the Secrecy Axiom is satisfied, we argue by induction on history of queries.
In the pre-query stage, for every i, P iY = ∅ and so, since Taut ∩ Si = ∅, (P iY )+ ∩ Si = ∅. Now
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suppose that the condition (PjY )+ ∩ Sj = ∅ holds for all j, and consider the next query α ∈ Q
posed by agent Mi. If K
+ ∩ {α,¬α} = ∅, then PjY does not change, and the above condition
is maintained. The same holds true if for some edge (Mi,Mj) ∈ A, (PjY ∪ {α¯})+ ∩ Sj 6= ∅.
So suppose that for all (Mi,Mj) ∈ A, (PjY ∪ {α¯})+ ∩ Sj = ∅. Then for (Mi,Mj) ∈ A,
PjY := PjY ∪ {α¯}. So with the new value of PjY , the same condition holds. Note that whenever
a query is assigned to be in QiY ∪ QiN ∪ QiU for some Mi ∈ M, it will not be re-evaluated for
Mi. Therefore, the property (P iY )+ ∩ Si = ∅ (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is an invariant of the algorithm. It
follows that the Secrecy Axiom is satisfied.
To show that the Closure Axiom is also satisfied, we assume that there is a query q ∈ (QiY )+
and q /∈ QiY . From q ∈ (QiY )+, we conclude K ` q. This means that when q was first queried by
Mi and evaluated (i.e., when q was not in QiY ∪QiN ∪QiU ), the scope of the execution was from
Lines 7-14. Moreover, in view that q /∈ QiY , the condition in Line 8 was satisfied. Hence, there
existed j where (Mi,Mj) ∈ A and β ∈ Sj s.t. (PjY ∪ {α})+ ∩ Sj 6= ∅. Therefore, there existed
β ∈ Sj such that PjY ∪ {α} ` β. Since q ∈ (QiY )+, QiY ` q and so
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈AQkY = P
j
Y ` β.
This contradicts the invariant of the algorithm. Hence, (QiY )+ ⊆ QiY . It then follows from the
fact that QiY ⊆ (QiY )+ that the Closure Axiom is satisfied.
By Theorem 4.2.7, E′ = {E′1, ..., E′m} with E′i = K+\QiY andQiY as computed by Algorithm
8 is an envelope. The next theorem shows that E′ is actually a tight envelope.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let 〈K, S, RH〉 be an MSQ system where RH is a K-reasoner resulting from
Algorithm 8 applied to a full history H. Define E = {E1, ..., Em} where Ei = K+ ∩ QiU for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then E is a tight envelope for S.
Proof By Lemma 4.3.1, for full history, the lazy evaluation algorithm is a secrecy-preserving
K-reasoner. It then follows from Theorem 4.2.7 that E = {E1, ..., Em} is an envelope. Suppose
that E is not tight. Then by Axiom TE, there exist Mi ∈ M and α ∈ Ei ⊆ QiU such that for
every edge (Mi,Mj) ∈ A and every β ∈ Sj , we have
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \ Ek) ∪ {α} 2 β. By
the soundness of `, we have ⋃k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K+ \ Ek) ∪ {α} 0 β, i.e., PjY ∪ {α} 0 β and hence
(PjY ∪{α})+∩Sj = ∅. Note that in this case, α¯ = α. So when α was posed as a query by agent
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Mi (for the first time), since K ` α and the condition in Line 8 is not satisfied, α should have
been added to QiY . However, this contradicts the choice of α ∈ QiU .
The lazy evaluation approach is rather simple, but as the number of queries increases,
the sets QiY get larger and checking condition in Line 8 takes longer time. Thus, answering
queries will tend to be more time consuming as the KB continues to operate. Therefore, as an
alternative, we propose to precompute an envelope and then utilize Theorem 4.2.8 to answer
queries. We formalize this idea in the next section.
4.4 Computing Envelopes
In this section, we provide a general approach to compute envelopes. Given a KB K and
a secrecy structure S, as indicated in Theorem 4.2.6 (and the paragraph before it), the basic
task is to construct an envelope for a single secrecy set. Our basic idea is to find a set of proof-
disrupting assertions (of secrets) and put these in an envelope. We utilize the normal inference
rules (that are native to the underlying language) and look for such disrupting formulas by
inverting the inference rules. Next we formalize these ideas.
For a given KB K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 and a formula α ∈ K+, we say that a finite set Γ ⊆f K+
is α-minimal if Γ  α and for every β ∈ Γ, Γ \ {β} 2 α. Let Fα = {Γ | Γ be α-minimal}. If
α needs to be protected, then at least one element in each set in Fα has to be protected so
that α cannot be entailed. Denote by φΓ an arbitrary but fixed element of a given set Γ. The
following theorem indicates a general way for obtaining an envelope for a secrecy structure.
Theorem 4.4.1 Given a secrecy structure S = 〈M,S,G〉 where S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define a sequence of sets where E0i = Si and Ek+1i = {φΓ | there is α ∈ Eki
and Γ ∈ Fα}. Let Ei =
⋃∞
k=0E
k
i and E
∗
i =
⋃
j:(Mi,Mj)∈AEj. Then E
∗ = {E∗1 , ..., E∗m} is an
envelope for S.
Proof For the given secrecy structure S, define a set of induced single-agent secrecy structures,
one for each Mi ∈ M: Si = 〈{Mi}, {Si}, 〈{Mi}, {(Mi,Mi)}〉〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. By Theorem 4.2.6,
it suffices to show that for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Ei is an envelope for Si. Suppose that for some α ∈ Ei,
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K+ \ Ei  α. Then there is a finite set Γ ⊆ K+ \ Ei s.t. Γ  α and Γ is α-minimal. Hence,
Γ ∈ Fα. According to the definition of Ei, there exists k such that α ∈ Eki . It follows that
φΓ ∈ Γ ∩ Ek+1i and so Γ ∩ Ei 6= ∅. This contradicts the fact that Γ ⊆ K+ \ Ei. Therefore, Ei
is an envelope for Si for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Since we have assumed that given a language L, ` is sound and complete w.r.t. , Theorem
4.4.1 in essence indicates a recursive procedure of computing an envelope (see an example in
Section 4.5). Once an envelope is computed, queries can be answered according to Theorem
4.2.8 without compromising secrecy, which is the basic goal of solving the SPQA problem.
As mentioned before, we would like to compute envelopes that are as small as possible so that
queries can be answered as informatively as possible. However, since given a language, deciding
a minimum envelope may be NP-hard (see Section 4.5), we aim at computing tight envelopes. In
general, when an envelope is finite, we could obtain a tight envelope by checking every formula
in the envelope to see whether removing it compromises any secrets. If it does, the formula
should be kept. Otherwise, it can be removed. After all the formulas in the original envelope
are checked, a tight envelope is obtained. When an envelope E = {E1, ..., Em} is infinite, we
may not obtain a tight envelope by removing assertions from it one by one. Given two weak
envelopes E = {E1, ..., Em} and E′ = {E′1, ..., E′m} for S, we say that E′ = {E′1, ..., E′m} is a weak
sub-envelope of E, denoted by E′ ⊆ E, if for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, E′i ⊆ Ei. A weak sub-envelope E′
of E is proper if there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that E′i ⊂ Ei. Let E′ and E be envelopes for S. If
E′ is a weak sub-envelope of E, then we say that E′ is a sub-envelope of E. We next show that
given an envelope E, there always exists a tight sub-envelope E′ of E.
Lemma 4.4.2 Given a KB K and a secrecy structure S on K, for every weak envelope E =
{E1, ..., Em} for S, if E does not contain a proper weak sub-envelope, then E is a tight envelope
for S.
Proof Since E does not contain a proper weak sub-envelope, for every Mi ∈ M and every
α ∈ Ei, there exist an edge (Mi,Mj) ∈ A and β ∈ Sj such that
⋃
k 6=i:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \ Ek) ∪
(K+\(Ei\{α}))  β. This amounts to
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+\Ek)∪{α}  β. Therefore, E satisfies
Axiom TE. It then follows from Lemma 4.2.5 that E is a tight envelope for S.
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Given a KB K and a secrecy structure S on K, for every weak envelope E for S, either it
has a sub-envelope E′, or it does not. In the latter case, E is a tight envelope for S by Lemma
4.4.2. Given a weak envelope E for S, let E = E0 ⊇ E1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ En ⊇ · · · be a descending chain
of weak envelopes for S where Ek = {Ek1 , ..., Ekm}(k ≥ 0). The next lemma holds.
Lemma 4.4.3
⋂∞
k=0 Ek = {
⋂∞
k=0E
k
1 , ...,
⋂∞
k=0E
k
m} is a weak envelope for S.
Proof Suppose that
⋂∞
k=0 Ek is not a weak envelope for S. Then
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+\⋂∞k=0Ekj ) 
α for some α ∈ Si. This means that there is a finite subset Φ ⊆f
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+ \⋂∞k=0Ekj )
such that Φ  α. Since Φ is finite, for some (large enough) n, Φ ⊆ ⋃j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K+ \ Enj ),
implying
⋃
j:(Mj ,Mi)∈A(K
+ \ Enj )  α. This contradicts the assumption that En is a weak
envelope for S.
A weak envelope E is minimal if it does not contain a proper weak sub-envelope. Let E be
a weak envelope for S and CE be the collection of all weak sub-envelopes of E. Since the binary
relation ⊆ between weak envelopes of a given E is a partial order on CE, by Lemma 4.4.3 and
(the dual of) Zorn’s Lemma, CE contains a minimal weak envelope E′. It follows from Lemma
4.4.2 that E′ is a tight envelope for S. Since every envelope is a weak envelope, this implies
that every envelope has a tight sub-envelope (for the same S).
Depending on the native inference system ` of a language, and/or properties of the com-
munication graph, some strategy may be designed to guide the computation of an envelope so
that when an envelope is constructed, it is tight. In what follows, we consider an example of a
communication graph that is an inverted forest (with self-loops) in which a strategy leads to a
tight envelope.
Definition 4.4.4 Given a formula α and a set D of formulas, for each Γ ∈ Fα, let ΓD =
Γ if Γ ∩ D = ∅ and ΓD = Γ ∩ D otherwise. Define Fα,D = {ΓD | Γ ∈ Fα}. For each
ΓD ∈ Fα,D, let φΓD be an arbitrary but fixed element in ΓD. Given a secrecy structure S =
〈M = {M1, ...,Mm}, {S1, ..., Sm}, 〈M,A〉〉 and a set D, define Ei[D] = {φΓD | α ∈ Si and
ΓD ∈ Fα,D}.
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For any set D, Ei[D] is a weak envelope for the induced single-agent secrecy structure Si:
If there is α ∈ Si s.t. K+ \ Ei[D]  α, then there is Γ ⊆f K+ \ Ei[D] s.t. Γ is α-minimal.
However, by Definition 4.4.4, there is φΓD ∈ Γ s.t. φΓD ∈ Ei[D], implying Γ ∩Ei[D] 6= ∅. This
contradicts the fact that Γ ⊆f K+ \ Ei[D]. Thus, Ei[D] is a weak envelope for Si.
Lemma 4.4.5 Given a KB K and a secrecy structure S = 〈M = {M1,M2}, {S1, S2}, 〈M,A〉〉
on K where A = {(M1,M1), (M2,M2), (M1,M2)}, define two induced single-agent secrecy
structure: Si = 〈{Mi}, {Si}, 〈{Mi}, {(Mi, Mi)}〉〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ 2). Suppose that E2 is a tight
envelope for S2. Let E1[E2] be obtained from Definition 4.4.4. Suppose that E1 ⊆ E1[E2] is a
tight envelope for S1. Then E∗ = {E∗1 , E∗2} where E∗i =
⋃
j:(Mi,Mj)∈AEj (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) is a tight
envelope for S.
Proof We first show that E∗ satisfies Axiom TE.
• For M2: Since E∗2 = E2 and E2 is a tight envelope for S2, for every α ∈ E∗2 , there exists
β ∈ S2 such that (K+ \ E∗2) ∪ {α}  β. Since E∗2 = E2 ⊆ E∗1 ,
⋃
k:(Mk,M2)∈A(K
+ \ E∗k) ∪
{α} = K+ \ (E∗1 ∩E∗2)∪ {α} = K+ \E∗2 ∪ {α}  β. This shows that Axiom TE holds for
M2.
• For M1:
– Consider α ∈ E∗1 ∩ E2 = E2. Since E2 is a tight envelope for S2, there exists
β ∈ S2 such that (K+ \ E2) ∪ {α}  β. Then
⋃
k:(Mk,M2)∈A(K
+ \ E∗k) ∪ {α} =
K+ \ (E∗1 ∩ E∗2) ∪ {α} = K+ \ E∗2 ∪ {α} = K+ \ E2 ∪ {α}  β.
– Consider α ∈ E∗1 \ E2 = E1 \ E2. Since E1 is a tight envelope for S1, there exists
β ∈ S1 such that K+ \ E1 ∪ {α}  β and K+ \ E1 2 β. Since α ∈ E1 ⊆ E1[E2],
by Definition 4.4.4, there exists a finite set Γ ⊆ K+ \E1 ∪ {α} such that α = φΓE2 ,
Γ  β and ΓE2 ∈ Fβ,E2 . If Γ ∩ E2 6= ∅, then α = φΓE2 ∈ E2 by the construction
of E1[E2] using Definition 4.4.4. However, this contradicts the assumption that
α ∈ E1 \ E2. Therefore Γ ∩ E2 = ∅. Moreover, since Γ ⊆ K+ \ E1 ∪ {α}  β, we
have (K+ \ E1) \ E2 ∪ {α}  β. Also, since
⋃
k:(Mk,M1)∈A(K
+ \ E∗k) = K+ \ E∗1 =
K+ \ (E1 ∪ E2) = (K+ \ E1) \ E2, we have
⋃
k:(Mk,M1)∈A(K
+ \ E∗k) ∪ {α}  β.
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These show that the TE condition holds for M1.
It follows from Theorem 4.2.6 that E∗ is a weak envelope. By Lemma 4.2.5, E∗ is a tight
envelope for S.
Theorem 4.4.6 Given a KB K and a secrecy structure S = 〈M, {S1, ..., Sm}, G = 〈M,A〉〉
on K where each node in G has only one successor besides itself, i.e., G is an inverted forest
with self-loops. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, in a bottom-up fashion according to G, define an envelope
Ei[Ej ] for an induced single-agent secrecy structure: Si = 〈{Mi}, {Si}, 〈{Mi}, {(Mi,Mi)}〉〉 as
per Definition 4.4.4, (Mi,Mj) ∈ A and Ej is a tight envelope for Sj. Suppose that Ei ⊆ Ei[Ej ]
is a tight envelope for Si. Then E∗ = {E∗1 , ..., E∗m} where E∗i =
⋃
j:(Mi,Mj)∈AEj is a tight
envelope for S.
Proof By Theorem 4.2.6, E∗ is a weak envelope. It suffices to show that E∗ satisfies Axiom
TE. Suppose, by contradiction, that there are Mi ∈ M and α ∈ E∗i s.t. for every j and every
β ∈ Sj where (Mi,Mj) ∈ A,
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \ E∗k) ∪ {α} 2 β. Consider (Mi,Mj) ∈ A where
i 6= j (when i = j the argument is easy). There are two cases:
• E∗i \Ej 6= ∅. By Lemma 4.4.5, for every α′ ∈ E∗i \Ej , there is γ ∈ Si s.t. K+\E∗i ∪{α′}  γ
(see proof of Lemma 4.4.5 case (ii) for M1). Since
⋂
k:(Mk,Mj)∈AE
∗
k ⊆ E∗i (in view that
(Mi,Mj) ∈ A), every model of K+ \
⋂
k:(Mk,Mj)∈AE
∗
k is a model of K
+ \ E∗i , and so
(K+ \⋂k:(Mk,Mj)∈AE∗k) ∪ {α′}  γ.
• E∗i \Ej = ∅, i.e., E∗i = Ej . By Lemma 4.4.5, {E∗i , Ej} is a tight envelope for the induced
two-agent secrecy structure: Sij = 〈{Mi,Mj}, {Si, Sj}, 〈{Mi,Mj}, {(Mi,Mi), (Mj ,Mj),
(Mi,Mj)}〉. Hence, for every α′ ∈ E∗i , there is γ ∈ Si ∪ Sj s.t. (K+ \ E∗i ) ∪ {α′}  γ or
(K+ \E∗i )∪ (K+ \Ej)∪{α′}  γ, i.e. (K+ \E∗i )∪{α′}  γ. Since
⋂
k:(Mk,Mj)∈AE
∗
k ⊆ E∗i ,
we have
⋃
k:(Mk,Mj)∈A(K
+ \ E∗k) ∪ {α′}  γ.
Both cases contradict the assumption that Axiom TE is not satisfied.
Note that both Lemma 4.4.5 and Theorem 4.4.6 consider communication graphs where each
node has only one successor besides itself. In both cases, for any node Mi, the computation of
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its envelope Ei is governed by the envelope Ej where (Mi,Mj) ∈ A so that as much information
in Ej is reused for Ei as possible and as less redundant information is put into Ei as possible.
In fact, Lemma 4.4.5 not only helps prove Theorem 4.4.6, but also is a special case of Theorem
4.4.6.
4.5 Horn MSQ System
In this section we illustrate multi-agent secrecy-preserving query answering in the context
of Horn knowledge bases. This is of some interest as Horn theories are widely used in AI and
Data Bases [97] and more recently KBs [98]. The main reason for this interest is that the
satisfiability and inference problems for Horn theories can be solved very efficiently [99]. In
fact, precisely for that same reason, non-Horn KBs are often “approximated” by Horn KBs
[100, 98].
Recall that a (propositional) Horn clause is a clause containing at most one positive literal,
i.e., generally, it is of the form: x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk → η where x1, x2, ..., xk are propositional names
(a.k.a. positive literals) and η is either a propositional name, in which case the Horn clause is
called a rule (or a definite clause), or it is ⊥, in which case it is called a constraint. In this
paper we shall have no further use of constraints. A Horn clause is called a fact if k = 0 and
η 6= ⊥, i.e. it consists of a single positive literal. We shall assume a single underlying inference
rule, the forward chaining, which is well-known to be sound and complete for Horn logic with
respect to the usual semantics of propositional logic,
Forward Chaining (FC):
{l1 ∧ l2 ∧ · · · ∧ lk → p}, l1, l2, ..., lk
p
where p, l1, l2, ..., lk are all propositional names.
A Horn KB is a triple K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 where K is a finite set of Horn clauses (no constraints),
Q is the set of all (relevant) facts (the query space), and Ω = {Y,N,U} is the answer space.
The set of clauses K can be further partitioned K = F ∪ R where F is the set of facts in K
and R is the set of rules in K. By F+ we will denote the set of all facts derivable by applying
108
the FC-rule with assumptions in F and the rules in R: F+ = {p | K `FC p and p is a fact}.
Obviously, if K is finite, so is F+.
Given a collection of querying agents M = {M1,M2, ...,Mm}, a corresponding collection
of secrecy sets S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, and a communication graph G we have a secrecy structure
S = 〈M,S,G〉. Note that the secrecy sets are subsets of F+. To compute an envelope for
S = 〈M,S,G〉, we can use the approach suggested in Theorem 4.2.6: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, com-
pute an envelope E1i for the induced single-agent secrecy structure Si = 〈{Mi}, {Si}, 〈{Mi},
{(Mi,Mi)}〉〉. Then, letting E∗i =
⋃
j:(Mi,Mj)∈AE
1
j , an envelope E∗ = {E∗1 , ..., E∗m} is obtained
for the secrecy structure S.
It remains to show how to compute an envelope for the single-agent secrecy structure
Si. We will use a methodology developed by the authors in [24]. The idea is to invert the
inference rules, in this case just the FC-rule, into new rules that enforce the intuitively obvious
requirement: whenever the conclusion of an inference rule is to be secret so must be at least
one of its premises. The inverted version of FC is denoted by FCI and it is formulated as
follows for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
FCI-rule:
p ∈ E′i, l1 ∧ l2 ∧ ... ∧ lk → p ∈ R, l1, l2, ..., lk ∈ F+ \ E′i
E′i := E
′
i ∪ {l}, for some l ∈ {l1, l2, ..., lk}
The actual computation of the envelopes proceeds by initializing E′ = {E′1, E′2, ..., E′m}
with E′i = Si (1 ≤ i ≤ m). The FCI -rule is then applied repeatedly until it is no longer
applicable. Denote by E1 = {E11 , E12 , ..., E1m} the resulting collection of the sets E11 , E12 , ...,
E1m. To prove the correctness of our procedure we must show that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, E1i is
an envelope for Si.
Claim 4.5.1 E1i is a secrecy envelope for Si.
Proof It suffices to show that E1i satisfies Axiom E1: for every α ∈ E1i , F+ \ E1i 2 α. Since
` is complete w.r.t. , we shall argue instead that for every α ∈ E1i , F+ \ E1i 0 α. First note
that for a fixed i, once a rule l1 ∧ l2 ∧ ...∧ lk → p ∈ R is used in an application of FCI -rule for
computing E1i , it is no longer applicable (for that fixed i). Thus, after at most |R| applications
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of the FCI -rule (for that i) the computation of the set E1i is complete. This means that for
any rule l1 ∧ l2 ∧ ...∧ lk → p ∈ R with l1, ..., lk ∈ F+ \E1i , p /∈ E1i and hence p ∈ F+ \E1i . This
implies the claim.
Since E∗ is an envelope, according to Theorem 4.2.8, a query can be safely answered by
checking whether it can provable from the given KB and its membership status w.r.t. E∗.
The envelope E∗ = {E∗1 , ..., E∗m} resulting from the single-agent “slices” in a manner indicated
above, need not be tight.
Example 4.5.2 Given a Horn KB K = 〈K,S,R〉 where K = 〈F = {l1, l2, s}, R = {l1 ∧
l2 → s}〉, S = 〈{M1, M2}, {S1, S2}, 〈{M1, M2}, {(M1,M1), (M2,M2), (M1,M2)}〉〉 and
S1 = S2 = {s}. Suppose that E11 = {s, l1} and E12 = {s, l2}. It is easy to check that E1i
is a tight envelope for Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2. Let E∗1 = E11 ∪ E12 = {s, l1, l2} and E∗2 = E12 . Then
E∗ = {E∗1 , E∗2} is an envelope for S. However, E∗ is not tight because we could remove l1 from
E∗1 and still have an envelope for S.
In fact, there are two tight envelopes for S: E∗1 = {{s, l1}, {s, l1}} and E∗2 = {{s, l2}, {s, l2}}.
As mentioned before, we aim at computing envelopes that are as small as possible. Un-
fortunately, the decision problem associated with finding a smallest cardinality envelope is
NP-complete. We specify the Minimum Envelope problem (ME ) by the pair 〈〈K,S〉, N〉 where
K = 〈K,Q,Ω〉 is a Horn KB, S = 〈M, S,G〉 is a secrecy structure for K and N is a positive in-
teger. The decision problem is to determine whether S has a secrecy envelope E = {E1, ..., Em}
satisfying |⋃1≤i≤mEi| ≤ N . It is easy to see that the problem is in NP as this only involves
checking that E satisfies the axioms E1 and E2.
We use the Hitting Set (HS) to show NP-hardness. Given a finite set X, a finite collection
of non-empty sets C = {C1, ..., Ck} ⊆ P(X) and an integer 0 ≤ N ≤ |X|, the problem is to
determine whether or not there is a subset Y ⊆ X such that |Y | ≤ N and for every C ∈ C,
C ∩ Y 6= ∅. Given such an instance of HS, we construct an instance of ME as follows:
• M = {M1}, a single querying agent;
• the communication graph consists of a single self-loop on M1;
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• S = {S1}, with S1 = {si | Ci ∈ C}, where si’s are new symbols;
• N ′ = N + |C|;
• K = F ∪R where F = X ∪ S1 and R = {l1 ∧ ... ∧ lr → si | Ci = {l1, ..., lr} ∈ C}.
Claim 4.5.3 C has a hitting set Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≤ N if and only if 〈K,S〉 has a secrecy
envelope E = {E1} such that S1 ⊆ E1 ⊆ F+ and |E1| ≤ N + |C|.
Proof Suppose that Y ⊆ X is a hitting set for C with |Y | ≤ N . Define the set E1 := Y ∪ S1.
Since Y ∩S1 = ∅, |E1| = |Y |+ |S1| ≤ N+ |C|. Moreover, for every C ∈ C, C∩Y 6= ∅. Therefore,
none of the rules in K can be used in applying the FC-rule to F+ \E1. It follows that E1 is a
secrecy envelope for S.
Conversely, let E = {E1} be a secrecy envelope for S such that S1 ⊆ E1 ⊆ F+ and
|E1 \ S1| ≤ N . By Axiom E1 and the soundness of the FC-rule, this implies that for every
α ∈ E1 : F+ \ E1 0FC α. We show that the HS instance C = {C1, ..., Ck} ⊆ P(X), together
with an integer 0 < N ≤ |X|, has a hitting set of size at most N . Define Y := E1 \ S1. It now
suffices to show that for every Ci ∈ C, Y ∩Ci 6= ∅. Let Ci = {l1, ..., lr}; by the definition of the
reduction, this implies that l1 ∧ ... ∧ lr → si belongs to R. If none of the lj(1 ≤ j ≤ r) belongs
to Y , then they all belong to F+ \Y and hence also to F+ \E1 because Ci∩S1 = ∅. Therefore,
F+ \ E1 `FC si ∈ E1, which leads to a contradiction.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Many applications require a KB that contains secrets to answer queries using secrets, when-
ever it is possible to do so, without revealing secrets. We considered this problem under the
OWA in a setting with multiple querying agents, where associated with each agent is a secrecy
set that the KB is obliged to protect from it, and the agents can selectively share the answers
that they receive with other agents. We introduced the notion of a secrecy envelope and prove
some results that are helpful in computing and updating the envelope, and for using the enve-
lope to protect secrets while answering queries. We also provided a strategy for constructing
tight envelopes in the interesting special case where the communication graphs are inverted
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forests. We illustrated an application of this general approach in the case of propositional Horn
KBs.
We have assumed that the secrecy sets are finite. It would be interesting to consider how
to relax cases where secrecy sets have finite descriptions that can be expressed in a suitable
policy language. Other interesting directions for future work include consideration of more
expressive communication graphs e.g., those that place additional restrictions on the answers
that can be shared between agents e.g., by attaching predicates to edges, and design of efficient
algorithms for constructing and maintaining envelopes and answering queries using envelopes
for KBs based on tractable yet practically useful knowledge representation languages.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This dissertation focuses on developing techniques to answer queries posed to KBs. The
first topic we studied is query answering in KBs that contain epistemic information. This topic
is presented in Chapter 2. The second topic (Chapters 3 and 4) we studied requires autonomous
entities or organizations to be able to selectively share information without disclosing sensitive
information. We investigate techniques for secrecy-preserving query answering against KBs
under the OWA. We consider two scenarios of increasing difficulty: (a) a KB queried by a
single agent; and (b) a KB queried by multiple agents where the secrecy policies can differ
across the different agents and the agents can selectively communicate the answers that they
receive from the KB with each other subject to the applicable answer sharing policies. Specific
contributions are listed below:
• In Chapter 2, we studied ALCKm and ALCS4m, knowledge representation languages
obtained by augmenting ALC with modal operators of the basic multi-modal logics Km
and S4m. The resulting logics allow us to represent and reason about the knowledge of
multiple experts. We developed sound and complete tableau algorithms ΛK and ΛS4 for
answering queries w.r.t. corresponding knowledge bases with acyclic TBoxes.
Instead of general concept inclusions allowed in KALC [40] which lead to a NEXPTIME
algorithm for satisfiability, the acyclicity restriction on the TBoxes is critical to achieving
the PSpace implementations for both algorithms. Our PSpace results for the satisfia-
bility of ALCKm and ALCS4m extend the result of Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka [2] for
the satisfiability and subsumption of ALC concepts.
• In Chapter 3, we studied the problem of answering queries against a knowledge base that
contains secret information. Based on the OWA, we designed reasoners that hide truthful
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answers to the queries that if faithfully answered, may compromise the secrecy. One such
reasoner was designed using the lazy evaluation. Since this approach becomes less and
less appealing over time, we proposed to maintain a secrecy system that precomputes an
envelope. Once an envelope is present, a query will be truthfully answered if it is outside
the envelope. A general framework for the solution to the problem was provided. We
discussed the relationship between a secrecy-preserving reasoner and an envelope. We
applied the general framework to the Description Logic EL and provided an algorithm
for constructing an envelope. To answer queries as informatively as possible, we aimed to
make envelopes as small as possible. Since computing the smallest envelope in EL is also
NP-complete, we have presented two algorithms for computing tight envelopes: a naive
algorithm and an optimized version, procedure Tight. We compared the complexities of
these two algorithms, designed experiments and concluded that the optimized algorithm
indeed is more efficient for applications whenever the sizes of the TBox and the secrecy
set are much smaller than that of the ABox, which is typical in many applications.
• In Chapter 4, we extended the general framework for secrecy-preserving query answering
problem in the single-agent case to multiple querying agents where a knowledge base
contains secret information for each agent and the agents are allowed to share query an-
swers in a constrained fashioned. We designed a secrecy-preserving reasoner that answers
queries without compromising the overall secrecy, analyzed the relationship between a
secrecy-preserving reasoner associated with a KB and a secrecy envelope used to protect
secrets, and discussed a special case of restricted communication for constructing tight
envelopes. The idea of constructing envelopes was illustrated using Horn KBs.
There are several directions for extending this dissertation.
• For the first topic, Baader et al. [57] have recently extended the PSpace result of [2] to
ALC with transitive and inverse roles. In light of this result, we conjecture that query
answering against SIKm, obtained by replacing ALC (in ALCKm) with SI (ALC aug-
mented with transitive and inverse roles), can also be implemented in PSpace. Another
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direction would be investigating algorithms for the satisfiability of ALCS5m whose syntax
is identical to that of ALCKm, but whose semantics is based on the modal logic S5m.
• For the second topic in single-agent case, strategies may be designed to specify secrets
(policy specifications) and generate secrecy sets in an automated way. For example,
a policy like “Whether or not a patient x is at risk of developing cancer must be kept
secret” specifies a requirement about a whole range of assertions which must be protected
(rather than a single assertion). This is rather different than most of the work on policy
languages for the web which focuses on specifying syntax-based restrictions on access to
specific resources or operations on the web (see Section 3.7).
• In the multiagent case, one direction could be applying our multiagent framework to
specific DLs such as ALC. Another direction would be to make the communication graph
more flexible and realistic. For instance, we could add restrictions on the information
sharing by putting predicates on the edges of the communication graph, or allow more
general graph structures (not necessarily DAG with self-loops).
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
A.1 Additional Material for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
Theorem 2.3.3 (Soundness of the expansion rules) Given a Kripke structure M = 〈S, pi,
E1, ..., Em〉 and an acyclic TBox T where M  T , let G be a constraint graph, α a local, global
or terminological expansion rule and Gα a constraint graph obtained by applying α to G. If
M  G via σ, then there exists a semantic extension Mα of M|NΣ∪OG s.t. Mα  Gα via σ′
(which extends σ) and Mα  T . Furthermore, Mα  G.
Proof Assume the hypotheses.
1. If α is a u-rule, then there is a constraint a : C1 u C2 ∈ L(n) in G and {a : C1, a : C2} *
L(n). After applying u-rule, L(n) = L(n)∪{a : C1, a : C2}. By Definition 3, a : C1uC2 ∈
L(n) implies (M, σ(n))  C1 u C2(a). It follows that api(σ(n)) ∈ (C1 u C2)pi(σ(n)), which
means that api(σ(n)) ∈ Cpi(σ(n))1 and api(σ(n)) ∈ Cpi(σ(n))2 . Hence, (M, σ(n))  C1(a) and
(M, σ(n))  C2(a). Thus, Gα obtained by application of u-rule from G is satisfied by M
via σ.
2. If α is a unionsq-rule, then there is a constraint a : C1 unionsq C2 ∈ L(n) in G and {a : C1, a : C2} ∩
L(n) = ∅. By Definition 3, (M, σ(n))  C1unionsqC2(a) and therefore api(σ(n)) ∈ (C1unionsqC2)pi(σ(n)).
This means that api(σ(n)) ∈ Cpi(σ(n))1 or api(σ(n)) ∈ Cpi(σ(n))2 . Hence, (M, σ(n)) satisfies C1(a)
or C2(a) (or both). It follows that unionsq-rule can be applied in a way such that Gα is satisfied
by M via σ.
3. If α is an ∃-rule, then there is a constraint a : ∃R.C ∈ L(n) in G. Since (M, σ(n)) 
∃R.C(a) (by Definition 3), there must be an element d ∈ ∆ such that (api(σ(n)), d) ∈
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Rpi(σ(n)) and d ∈ Cpi(σ(n)). After applying the ∃-rule, a fresh individual name c is picked
and L(n) := L(n) ∪ {(a, c) : R, c : C}. Define the interpretation pi′ as pi except for the
fresh individual name c: cpi
′(σ(n)) = d. The resulting Gα is satisfied by Mα via σ where
Mα = 〈S, pi′, E1, ..., Em〉 is a semantic extension of M|NΣ∪OG .
4. If α is a ∀-rule, then there is a node n with {a : ∀R.C, (a, b) : R} ⊆ L(n) and b : C /∈ L(n).
By Definition 3, a : ∀R.C ∈ L(n) implies (M, σ(n))  ∀R.C(a), which means that for all
d ∈ ∆, (api(σ(n)), d) ∈ Rpi(σ(n)) implies d ∈ Cpi(σ(n)). Moreover, (a, b) : R ∈ L(n) implies
(M, σ(n))  R(a, b), which means (api(σ(n)), bpi(σ(n))) ∈ Rpi(σ(n)). After applying the ∀-rule,
b : C is added to L(n). The resulting Gα is satisfied by M via σ.
5. If α is a ♦C-rule, there is a constraint a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) in G and n does not have an
i-successor l such that a : C ∈ L(l). By Definition 3, a : ♦iC ∈ L(n) implies (M, σ(n)) 
♦iC(a) which means that there is a world s with (σ(n), s) ∈ Ei and api(s) ∈ Cpi(s). After
applying the ♦C-rule, a new node n′ is generated with L(n′) = {a : C} and L(n, n′) = {i}.
Extend σ to σ′ such that σ′(n′) = s. M satisfies the resulting Gα via σ′.
6. If α is a C-rule, then there are two nodes n and n′ in G such that i ∈ L(n, n′), a : iC ∈
L(n) and a : C /∈ L(n′). By Definition 3, a : iC ∈ L(n) implies (M, σ(n))  iC(a)
which means that for all s with (σ(n), s) ∈ Ei, (M, s)  C(a). It follows that (M, σ(n′)) 
C(a). After applying the C-rule, a : C ∈ L(n′). Gα obtained from G is satisfied by M
via σ.
7. If α is a T-rule, then there is a constraint a : A ∈ L(n), a definition A .= D ∈ T and
a : D /∈ L(n). After applying α, L(n) = L(n) ∪ {a : D}. Since M  G and M  T ,
api(σ(n)) ∈ Api(σ(n)) = Dpi(σ(n)). Therefore, (M, σ(n))  D(a) and hence, M  Gα via σ.
8. If α is an N-rule, then {a : ¬A, a : B} ∩ L(n) 6= ∅, A .= ¬B ∈ T and {a : ¬A, a :
B} * L(n). Since M  G and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  A .= ¬B and therefore
api(σ(n)) /∈ Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ Bpi(σ(n)). Because only one of a : ¬A and a : B is in
L(n), after applying the N-rule, the other constraint is added to L(n) and it is satisfied
by (M, σ(n)). Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
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9. If α is an Nu-rule, then a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= B1uB2 ∈ T , and a : ¬B1unionsq¬B2 /∈ L(n). Since
M  G and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  ¬A(a), (M, σ(n))  A .= B1 u B2 and therefore
api(σ(n)) /∈ Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ (B1 uB2)pi(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ ∆ \ (Bpi(σ(n))1 ∩Bpi(σ(n))2 )⇔
api(σ(n)) ∈ (∆ \ Bpi(σ(n))1 ) ∪ (∆ \ Bpi(σ(n))2 ) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ (¬B1)pi(σ(n)) ∪ (¬B2)pi(σ(n)). This
means that api(σ(n)) ∈ (¬B1 unionsq ¬B2)pi(σ(n)). After applying α, a : ¬B1 unionsq ¬B2 ∈ L(n) and
it is satisfied by (M, σ(n)). Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
10. If α is an Nunionsq-rule, then a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= B1unionsqB2 ∈ T , and a : ¬B1u¬B2 /∈ L(n). Since
M  G and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  ¬A(a), (M, σ(n))  A .= B1 unionsq B2 and therefore
api(σ(n)) /∈ Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ (B1 unionsqB2)pi(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ ∆ \ (Bpi(σ(n))1 ∪Bpi(σ(n))2 )⇔
api(σ(n)) ∈ (∆ \ Bpi(σ(n))1 ) ∩ (∆ \ Bpi(σ(n))2 ) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ (¬B1)pi(σ(n)) ∩ (¬B2)pi(σ(n)). This
means that api(σ(n)) ∈ (¬B1 u ¬B2)pi(σ(n)). After applying α, a : ¬B1 u ¬B2 ∈ L(n) and
it is satisfied by (M, σ(n)). Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
11. If α is an N∃-rule, then a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= ∃R.B ∈ T , and a : ∀R.¬B /∈ L(n). Since
M  G and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  ¬A(a), (M, σ(n))  A .= ∃R.B and therefore
api(σ(n)) /∈ Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ (∃R.B)pi(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ {c ∈ ∆ | ∃b : (c, b) ∈
Rpi(s) ∧ b ∈ Bpi(s)} ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ {c ∈ ∆ | ∀b : (c, b) ∈ Rpi(s) → b /∈ Bpi(s)} ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈
(∀R.¬B)pi(σ(n)). After applying α, a : ∀R.¬B ∈ L(n) and it is satisfied by (M, σ(n)).
Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
12. If α is an N∀-rule, then a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= ∀R.B ∈ T , and a : ∃R.¬B /∈ L(n). Since
M  G and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  ¬A(a), (M, σ(n))  A .= ∀R.B and therefore
api(σ(n)) /∈ Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ (∀R.B)pi(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ {c ∈ ∆ | ∀b : (c, b) ∈
Rpi(s) → b ∈ Bpi(s)} ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ {c ∈ ∆ | ∃b : (c, b) ∈ Rpi(s) ∧ b /∈ Bpi(s)} ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈
(∃R.¬B)pi(σ(n)). After applying α, a : ∃R.¬B ∈ L(n) and it is satisfied by (M, σ(n)).
Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
13. If α is an N♦-rule, then a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= ♦iB ∈ T , and a : i¬B /∈ L(n). Since
M  G and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  A .= ♦iB, (M, σ(n))  ¬A(a) and therefore
api(σ(n)) /∈ Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ (♦iB)pi(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ ∆ \ (♦iB)pi(σ(n)) where ∆ \
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(♦iB)pi(σ(n)) = ∆ \
⋃
t∈Ei(σ(n))B
pi(t) =
⋂
t∈Ei(σ(n))(∆ \ Bpi(t)) =
⋂
t∈Ei(σ(n))(¬B)pi(t) =
(i¬B)pi(σ(n)). Hence, api(σ(n)) ∈ (i¬B)pi(σ(n)). After applying α, a : i¬B is added into
L(n) and is satisfied by (M, σ(n)). Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
14. If α is an N-rule, then a : ¬A ∈ L(n), A .= iB ∈ T , and a : ♦i¬B /∈ L(n). SinceM  G
and M  T , we have (M, σ(n))  A .= iB, (M, σ(n))  ¬A(a) and therefore api(σ(n)) /∈
Api(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) /∈ (iB)pi(σ(n)) ⇔ api(σ(n)) ∈ ∆\(iB)pi(σ(n)) where ∆\(iB)pi(σ(n)) =
∆\⋂t∈Ei(σ(n))Bpi(t) = ⋃t∈Ei(σ(n))(∆\Bpi(t)) = ⋃t∈Ei(σ(n))(¬B)pi(t) = (♦i¬B)pi(σ(n)). Hence,
api(σ(n)) ∈ (♦i¬B)pi(σ(n)). After applying α, a : ♦i¬B is added into L(n) and is satisfied
by (M, σ(n)). Therefore, M  Gα via σ.
It follows that after the application of every expansion rule, the resulting constraint graph Gα is
satisfied by Mα which, except after applying an ∃-rule, is the same as M. When α is an ∃-rule,
Mα differs from M only in the interpretation of the newly picked individual name. Therefore,
T is valid in Mα. Since Mα is a semantic extension of M restricted to NΣ ∪ OG, it is obvious
that Mα satisfies the constraint graph G.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3.5
Lemma 2.3.5 Let T be an acyclic TBox and let G be an open complete constraint graph w.r.t.
local, global and terminological expansion rules. Then for every A ∈ NC and every a ∈ ∆,
a : ¬A ∈ L(n)⇒ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
Proof There are two cases, and for both, since G is open, a : A /∈ L(n).
(1) When A ∈ Θ, a : ¬A ∈ L(n) ⇒ a : A /∈ L(n) ⇒ a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n) 
¬A(a). The first implication is due to the fact that G is open. The second implication is
by Definition 2.3.4 and the rest equivalences are because of the semantics.
(2) When A /∈ Θ, i.e., there is a definition A .= D ∈ T , we will prove by induction on the
structure of D. For the base case where the concept names involved in D are elements in
Θ, we have the following cases:
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1. D is of the form ¬B where B ∈ Θ. Since G is complete, a : B ∈ L(n). By Definition
2.3.4, a ∈ Bpi(n) ⇔ a /∈ (¬B)pi(n). Since G is open, a : ¬A ∈ L(n) ⇒ a : A /∈ L(n).
However, Api(n) = {b | b : A ∈ L(n)} ∪ (¬B)pi(n). This implies that a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈
(¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
2. D is of the form B1uB2 where {B1, B2} ⊆ Θ. Since G is complete, a : ¬B1unionsq¬B2 ∈
L(n) and a : ¬B1 or a : ¬B2 is in L(n). W.l.o.g., suppose a : ¬B1 ∈ L(n). Since
G is open, a : B1 /∈ L(n). Because B1 ∈ Θ, a /∈ Bpi(n)1 ⇔ a ∈ (¬B1)pi(n) ⇒ a /∈
(B1uB2)pi(n). However, Api(n) = {b | b : A ∈ L(n)}∪ (B1uB2)pi(n) and a : A /∈ L(n).
Hence, a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
3. D is of the form B1 unionsq B2 where {B1, B2} ⊆ Θ. Since G is complete, a : ¬B1 u
¬B2 ∈ L(n) and {a : ¬B1, a : ¬B2} ⊆ L(n). Since G is open, a : B1 /∈ L(n) and
a : B2 /∈ L(n). Because {B1, B2} ⊆ Θ, a /∈ Bpi(n)1 and a /∈ Bpi(n)2 ⇔ a /∈ (B1unionsqB2)pi(n).
However, Api(n) = {b | b : A ∈ L(n)} ∪ (B1 unionsq B2)pi(n) and a : A /∈ L(n). Therefore,
a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
4. D is of the form ∃R.B where B ∈ Θ. Since G is complete, a : ∀R.¬B ∈ L(n) and
for every b, (a, b) : R ∈ L(n) ⇒ b : ¬B ∈ L(n). Suppose (a, b) : R ∈ L(n). Then,
b : ¬B ∈ L(n), and since B ∈ Θ and G is open, we have b /∈ Bpi(n). Moreover, since
R ∈ NR, we have (a, b) ∈ Rpi(n). It follows that for every b, (a, b) ∈ Rpi(n) ⇒ b /∈
Bpi(n). So a ∈ (∀R.¬B)pi(n) and therefore a /∈ (∃R.B)pi(n). However, Api(n) = {c | c :
A ∈ L(n)} ∪ (∃R.B)pi(n) and a : A /∈ L(n). Hence, a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔
(MG, n)  ¬A(a).
5. D is of the form ∀R.B where B ∈ Θ. Since G is complete, a : ∃R.¬B ∈ L(n) and
there exists b s.t. (a, b) : R ∈ L(n) and b : ¬B ∈ L(n). Since B ∈ Θ and G is
open, we have b /∈ Bpi(n). And since R ∈ NR, we have (a, b) ∈ Rpi(n). Therefore,
there exists b s.t. (a, b) ∈ Rpi(n) ∧ b /∈ Bpi(n). Thus, a ∈ (∃R.¬B)pi(n) and hence,
a /∈ (∀R.B)pi(n). However, Api(n) = {c | c : A ∈ L(n)}∪ (∀R.B)pi(n) and a : A /∈ L(n).
Therefore, a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
6. D is of the form ♦iB where B ∈ Θ. Since G is complete, a : i¬B ∈ L(n) and for
120
each n′ with i ∈ L(n, n′), a : ¬B ∈ L(n′). Since B ∈ Θ and G is open, we have
a /∈ Bpi(n′) whenever i ∈ L(n, n′). Therefore, we have a ∈ ⋂n′∈Ei(n)(¬B)pi(n′) ⇔ a ∈
(i¬B)pi(n) ⇔ a /∈ (♦iB)pi(n). However, Api(n) = {b | b : A ∈ L(n)} ∪ (♦iB)pi(n) and
a : A /∈ L(n). Hence, a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
7. D is of the form iB where B ∈ Θ. Since G is complete, a : ♦i¬B ∈ L(n) and
there exists n′ s.t. i ∈ L(n, n′) and a : ¬B ∈ L(n′). Since B ∈ Θ and G is open, we
have a /∈ Bpi(n′). Therefore, we have a ∈ ⋃n′∈Ei(n)(¬B)pi(n′) ⇔ a ∈ (♦i¬B)pi(n) ⇔
a /∈ (iB)pi(n). However, Api(n) = {a | a : A ∈ L(n)} ∪ (iB)pi(n) and a : A /∈ L(n).
Hence, a /∈ Api(n) ⇔ a ∈ (¬A)pi(n) ⇔ (MG, n)  ¬A(a).
Note that for the first five cases, the correctness of the implication a : ¬A ∈ L(n) ⇒
(MG, n)  ¬A(a) depends on the fact that the constraint graph G has no applicable local
or terminological expansion rules. For the last two cases, the correctness of the implication
depends on the fact that G has no applicable global or terminological expansion rules.
The induction step is similar to the corresponding base case, except that in the general
case, in order to show that a /∈ Dpi(n), we use the induction hypothesis rather than relying
on the membership in Θ when none of the concept names occurring in D belong to Θ, and
we use both induction hypothesis and the membership in Θ when some of the concept
names occurring in D belong to Θ and some don’t.
A.1.3 An Example for Footnote 2
One may wonder what would happen if the terminological expansion rules go from left to
right for definitions involving modalities (to avoid backtracking) and go from right to left for
definitions that do not involve modalities. It turns out that using this approach causes the
tableau algorithm to become incomplete as is illustrated in Example A.1.1.
Example A.1.1 Consider a set of expansion rules that contains (i) local and global expansion
rules as given in Fig. 2.1, and (ii) terminological expansion rules that contain the T-, N♦-, and
N-rules as given in Fig. 2.2. Suppose that there are also five other rules (corresponding to the
N-, Nu-, Nunionsq-, N∃- and N∀-rules in Fig. 2.2) that examine the right-hand sides of definitions
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in the TBox. For example, the rule “If there is a node n with {a : B1, a : B2} ∩ L(n) 6= ∅, A .=
B1unionsqB2 ∈ T , and a : A /∈ L(n), then L(n) := L(n)∪{a : A}” corresponds to the Nunionsq-rule in Fig.
2.2. Now consider a Tbox T = {A .= C1 unionsq C2, C1 .= ♦1B} and a constraint tree G containing
the constraint systems L(n0) = {a : ¬A, a : 1B, b : ♦1C} and L(n1) = {b : C, a : B} where
1 ∈ L(n0, n1). With respect to this set of expansion rules, G is complete and open. Suppose
that there is a model M  G via σ and M  T . Then we have (M, σ(n1))  B(a) and
E1(σ(n0), σ(n1)), which implies (M, σ(n0))  ♦1B(a). Since M  T and C1 .= ♦1B ∈ T , we
have (M, σ(n0))  C1(a). Furthermore, because M  A .= C1 unionsq C2, we have (M, σ(n0))  A(a).
However, the fact that M  G and a : ¬A ∈ L(n0) implies that (M, σ(n0))  ¬A(a), and this
contradicts (M, σ(n0))  A(a). Hence, there does not exist a model that satisfies G. Thus, due
to the inability to generate a : ¬A in L(n0), this set of expansion rules fails to detect a potential
clash.
A.2 Additional Material for Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of Observation (f3)
f3. For all a ∈ Of \ OΣ, if a was introduced via an application of the ∃A2 -rule to an assertion
∃r.C(b), then for any D ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ Af}, C v D ∈ T f .
Proof We prove this by induction on the application of the assertion expansion rules. Let A′
(A′′) be the ABox before (after) the application of an expansion rule. We assume that for any
individual a ∈ Of \ OΣ and for all D ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ A′}, C v D ∈ T f and we argue that
C v E ∈ T f for all E ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ A′′}. The base case is when a was just introduced as
a result of applying the ∃A2 -rule to ∃r.C(b) and no other rule was applied yet. Then we have
{C ′ | C ′(a) ∈ A′} = {C} and obviously, C v C ∈ T f .
If thevA-rule is applied to an assertion E(a) where E ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ A′} and E v F ∈ T f ,
then we add F (a) ∈ A′′. By IH, C v E ∈ T f . It follows that C v F ∈ T f .
If the uA-rule is applied to assertions E1(a), ..., Ek(a) where E1, ..., Ek ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ A′}
and E1u· · ·uEk ∈ SubE, then we have E1u· · ·uEk(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, C v Ei ∈ T f (i = 1, ..., k).
It follows that C v E1 u · · · u Ek ∈ T f .
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If the ∃A2 -rule is applied to an assertion ∃r.E(a) where ∃r.E ∈ {D′ | D′(a) ∈ A′}, then
a fresh individual c and new assertions, r(a, c) and E(c), are introduced. Since for every
b ∈ Of \OΣ where b 6= c, {D′ | D′(b) ∈ A′} = {D′ | D′(b) ∈ A′′}, the claim holds for individual
b. For the fresh individual c, we have {C ′ | C ′(c) ∈ A′′} = {E} and obviously, E v E ∈ T f .
If the ∃A1 -rule is applied to assertions r(a, c), E(c) ∈ A′, then ∃r.E(a) ∈ A′′ and ∃r.E ∈
{D′ | D′(a) ∈ A′′}. Since a ∈ Of \ OΣ, it follows from (f1) that c ∈ Of \ OΣ and so, in
view of r(a, c) ∈ A′, the individual c was introduced as a result of applying the ∃A2 -rule to an
assertion, say ∃r.F (a) ∈ A′. By IH, C v ∃r.F ∈ T f and F v E ∈ T f . It then follows that
C v ∃r.E ∈ T f .
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4.3
Theorem 3.4.3 (Soundness of the Assertion Expansion Rules) Let Af be an assertionally
closed ABox obtained from Σ by applying the tableau algorithm Λ. For any C ∈ C ∩ SubE and
any a ∈ Of , if C(a) ∈ Af , then for every model I = 〈∆, ·I〉 of Σ, there is a semantic extension
of INΣ that satisfies C(a). In particular, if a ∈ OΣ, then Σ  C(a).
Proof Let I = 〈∆, ·I〉 be an arbitrary model of Σ. We need to show that after applying each
of the expansion rules, there is a semantic extension of INΣ that satisfies the new assertion(s)
being added to Af . We prove this by induction on the construction of Af . The base case is
when C(a) ∈ A. Since I is a model of Σ, so is INΣ , and hence INΣ satisfies C(a). For the
induction step, we use A′, O′ and I ′ = 〈∆, ·I′〉 to denote the ABox before the application
of an expansion rule, the set of individual names appearing in A′, and a model of 〈A′, T 〉,
respectively, where, by IH, I ′ = I ′NΣ∪O′ is a semantic extension of INΣ . We also denote by A′′
the ABox after the application of the expansion rule and by O′′ the set of individual names
appearing in A′′. Note that in the first three cases below, O′′ = O′.
1. If vA-rule is applicable, then C(a) ∈ A′, C v D ∈ T f and D(a) /∈ A′. After applying
the rule, D(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, C(a) ∈ A′ implies that aI′ ∈ CI′ . Since C v D implies
CI′ ⊆ DI′ , we have aI′ ∈ DI′ . It follows that the newly added assertion D(a) is satisfied
by I ′.
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2. If uA-rule is applicable, then {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A′, C1u· · ·uCk(a) /∈ A′ and C1u· · ·u
Ck ∈ SubE. After applying the rule, C1 u · · · uCk(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, aI′ ∈ CI′i (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
which implies aI′ ∈ CI′1 ∩ · · · ∩ CI
′
k = (C1 u · · · u Ck)I
′
. It follows that I ′ satisfies the
newly added assertion C1 u · · · u Ck(a).
3. If ∃A1 -rule is applicable, then {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A′, ∃r.C ∈ SubE and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A′. After
applying the rule, ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A′ implies that (aI′ , bI′) ∈ rI′
and bI′ ∈ CI′ . It follows that aI′ ∈ (∃r.C)I′ . So, I ′ satisfies the newly added assertion
∃r.C(a).
4. If ∃A2 -rule is applicable, then ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′, a is not blocked and for all b ∈ O′, {r(a, b),
C(b)} * A′. In applying the rule, a fresh individual name c is introduced and after the
application, {r(a, c), C(c)} ⊆ A′′. By IH, ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′ implies that there is an individual
d ∈ ∆ such that (aI′ , d) ∈ rI′ and d ∈ CI′ . We define an interpretation J such that
cJ = d and JNΣ∪O′ = I ′NΣ∪O′ . Let O′′ := O′ ∪ {c}. It is obvious that JNΣ∪O′′ is a
semantic extension of I ′NΣ∪O′ and we have (aJ , cJ ) ∈ rJ and cJ ∈ CJ .
Next we show that if a ∈ OΣ, then Σ  C(a). The fact that a ∈ OΣ implies that C(a) can
only be obtained by an application of the vA-, uA-, or ∃A1 -rule. There are two cases: (a) If
C(a) is obtained through a sequence of applications of the assertion expansion rules without
the ∃A2 -rule from A, since at each step, no new individual is created, the semantic extension
of I is itself, and hence C(a) is satisfied by I. Since I is an arbitrary model of Σ, we have
Σ  C(a). (b) If in the sequence of applications of obtaining C(a), the ∃A2 -rule has been applied
to an assertion D(a), in view that a ∈ OΣ, by (f3) and the (EX)-rule in [59], D v C ∈ T f .
Therefore, C(a) could have been obtained from C(a) by an application of the vA-rule. It then
follows from case (a) that Σ  C(a).
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.4
To prove the completeness of Λ, we define a canonical interpretation JAf = 〈∆, ·J 〉 for the
assertionally closed ABox Af as follows:
• ∆ := Of ;
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• aJ := a, for every a ∈ Of ;
• AJ := {a | A(a) ∈ Af} where A ∈ NC ∩ SubE;
• rJ := {(a, b) | r(a, b) ∈ Af or r(c, b) ∈ Af where c ∈ Of blocks a and is not blocked by
other individuals}
• JAf is extended to all of SubE as usual.
Because of blocking, some assertions of the form ∃r.C(a) ∈ Af may not have a witness
d ∈ Of such that {r(a, d), C(d)} ⊆ Af . In this case, the canonical interpretation of ∃r.C is
obtained by utilizing an individual, say c, that blocks a and is not blocked by other individuals.
Then we have {∃r.C(c), r(c, b), C(b)} ⊆ Af for some b ∈ Of . The individual b can be used as
an r successor of the individual a when constructing the interpretation of ∃r.C and therefore
a becomes an element of (∃r.C)J . This is reflected in the definition of rJ .
Lemma A.2.1 For every concept C ∈ C ∩ SubE and for every individual a ∈ Of , C(a) ∈
Af ⇔ JAf  C(a).
Proof (=⇒) Assume that C(a) ∈ Af . We argue by induction on the structure of C. The base
case is when C ∈ NC ∩ SubE. By the definition of JAf , aJ ∈ CJ and hence JAf  C(a).
If C = C1 u · · · u Ck, by the computation of SubE, Ci ∈ SubE (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Since Af is
assertionally closed, {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ Af due to the vA-rule. By IH, Ci(a) ∈ Af ⇒ JAf 
Ci(a)⇒ aJ ∈ CJi , 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Hence aJ ∈ CJ1 ∩ · · · ∩CJk = (C1 u · · · uCk)J = CJ . Therefore,
JAf  C(a).
If C = ∃r.C1, there are two cases:
• ∃r.C1(a) has a witness b ∈ Of such that {r(a, b), C1(b)} ⊆ Af . Then by the definition of
JAf , (aJ , bJ ) ∈ rJ . By IH, bJ ∈ CJ1 . It follows that aJ ∈ (∃r.C1)J = CJ and hence,
JAf  C(a).
• ∃r.C1(a) does not have a witness b ∈ Of such that {r(a, b), C1(b)} ⊆ Af . Then there
must exist an individual c ∈ Of that blocks a and {r(c, d), C1(d), ∃r.C1(c)} ⊆ Af for
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some d ∈ Of . By the definition of JAf , (aJ , dJ ) ∈ rJ . By IH, dJ ∈ CJ1 . It follows that
aJ ∈ (∃r.C1)J = CJ . Therefore, JAf  C(a).
(⇐=) It suffices to show that for every concept C ∈ C ∩ SubE and individual a ∈ Of , if
C(a) /∈ Af , then JAf 2 C(a). We again argue by induction on the structure of C. The base
case is when C ∈ NC ∩ SubE. If C(a) /∈ Af , by the definition of JAf , aJ /∈ CJ . Therefore,
JAf 2 C(a).
If C = C1 u · · · u Ck, then since Af is assertionally closed, C(a) /∈ Af implies {C1(a), ...,
Ck(a)} * Af due to the uA-rule. So there is a Ci such that Ci(a) /∈ Af , 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By IH,
JAf 2 Ci(a). It follows that aJ /∈ CJi and hence aJ /∈ CJ1 ∩· · ·∩CJk = (C1u· · ·uCk)J = CJ .
Therefore, JAf 2 C(a).
If C = ∃r.C1, then since Af is assertionally closed, C(a) /∈ Af implies that there does
not exist an individual b ∈ Of such that {r(a, b), C1(b)} ⊆ Af due to the ∃A1 -rule. By the
definition of rJ and IH, for every b ∈ Of , either (aJ , bJ ) /∈ rJ or bJ /∈ CJ1 . It follows that
aJ /∈ (∃r.C1)J = CJ and hence, JAf 2 C(a).
Corollary A.2.2 In the canonical interpretation JAf , for every C ∈ C ∩ SubE, CJ = {b ∈
Of | C(b) ∈ Af}.
Lemma A.2.1 says in effect that the canonical interpretation is a model of the ABox Af .
Next lemma shows that JAf is also a model of the TBox T f .
Lemma A.2.3 For all concepts C,D ∈ C ∩ SubE, C v D ∈ T f ⇒ JAf  C v D.
Proof The claim is an easy consequence of the vA-rule and Lemma A.2.1. For any subsump-
tion C v D ∈ T f and any a ∈ Of , C(a) ∈ Af ⇒ D(a) ∈ Af by the vA-rule. By Corollary
A.2.2, CJ = {b ∈ Of | C(b) ∈ Af} and similarly for DJ . It follows that CJ ⊆ DJ .
Theorem 3.4.4 (Completeness) Let SubE be the set of subexpressions obtained from a KB
Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite set of assertions S (see Section 3.4.1). Let Af be an assertionally
closed ABox obtained from Σ by applying the tableau algorithm Λ. Then for every concept
C ∈ C ∩ SubE and for every individual a ∈ Of , Σ  C(a)⇒ C(a) ∈ Af .
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Proof Suppose that C(a) holds in all models of Σ. By Lemma A.2.1, the canonical interpreta-
tion JAf is a model of Af and hence of A. By Lemma A.2.3, JAf is a model of T f and hence
of T . It follows that C(a) holds in JAf . By Lemma A.2.1, C(a) ∈ Af .
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